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Abstract
This thesis comprises three chapters. All chapters have a common theme which at i t’s 
base deals with how interactions in social non-market contexts may shape individual and 
aggregate economic outcomes.
Chapter 1 entitled ’’Whom Should I Observe?” , studies a model of observational 
learning in the context of a simple learning problem. Players have heterogeneous prefer­
ences over outcomes. A player can leaxn about the underlying outcome distribution by 
observing one other player. We characterise optimal link formation. The main result is 
that some players prefer to form a link with a player who experiments with actions that 
they are not willing to experiment with themselves. This is interpreted as an informa­
tional micro-foundation for a preference for diversity. Applications are discussed.
Chapter 2 is entitled ’’Are Gifts-in-Kind Inefficient?” . It is often argued that gifts- 
in-kind are inefficient transfers (Waldfogel 1993). We study a model of partnership 
formation, where players have incomplete information about the desirability of the part­
nership. Prior to the players simultaneously deciding whether to form the partnership, 
one player gets a signal of the partner’s type and can send gifts, which may be either 
a gift-in-kind or cash. The model has multiple equilibria. Under certain conditions the 
efficient equilibrium payoffs involves the transfer of gifts-in-kind. The reason is that 
gifts-in-kind reveals more to the receiver about the giver’s beliefs about the receivers 
type than do other transfers. An evolutionary argument, in the spirit of Kim and So- 
bel (1995), is given. In the long run the efficient equilibrium is played with positive 
probability.
Chapter 3 entitled ’’Revisiting Schelling’s Spatial Proximity Model” formalises the 
model of Schelling (1969, 1971) of interaction in one-dimensional neighbourhoods. We 
show, via numerical simulations, that the rest points of the adaptive process tends to 
select neighbourhood configurations which are relatively segregated in the aggregate. We 
test the robustness of rest points to the introduction of noise in the adaptive process. 
The long run prediction is that complete segregation occurs. The model is simulated 
and results show that the wait until the stochastic process reaches the set of segregated 
states increases rapidly in the size of the population. Variations, with better long run 
properties, are suggested and analysed. We also analyse a model where residents have 
a strict preference for integration. Nevertheless the only stochastically stable states are 
segregated. We test the robustness of this prediction by allowing for heterogeneity in
2preferences. Interestingly this turns the prediction on it’s head: only integrated states 
are stable. Schelling’s original model is robust to this pertubation.
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In recent years economics have according to some started to encroach or colonize the 
other social sciences. It is certainly true that the methodology of economic analysis is 
being applied to explain a much wider range of social phenomena than was previously 
the case. Other mechanisms for allocating resources, apart from the market, is being 
increasingly recognized. To name but a few the “market” for marriages and social 
learning and experimentation in networks of say consumers. Psychological phenomena 
are also attracting increasing attention by economist.
To some extent at least I believe this is due to the success of non-cooperative game 
theory, as a general methodology for the analysis of strategic interaction.
The chapters contained in this thesis can be viewed as another attem pt to expand 
the domain of economics. In particular they explore such social phenomena as a step 
toward the analysis of network formation in a heterogenous population, the practice 
of gift giving as the foundation for building good social interaction, and the aggregate 
phenomenon of segregation of neighbourhoods.
Much empirical evidence has by now been brought to light tha t suggests that informal 
networks of connections between agents, play a major role in determining individual 
and aggregate economic outcomes. Granovetter (1995 [1975]) was perhaps the first to 
document empirically that informal contact networks play a crucial role in determining 
the allocation of jobs. As a more general observation, this is very important lesson. There 
is usually no market and no direct price for contacts or network connections, instead our 
choice of what education to take, where to live, what to wear etc. determines to some 
extent whom we socialise with, form friendships with, and thus from whom we hear about 
products, jobs, education opportunities, investment opportunities. Information passed 
through networks can be thought of as either providing information about new choices
12
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or actions (such as information about new jobs, products etc.) or more information 
about choice or actions that the decision maker is already aware of (such as information 
from neighbours about their experiences with an already known product). The reason 
why networks are useful is first and foremost that we have incomplete information about 
what is available and that we face uncertainty over the outcome distribution associated 
with a particular choice. But there is no reason for why economics should not have 
anything to say about networks, how they are formed and changes over time in response 
to the underlying economic conditions.
Chapter 2 explores an information based approach to endogenous link formation. 
We study a model of observational learning in the context of a simple learning problem. 
In particular we consider a 2-period bandit problem, where the bandit has either two or 
three arms. Players have heterogeneous preferences over outcomes. A player can learn 
about the underlying outcome distribution by observing one other player. We consider 
two informational settings. One in which the observing player is able to both observe 
the action and the outcome of the player she is observing, and a setting in which she 
is only able to observe the action. We characterise whom it is optimal to observe. The 
main result is that some players prefer to form a link with a player who experiments 
with actions that they are not willing to experiment with themselves. This is interpreted 
as an informational micro-foundation for a preference for diversity.
Chapter 3 examines a particular social institution: gift giving. The institution of 
gift giving is an almost universal cultural institution among human beings. Economic 
anthropologists have documented the existence of large network based exchange systems 
such as the Kula Ring in Micronesia studied by Stanislav Malinowski (Malinowski 1978). 
Mauss (1990) produced a general study of the role that gifts have in human society, not­
ing that gift giving is a “total social phenomenon” . In spite of gift giving being such a 
widespread economic phenomenon only little interest has been taken in it by economists. 
Camerer (1988) was the first to use game theoretic tools to analyse a gift giving game. 
Most effort in economics has however been devoted to exploring the efficiency properties 
of gift giving practices. Waldfogel (1993) argues that gift giving practices around Christ­
mas is very inefficient. He estimates a welfare loss between 10% to 33% of the value 
of the gifts given as valued by the recipients. However Waldfogel’s approach is in my 
view too reductionist. In particular he ignores exactly as pointed out by Mauss that gift 
giving is a total social phenomenon. It may be that some gifts are given not as a direct 
transfer from the giver to the receiver, but that gifts are given in order to facilitate social 
interaction. The chapter studies a model of partnership formation, where players have
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incomplete information about the desirability of the partnership. Prior to the players 
simultaneously deciding whether to form the partnership, one player gets a signal of the 
partner’s type and can send gifts, which may be either a gift-in-kind or cash. In general 
the model has multiple equilibria. We show that under certain conditions the efficient 
equilibrium payoffs involves the transfer of gifts-in-kind. The reason is that gifts-in-kind 
reveals more to the receiver about the giver’s beliefs about the receivers type than do 
other transfers, and the additional informational value contained in gifts-in-kind may be 
sufficient to off-set the inefficiency associated with gifts-in-kind themselves. An evolu­
tionary argument, in the spirit of Kim and Sobel (1995), is given. In the long run the 
efficient equilibrium is played with positive probability.
In the final chapter we revisit the model neighbourhood interaction of Schelling (1969, 
1971). We formalise Schelling’s model for one-dimensional residential areas. We then 
test the robustness of equilibria to persistent shocks via stochastic stability (Young 1993), 
and show that the stochastically stable states are precisely the segregated states. We 
numerically simulate the model in order to check for the validity of the long run prediction 
of neighbourhood evoloution. For reasonable noise levels the wait until the segregated 
states are reached is unacceptably long. We suggest various variations with better long 
run properties. We then assume that players have a preference for diversity, and show 
that the segregated states are the only stochastically stable states. Simulations reveal 
that the problem of waiting times is more severe in this case, and perhaps more worrying 
for reasonable levels of noise the process spends a significant amount time outside of the 
segregated states. We then suggest a model with better long run properties. Finally 
we introduce player heterogeneity to examine the driving force of segregation. We show 
that with the presence of just one “social activist” who is actively seeking out new 
opportunities for diverse neighbourhoods to form then the only stable configuration is 
the fully integrated state. I simulate the model to see how the presence of a few “social 
activists” can have a positive externality on other players. Interestingly Schelling’s 
original model is robust to this pertubation of the preferences of agents.
Chapter 2
W hom Should I Observe?
2.1 Introduction
Many elements of daily economic life involve an element of learning. Through experimen­
tation we learn what consumer goods we like, what projects to invest in, which jobs we 
like, where we like spending our holidays, etc. In daily interaction with social relations 
we often ask for and get given advice, or we merely observe how other people choose and 
we learn from their experiences. Our social acquaintances may have diverse experiences, 
perhaps due to differing social circumstances, or differences in tastes. At the same time 
we are often constrained in how many of our acquaintances we can gather information 
from. Thus we are faced with a choice problem: Whom to observe? Observing people 
similar to oneself, could lead to better information about choice alternatives that we are 
already optimistic about. On the other hand observing people who are dis-similar may 
provide valuable information about choice alternatives that we would not be willing to 
consider ourselves, in the absence of more information about these choices. The main 
aim of this paper is to construct a simple set of models, which allow us to study the 
question whether a decision maker prefers to observe the experiences of someone similar 
or dis-similar to herself.
Mankind’s evolutionary heritage suggests that we are social beings. Dunbar (1996) 
argues that the human brain is so large relative to our body mass because we must keep 
track of many social relations (Dunbar estimates that humans can keep track of about 
150 social relations). Socialising with others, and learning from observing their behav­
iour may be an important component in mankind’s celebrated adaptability. According 
to Social Learning Theory (Bandura 1977) people are able to learn from observing oth­
ers, not simply through imitating or mimicking behaviour, but adapting the observed
15
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behaviour to their own circumstances. This suggests that socialising may have an evolu­
tionary advantage to autarky. One of the advantages may be that we through observing 
what other people do receive information that make us able to make better informed 
decisions. This is the channel investigated in this paper. Is it an advantage to associate 
with people who have different tastes? People with different tastes will generally be 
choosing different alternatives. If such wide-ranging experimentation is important then 
associating with people that are dis-similar may be an advantage. One of the models 
presented in this paper will indeed deliver this insight. However the paper also high­
lights that observability plays a key role when choosing whether to observe similar or 
dis-similar players. The reason is this: if it becomes more difficult to infer whether 
you will like a particular alternative from observing the behaviour of others, then the 
importance of them being like you increases.
Empirical studies have highlighted the importance of social networks for diffusion 
of knowledge of new products, adoption of new technologies, educational choice, job 
opportunies, etc. Granovetter (1995 [1975]) studied how a sample of 282 recent job- 
changers in the Boston suburb of Newton heard about their current job. About 50% of 
the sample found their new job via referrals from acquaintances, friends and family, as 
opposed to more formal channels, such as newspaper adverts, etc. Coleman, Katz, and 
Menzel (1966) studied how adoption of a new medical drug, tetracycline, among physi­
cians in Illonis state, spread via informal network channels: a doctor who knew and had 
experimented with the drug and had a positive evaluation of the drug relative to similar 
drugs would recommend it to his colleagues and friends within the profession. Rapid 
adoption of the drug took place among physicians in the cities in the sample mediated 
by social networks. Brown and Reingen (1987) summarising earlier evidence find that 
word-of-mouth was the single most im portant source of information for 60% of the people 
sampled, in the choice of automotive diagnostic center and selection of physicians. Fos­
ter and Rosenzweig (1995) study how farmers adopt new crop varieties, relying on own 
experimentation and learning from observing the experiences of their neighbours. Topa 
(2001) estimates a model of job-contact networks between neighbourhoods in Chicago. 
Borjas (1995) estimates a model where individual human capital accumulation depends 
on the average human capital level in the neighbourhood.
In section 2.2 we study players faced with a two-armed bandit problem1, one safe arm 
with a known distribution of outcomes, and one risky arm with an uncertain distribution
1See Berry and Fristedt (1985) for a general and com prehensive study of Bandit Problem s.
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of outcomes. The problem is particularly simple in that conditional on the state the 
distribution of outcomes on the risky arm is degenerate. Prior to playing the bandit 
a player can observe one of her contact’s (or friends as we shall call them) experiences 
playing the bandit. The question we shall ask is: Whom among her friends should 
she observe? We assume that the player observing knows the cardinal preferences of 
her friends2. Learning from the experiences of others is useful in this context only if 
the environment is relatively stable, i.e. that the outcome distribution does not change 
too much between observation and play. For simplicity we assume that the outcome 
distribution is drawn at the start of the game by nature, and remains fixed throughout. 
Furthermore we assume that a player can only observe one of her friends3. We study 
two different informational settings: one where both the action taken in each period 
and the outcome is observable, and one where only the action is observable. The latter 
environment allows the observer to infer whether the player liked the risky outcome or 
not relative to the safe outcome, but in general she will not be able to infer the outcome 
itself.
The main insight of this section is that as the environment becomes increasingly 
less conducive to observation, i.e. when only actions are observable, the importance of 
associating with players that are similar becomes more im portant. The reason is that as 
the environment becomes less and less conducive to observation the player becomes more 
and more concerned about making inference errors, i.e. making wrong inference from 
observed behaviour. If players are similar then this becomes less of an issue. Although 
outcomes are not observable, the observing player can infer her own preference for the 
unknown outcome from observed behaviour. This is straightforward. A player with 
the same preferences over outcomes will be making the same decisions as the observing 
player would, was it her who was experimenting. In this sense the observing player can 
free-ride on the experimentation of her friends. Note that the argument also applies 
to players who have the exact opposite preferences over outcomes, since these players 
will always take the opposite decision of the observing player, but this is sufficient for 
inference purposes.
In section 2.3 we add one more risky arm to the bandit. The addition of a second risky 
alternative adds a second insight to the analysis. Some players may be concerned with 
wide-ranging experimentation, in the sense that ex-ante the player may be willing to
2This is equivalent to knowing the payoffs.
3W hile this is clearly a shortcut, in practice people often rely on a lim ited set of referrals (e.g. Brown 
and Reingen (1987) report that 82% of receivers of referrals for piano teachers had only one sender).
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consider both risky alternatives, but due to the nature of the decision problem, must 
choose between them. In this case some players may prefer to learn more about a risky 
alternative which is not their most attractive action ex-ante. The intuition relies on 
considering the marginal value of information of a risky alternative. Acquiring more 
information 011 a particular risky alternative is only valuable if it changes the ex-ante 
ordering of alternatives. The reason for this is the following. If the player favours a 
particular risky alternative over another risky alternative, and she receives information 
that her ex-ante preferred alternatives is indeed better, this has no value to her, since she 
would have learned this by experimenting with the alternative herself. More information 
about an alternative which is already ranked highest is only valuable if information is 
revealed that changes the ex-ante ordering, i.e. information which reveals that the 
alternative is not attractive.
A p p lica tio n s  The model can be interpreted as a framework for institutional design. 
One of the main insights of the model is that some players may benefit from interacting 
with players that are different from themselves in the sense tha t they are willing to try 
out risky alternatives which they are reluctant to try  themselves. I11 this sense we can 
interpret our results as an informational preference for diversity.
Many social institutions involves interaction within groups. From a designer per­
spective one can then ask whether interaction in heterogeneous groups is desirable to 
interaction in homogeneous groups? The insights of the model then has some interesting 
applications. Examples include the composition of student populations in schools, regu­
lation of and social programmes that affect the composition of housing markets (such as 
e.g. Movement-to-Opportunity Programmes, see also section 2.4 for further discussion 
of this point), the design of science parks, etc.
R e la te d  L ite ra tu re  The literature most closely related to this paper is the models 
of Bala and Goyal (1998) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1995). In Bala and Goyal (1998) 
players belong to a fixed network and can observe the actions and outcomes of her 
neighbours. In Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) a player receives a random sample of fixed 
size and observes the action and utility of players in her sample. The main distinction 
between these models and the model presented in this paper is that we assume that the 
player has some choice over whom she learns from.
Social learning in two-armed bandit problems is studied by Bolton and Harris (1999) 
and Cripps, Keller, and Rady (2002). Payoff realisations are publically observable. This 
leads to the usual incentive problems and underprovision of the public good (here ex-
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periinentation with a single risky alternative). Strategic free-riding is built directly into 
our model. By choosing to associate with players who are ex-ante willing to experiment, 
the observing player free-rides on their experimentation. Bolton and Harris (1999) also 
identifies an encouragement effect. This is a dynamic effect: a higher rate of experimen­
tation by a player today, induces a higher rate of experimentation by others tomorrow. 
This effect does not appear in our model. Since the player being observed does not 
move again after the observing player has moved, she has no incentives induce more 
experimentation. The encouragement effect would reappear in a model where players 
alternated playing the bandit.
Manski (2002a, 2002b) studies social learning, where the current generation tries 
to learn from observing the experiences of past generations. Current decision making 
suffers from the selection problem: decision makers today can only observe the outcome 
realisations of choices actually taken by past generations. Manski shows that some learn­
ing is possible as decision makers can sequentially exclude dominated actions. However 
whereas in Manski decision makers can observe a population sample of past experiences, 
our focus is on the choice of whom to observe from a group of players. Moreover our 
decision problem is dynamic, and allows for individual learning.
Finally, there is a literature which studies network formation as a game between 
players. In Bala and Goyal (2000) a link has a cost which one player must pay, whereas 
there is a fixed benefit of the link for both players. Bala and Goyal focus on the relation 
between equilibrium network structures and social efficiency. Goyal and Vega-Redondo 
(2000) study a related model, but instead of links having a fixed benefit a coordination 
game is played between linked players. They show that in equilibrium local conformity 
is obtained. This paper contributes to this literature on endogeneous network formation. 
It explores an alternate channel for forming links with other players: information trans­
mission between links. This paper studies this problem in the context of heterogeneous 
preferences. The papers mentioned above characterises the architecture of equilibrium 
networks. Our model makes no such attem pt, and instead seeks to give more structure 
to the underlying model of incentives to associate.
This paper is organised as follows. The basic model with two actions is presented and 
analysed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 looks at a model with three actions. Section 2.4 
offers some concluding remarks.
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2.2 One R isky A ction
2 .2 .1  M o d e l
T h e  U n d e rly in g  D ecision  P ro b le m  is a two-armed bandit problem with a risky (r) 
and a safe (s) action (the bandit in what follows). Nature picks a state w E O  = {1.2,3}. 
from a prior distribution p  G {q G R++ | XLew ^  ~  !}• The sta<:e is llot observed by the 
decision maker. At each time t = 1,2 the decision maker chooses an action at G {r. s}. 
If the state is uj and the risky action is chosen then the outcome is x .^. If the safe 
action is chosen then the outcome is x s irrespective of the state. The set of outcomes is 
X  =  {x \ . X2 - :r3. x*}.
D ecision  M ak ers  have a vNM -utility function u : X  —> R, in the set of u tility  functions 
U . If u G U then u has the following properties: (1) T he u tility  of the safe outcome: 
u ( x s )  =  0. (2) T here is at least one s ta te  u j  where the outcom e on the risky arm  yields 
g reater utility  than  the safe outcome: ^ (x ^ ) > 0. for some u; G i l .  and at least one 
s ta te  uj' wrhere the safe outcom e yields greater utility  th an  the outcom e on the risky 
arm: u ( x u;') <  0. for some u/  G D .u /  ^  uj. (3) If two risky outcom es x u and x^< yield 
greater u tility  th an  the safe outcom e then  u ( x u)) =  u ( x Lj>) >  0. A lternatively if the 
u tility  of the safe outcom e yields greater utility  th an  two risky outcomes x^ and x ut 
then  ^ (x ^ ) =  ^(Xy/) <  0. (1) is ju st a norm alisation, (2) is imposed to  make r  risky 
for all players, and (3) is m ade purely for tractability . W hen th is assum ption becomes 
binding for results, we shall comment on how this assum ption can be relaxed.
Fix a decision maker S ta tis tic ian ) with some utility-function a G U . We assume that 
S  has a non-empty set of friends, which is denoted F. There is a function: g : F  —> U, 
which maps a friend to a utility-function. We assume that S  knows g.
We now specify the game.
T h e  G am e
P e r io d  0: Nature picks a state of the world (unobserved by
the players) from the prior distribution p. The 
state remains fixed until the end of the game.
P e r io d  1: S  chooses to observe some /  among her friends,
f e F .
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P e rio d s  2 a n d  3: /  plays the bandit (a 2-period decision problem).
S  either observes the realised outcomes and actions 
or only the actions taken by / .
P e rio d s  4 an d  5: Given the information obtained from observing / ,
S  plays the bandit (a 2-period decision problem).
Players are Bayesian rational. A player’s objective is to maximise her expected sum of 
returns from the bandit. We look for a sequential equilibrium of the game. Note the 
assumption that the state remains fixed throughout the game.
2 .2 .2  W h o m  to  O b se rv e ?
We shall make two different assumptions about what S  can observe: either S  is able to 
observe both the outcomes and the actions tha t her friend takes, or she is only able to 
observe the actions that her friends take.
In each environment we will ask whether there are any friends which allows S  to 
achieve the first best, in the sense that after having observed the experiences of this 
friend S  will be able to infer her ex-post optimal action.
The ex-post optimal action maps a utility function and a state into the action which 
maximises the expected sum of returns,
a*(u,Lj) : U x —> A — {s,r}
If S  can infer the ex-post optimal action with probability one after having observed the 
behaviour of a friend /  G F  then /  is ideal:
D efin ition  1 (Ideal). A friend f  G F  is ideal if  S  can infer the ex-post optimal action 
with probability one after having observed how f  plays the bandit.
If S  has an ideal friend then she can achieve the first best.
We shall also be interested in the question of whom S  should observe if she cannot 
achieve the first best. This may occur for two reasons: either because the first best is 
not achievable, or because S  has no friends which allow her to achieve the first best.
We now solve the game.
H ow  F riends P lay  th e  B a n d it A strategy of a friend is a  G { v r }> and denotes the 
action to be taken in the first period, and when play in the second period is sequentially 
rational. If a — r then the player is experimenting. The worth of a strategy, a, is denoted
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W(a) .  An optimal strategy, a*, maximises the worth of the bandit among all possible 
strategies:
a* € argm axW (cr)<7
Fix a utility function u G U. Let fi =  5Z{w€Si|ti(x1u)>o} the prior probability that
the risky arm gives an outcome which is preferred to the safe outcome. Then we have:
r  if
s otherwise
where u is the utility of outcome(s) that are preferred to the safe outcome, and u is the 
utility of outcome(s) which are not preferred to the safe outcome. Note that if the player 
is indifferent between experimenting and choosing the safe alternative, then we assume 
that she experiments.
O bservab le  A ctions an d  O u tcom es
Partition the set of friends into experimenting friends: F(r)  
and friends who are not experimenting F( s ) =  F  \  F(r).
S  has E x p e r im e n tin g  F riends If S  has friends who are experimenting then these 
friends are ideal as the following proposition shows:
P ro p o s itio n  1 (Ts/ Best). Suppose Outcomes and Actions are Observable. I f  S  has 
experimenting friends, F(r) ^  0, then any friend f  £ F(r)  is ideal.
Proof. Suppose a friend /  is experimenting. Conditional on the state being ui the out­
come is for sure. Since outcomes are observable to S  she learns from observing /  
whether she likes the outcome on the risky action relative to the safe outcome with 
probability one in any state of the world. □
R e m a rk  1. The result relies on the assumption that outcomes are non-stochastic con­
ditional on the state, and that the state remains fixed throughout the game.
R e m a rk  2. From knowing g S  can deduce the optimal strategy of her friends. Con­
ditional on a friend being willing to experiment, her individual taste does not play a 
role.
S  has no E x p e rim en tin g  F rien d s If S  does not have any friends who are experi­
menting, then the result is:
CHAPTER 2. WHOM SHOULD I  OBSERVE? 23
P ro p o s itio n  2 (2nd Best). Suppose Outcomes and Actions are Observable. I f  S  has no 
experimenting friends, F  =  F(s),  then there are no benefits to observation.
Proof. If a friend /  is not experimenting, then she chooses the safe arm in both periods. 
Therefore S  receives no new information about the state of the risky alternative. □
O bservab le  A ctions
We now focus on the case where S  has a non-em pty set of friends who are experimenting, 
i.e. F(r) ^  0.
We partition the set of experimenting friends into friends tha t are preference-homophile 
(p-homophile): that is friends who like the same outcome(s) on the risky arm as S  (rel­
ative to the safe outcome) or who do not like the outcome whenever S  likes it (and vice 
versa), F (r, ~ ). Friends who axe contained in the complement: F (r , no) =  F(r)  \  F (r, ~ ) 
are preference-heterophile (p-heterophile)4.
When only actions are observable S  can only a ttem pt to infer from / ’s decision to 
stay with or switch away from the risky action, whether she will like the outcome. Thus 
she is concerned about not making inference errors. Observing experimenting friends 
with different preferences over outcomes will generate different information structures, 
but all have this generic form:
UJ uJ UJ
h 1 0 0
t2 0 Pu/ PCJPui' +Pw Pu>'+Pu
where uj. uj' and uj axe the possible states of the world. A signal realisation is whether /  
stayed with or switched away from the risky action in period 2 of her decision problem. 
An entry is the posterior belief about a state of the world, conditional on a signal 
realisation t G i , 2^ }-
S  has p -H om oph ile  F riends The following proposition establishes that if S  has friends 
that are p-homophile, then these friends are ideal. Moreover p-heterophile players are 
not ideal:
P ro p o s itio n  3 (1st Best). Suppose only Actions are Observable. A friend f  G F  is ideal
if and only if  f  is experimenting, f  G F (r) , and f  is p-homophile, i.e. f  G F(r, ~ ).
4T he terms homophile and heterophile  are used by Rogers (1983). Two people who are hom ophile 
share som e observed social characteristics, such as education, age and gender. If they do not share these  
characteristics then they are heterophile
CHAPTER 2. WHOM SHOULD I OBSERVE? 24
Proof. It follows from propositions 1 and 2 that a necessary condition for a player to be 
ideal, is that she is experimenting. Next note tha t from the action taken in the second 
period S  can infer whether /  likes the outcome of the risky action relative to the safe 
outcome.
Now consider p-homophile friends. If /  likes the same outcomes as S  then / ’s second 
period action is identical to the ex-post optimal action: a* — a<i( /) . If /  does not like the 
outcome whenever S  likes it (and vice versa) then the ex-post optimal action is identical 
to the action which is not played by /  in the second period of / ’s decision problem: 
a* = A \  0 2 ( f ) ■ This establishes that such players are ideal.
Friends who are p-heterophile are not ideal. Since /  and S  are p-heterophile, there 
is at least one state uo such that a*(S.uj) =  a*(f,uj),  and another state u j '  ^  u j such that 
a*(S,uj') ^  a*(f,co'). Wlog. assume that a*(f,uj) =  a * ( f . u ') =  r. Both u j and u/  has 
positive prior probability. Since S  only observes actions she cannot infer from observing 
0-2 {f) — t  whether the state is u j or u j1 , but a*(»S,ct;) 7  ^ a*(S,u' ) .  Hence S  cannot infer 
the ex-post optimal action with probability one. □
The intuition for the result is that when players are p-homophile then / ’s action to 
either stay with or switch away from the risky action in period 2 is sufficient to infer 
the ex-post optimal action. For players with the same ordinal preferences the action 
taken by /  in period 2 is perfectly positively correlated with the ex-post optimal action. 
For players with the opposite ordinal preferences the action taken by /  in period 2 is 
perfectly negatively correlated with the ex-post optimal action. This does not hold for 
p-heterophile players. Note that S's knowledge of / ’s cardinal preferences matters for 
identifying the optimal strategy of / .  Conditional an optimal strategy only ordinality 
m atters for inference.
<S has only  p -H ete ro p h ile  F riends Suppose S  can only choose among friends who 
are experimenting but which are p-heterophile. It follows from proposition 3 that no 
such players are ideal. S  no longer receives a signal realisation ( / ’s second period action) 
which is perfectly correlated with the ex-post optimal action, in every state of the world, 
instead in two states she receives a noisy (but informative) signal realisation.
In other words there are two states, u/  and u j , for which /  will take the same action 
in period two, but for S  the ex-post optimal action is not the same in both states.
Before stating the result observe that, given the prior p, if the action taken by S  
in the first period of her decision problem is independent of the signal realisation, then 
learning through observation has no value to her. Therefore we restrict attention to
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players for whom observation m atters for some possible information structure.
D efin ition  2 (Observation M atters). Observation matters to S  i f  there is at least one 
information structure where her period one action is not independent of the signal she 
receives.
This means that there must be some information which S  could recieve, which would 
make her change action. A more technical interpretation is that, for a fixed prior, we 
have imposed an upper and a lower bound on the utility of outcomes on the risky arm. 
We can now state the proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  4 (2nd Best). Suppose only Actions are Observable, and that Observation 
M atters to S . I f  S  can only observe f  E F(r),  such that no friends are p-homophile, i.e. 
V / : /  E F (r.* '), then S  optimally observes f  such that the prior probability of being 
able to infer the ex-post optimal action with probability one is maximised.
Proof. Let the signal realisation where the ex-post optimal action is known with proba­
bility one be t\, and the signal realisation when i t ’s not be ti-
Wlog. assume that the action taken after t \  is r  (identical to the ex-post optimal 
action), and the corresponding state is u j . Since observation m atters there is another 
state u j '  with support in t 2  such that the ex-post optimal action is r  but the action taken 
after t 2  is s. When t 2  is received and the state is u j '  then S  makes an inference error, 
denoted ew/, since the ex-post optimal action is r (and learning stops).
If t\ is received in state uj then the probability of making an inference error, ew/, is:
TV
<V =  — - —
TV T Pu
where a*(S,uj) = s , and if t\ is received in state u j '  then
Puj + P u
Clearly > ew/ iff >  p^ >. Hence the inform ation structu re  where t\ is received in 
s ta te  uj is optimal iff p u >  p ^ / . □
R e m a rk  3. Note that the argument is only complete because the cost of inference error 
are identical in states u j and u j '  (parametrised by ufx^f) =  u{x^) ) .
R e m a rk  4. Note that Blackwell's Sufficiency Criterion for Information Structures (see 
e.g. Kihlstrom (1984)) (which is an incomplete ordering) does not order the information 
structures.
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We now relax the assumption that the utility of the two different outcomes which 
are preferred to the safe outcome are identical.
T h e  M arg ina l V alue o f In fo rm a tio n  The m a r g i n a l  v a l u e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  is defined 
as the marginal increase in the value of the bandit as a result of receiving a particular 
information structure. As above assume that the ex-post optimal action in the states 
uj , uj' G is r, and s  in state uj. Assume that in the absence of learning through 
observation the optimal strategy is a* =  r .  Also assume that o b s e r v a t i o n  m a t t e r s  for S  
in both possible information structures. Then the marginal value of information if t \  is 
received in state uj is:
MVU = - p w'(2u(xw/)) -  pjjuixjj) > 0 
and if it is received in state u/ :
M V ui =  - p ^ ( 2 u ( x UJ))  -  pcju(xcj) >  0
hence MVU > M VU> if:
Pw'ufay) <  P*u{xj)
The marginal value of information in this case is tha t S  may switch behaviour to the 
safe action, when she does not know the state with probability one. The benefit of 
doing so is that x^  is avoided, the cost increases proportionally to the likelihood of the 
state (in the case where u(xw) =  ^(x^/)), and to the expected value of the state (when 
■u{xu ) ±  u { x u')).
R e m a rk  5. R e s u l t s  a r e  e a s i l y  e x t e n d e d  t o  a n y  f i n i t e  s e t  o f  o u t c o m e s .
2.3 Two Risky A ctions
2 .3 .1  M o d e l
T h e  U n d erly in g  D ecision P ro b le m  is a three-armed bandit problem with two 
risky (n  and r 2 )  and a safe ( s )  action (referred to as the b a n d i t ) .  Nature picks a state 
uj =  (UJ1 .UJ2 ) G x fl2 =  {T2} x {1,2}, from a prior distribution, p  =  (pi,P2 ), where 
Pi  G {q G K++ | YLueiii Qu =  1}) =  1) 2- We assume that the arms are independent. The 
state chosen by nature is unobserved by the decision maker.
At each time t  = 1,2 the decision maker chooses an action a t G { r i ,r 2 ,s}. If arm 
r-j is chosen and the state of arm is uj, then the outcome is x ^ ,  i  = 1,2. If the safe
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action is chosen then the outcome is x s independent of the state. The set of outcomes 
is X  =  { x n .X i 2 .X 2 l- X2 2 -Xs}.
D ecision  M akers have a vNM-utility function u : X  —> R, in the set of utility functions 
U. Furthermore any u E U satisfy the following properties: (1) The utility of the safe 
outcome: u(xs) = 0. (2) On each risky arm, r (, there is one outcome which is preferred 
to the safe outcome, and one which is not: u% =  u(xiu ) < 0 < u {x 1{jJ' )  = ut , for some 
w,u/ E Qi, uj ^  uj', i = 1,2
Fix a decision maker S  with some utility function u E U. We assume that S  has a 
non-empty set of friends, which is denoted F. There is a function g : F  —► U, which 
maps a friend to a utility function in U. We assume that S  knows g.
T h e  G am e is identical to the game studied in the section with two actions, we repeat 
it here for convenience.
P e rio d  0: Nature picks a state of the world (unobserved by
Players are Bayesian rational. A player’s objective is to maximise her expected sum of 
returns from the bandit. Again we look for a sequential equilibrium of the game. Note 
the assumption that the state remains fixed throughout the game.
2.3 .2  W hom  to  Observe?
As in the section with two actions we shall be asking whether there are friends which
the players) from the prior distribution p. The 
state remains fixed until the end of the game.
P e r io d  1: S  chooses to observe some /  among her friends, 
f e F .
P e rio d s  2 a n d  3: /  plays the bandit (a 2 -period decision problem). 
S  either observes the realised outcomes and actions 
or only the actions taken by / .
P e rio d s  4 an d  5: Given the information obtained from observing / ,  
S  plays the bandit (a 2 -period decision problem).
achieve the first best. We shall also characterise whom should be observed if the first
best is not achievable.
H ow  F riends P la y  th e  B a n d it A strategy a  G {5 , r \ , r 2 ) denotes the arm to be tried 
in the first period, and when play is sequentially rational. The worth of a strategy, a, is
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denoted, W (a). The optimal strategy <r* is the strategy which maximises the worth of 
the bandit among all possible strategies:
a* G argmaxVF(a)f7
Let fil be the prior probability that the outcome on arm is preferred to the safe 
outcome, i — 1,2. We characterise optimal strategies in the following lemma.
Let a period 2 history, h, be the outcome induced by a period 1 action, h G X .  By 
sequential rationality each possible history induces an optimal action to be taken in 
period 2, a(h) : X  —» A. Since period 2 is the final period, the optimal action is simply 
the action that maximises the myopic payoff in period 2 .
Fix a utility function u G U. The only non-trivial histories are histories where the period 
1 action was to experiment with a risky arm, i =  1 . 2 , but the outcome was worse 
than the safe outcome. Denote these two histories hi if the realised outcome was x ?u/. in 
period 1 and u(xlu!) < 0 , i = 1 , 2 .
Given the history h\ it is optimal to play T2  in period 2  iff:
otherwise s is the optimal action.
Equivalently the optimal action is r\ after history Ji2  iff:
_ ^  ( 1  -  hi)
U \  > --------------------U i  =  HL\
hi
and s otherwise. All other continuations are trivial.
We can now derive optimal strategies.
L em m a 1. The optimal strategy a* is given by:
1. I f  u\ < k,\ and U2  < «2 '
a
T2  otherwise
s if  u% < i =  1 , 2 .
if  ui > ^  and u 2  <
2- I f  u\ > K\ and U2  < K2 :
ri if  u 2  < 
r 2 otherwise
2^ 2
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3. I f  u\ < K\ and U2  > «2 -'
a =
if  n 2  <
V2  otherwise
4  ■ I f  u i > K i a n d  u 2 > k 2 :
a =
r\ if  
T2  otherwise
The following example illustrates optimal strategies for a given prior distribution 
over outcomes, and a given subset of utility functions.
E x am p le  1. Lemma 1 is illustrated in figure 2.1 for utility functions of the form: 





Figure 2.1: Optimal Strategies as characterised by lemma 1 in («n, U2 i)-space. Drawn for fixed 
W12 <  U22 < 0, U1 1 . U2 1 > 0 and prior pn — P21 — P- Yellow. Experimentation with To the 
right of vertical dashed line: willing to experiment with r\ in period 2 if T2 reveals X22 in period 
1. Lightgray: Experimentation with r\. Above horizontal dashed line willing to experiment with 
r2 in period 2 if r\ is reveals X12 in period 1.
O bservab le  O u tcom es a n d  A ctions
F riends W h o  a re  Id ea l The next proposition shows how ideal friends play the bandit:
P ro p o s itio n  5 (Is* Best). Suppose Outcomes and Actions are Observable, and that S ’ 
preferences satisify u{x luJi) =  ut > uj =  u{xJU)3) > 0, i , j  — 1,2, i 7  ^ j .  A friend f
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is ideal if-and-only-if cr*(f) = r, and after history h =  {x iuJ/}, ^  wi, f  takes action
a{h) = rj.
Proof. Wlog. assume that the most preferred outcome of S  is on arm ri and let this 
outcome be x iwi. Hence for S: u\ > u{x 2 ^2) =  W2 > 0 =  u (xs).
Consider observing a friend, / ,  such tha t a* =  r\ and after history h = {xlu/} ,  
the optimal action for /  is a(a;la/ )  =  r 2 . Such a friend is ideal by the following 
argument. If /  plays 7*2 in period 2, then S  learns the state of arm 7*2 , and hence whether 
the outcome on 7*2 is preferred to the safe outcome. Furthermore she knows that the 
outcome on r\ is not x iWl (otherwise /  would not have switched arm in period 2). Thus 
she learns that the ex-post optimal action. If /  also plays r\ in period 2, then S  knows 
that the ex-post optimal action is r\ (otherwise /  would have switched arm in period 
2). and ui > U2 - Hence S  learns the ex-post optimal action with probability one.
Now we establish that only such friends are ideal. Clearly any /  such that a* — s are 
not ideal.
Consider friends such that a* = 7*1 , but c*(:rla;/) =  s. Such friends are not ideal, 
since after h =  { x ^ j  } S  only learns that a*(<S) G { s ^ } .  A friend with optimal strategy 
a* = T2 , but a(h) =  s for some history h G {x2u2 x 2 uj'2 } not ideal since after history 
h either a*(S) =  {s,ri}  or a*(S) G
Now consider a friend /  such that a* =  7-2 and a (h ) =  r\ for some h G {£2 .^2, x 2 '^2}- 
First suppose h =  { a ^ } -  When the realised outcome on 7^  is x 2 u J '2 (as revealed by / ’s 
behaviour) then S  learns that a*(S) G {s,ri} . Then suppose h = {x2w'} . When the 
realised outcome is X2 u2 then learns that a* (S) G {7*1 ^ 2 }. Finally consider a friend 
/ ,  such that a* =  r\ but after h =  {.xiw} /  optimally plays ct{h) — 7-2 . Then after 
observing that the outcome is x iu)> on r\ then S  learns tha t a*{S) G {a-. 7 2 }. □
The intuition for the result is straigthforward. «S will only need to learn the state 
of both arms (in order to be able to infer the ex-post optimal action), in states of the 
world where the ex-post optimal action is not on the arm that /  experiments with in the 
first period. Thus /  should be willing to switch to the other risky arm in states where 
S  herself would want to switch away.
R e m a rk  6. Note that the characterisation in proposition 5 does not rely on the prior 
distribution.
R e m a rk  7. Note that by restricting the space of outcomes on each risky arms to two, 
we lose the distinction between p-homophile and p-heterophile. In essence all friends
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are, conditional on a particular arm, p-homophile. Note however that if  a friend is ideal 
it is no longer sufficient that she is p-homophile she must have the same ordering as S  
on the risky alternative she experiments with in period 1 .
E x am p le  2. The characterisation of ideal friends given in proposition 5, is illustrated 
in figure 2.2. for the same utility function and prior distribution as in example 1. We 
have superimposed the characterisation on figure 2 . 1  characterisering optimal strategies 
with no learning through observation.
45°
Figure 2.2: Ideal friends in (tin,U2 i)-space. Drawn for u \ 2  < U2 2  < 0, itn,U 2 i > 0, and prior: 
P11 — V2 \ — P- Gray. An ideal friend experiments with r 1 in period 1, and experiments with r2  
in period 2, if r\ reveals x \ 2 . Transparent: An ideal friend experiments with r'2 in period 1, and 
experiments with r\ in period 2, if reveals X2 2 -
C hoosing  w hen  F riends a re  n o t Id ea l Consider the case where S  has no friends 
who are ideal. To make the problem interesting we assume that S  only has friends 
who are willing to experiment with at most one risky alternative, i.e. we consider 
friends who uses an optimal strategy cr* E { n .^ } ,  and a(h) =  s after any non-trivial 
history. We distinguish between friends who are action-homophile (a-homophile) and 
action-heterophile (a-heterophile). A friend, / ,  is a-homophile if her action in the first 
period of her decision problem is the same as the action S  would take in the absence of 
observational learning, that is ex-ante both S  and /  rank r* above r y , i ^  j .  Otherwise 
she is a-heterophile.
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Interestingly the following proposition establishes conditions under which some decision­
makers may prefer to gain more information on a risky alternative which is not preferred 
ex-ante, that is associate with a-heterophile friends.
P ro p o s itio n  6 (2nd Best). Suppose Outcomes and Actions are Observable, and that S  
only has friends with optimal strategies a* =  r t, 2 =  1,2 and a(h) = s after any non­
trivial history. Fix an ordinal preference ordering for S , and U i,u 2  < 0. There exists 
U\.U2  such that a*(S) =  rj, and S  find it optimal to observe cr*(f) = rj i ^  j .
Proof. The proof is via example, and is relegated to appendix A.2. □
Two interpretations will be offered. The first relies on the opportunity cost of informa­
tion, that is what a player could have learned had she observed a player with a different 
behaviour. The second interpretation relies on the marginal value of information.
T h e  O p p o r tu n ity  C ost o f In fo rm a tio n  To gain some intuition for the result recall 
that a state is a collection of state realisations for each of the risky arms: (w,u/) E 
Vt\ x 0,2. Let the prior probability of this realisation be denoted p{pj,uj').
Let Vj(u;,u/), i = 1,2 be the payoff which is obtained if S  learns the z’th  element of 
(w,u/), and play is sequentially rational.
For i , j  =  1,2 , i ^  j  define:
f 0 if V iu j.u ')  > V j (uj,uj')
C i { U , W  ) =  <
I Vj(cj, u j ' )  — Vi(uj, a /) otherwise
ct (uj,uj') can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of learning arm r t when the state 
is ( c N o t e  that ct > 0. If c ,(u .u ')  > 0 then S  makes an inference error in state 
( l v . u j ' )  when she learns the state of arm r, . The cost depends upon what she could have 
learned had she learned the state of arm rj instead.
S  should learn the state of arm iff:
C i ^ Y ,  p { u , uj ' ) c j ( u j , uj ' )  =  C j
(w,u/) (w,w')
As an example take a decision maker S  such that if S  only has her prior information 
then <j (S) = s, i.e. she plays the safe action in both periods. Now she can choose 
between learning the state of arm r\ or r2. Note that since arms are independent the 
ordering of arms s and rj are unaffected by gaining information about arm r,, i j - j .
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Suppose wlog. that u\ > U2 - Then C\ — (1 — m ) n 2 ^U2 , since S  does not take the 
(constrained) ex-post optimal action (r2 ) if she learns that the safe outcome is preferred 
to the outcome on r\. C2  =  /v-i/^ -2(2fii -  2 u.2 ) +  / /i( l  -  ^ 2 ) ^ 1  since if r 2  is learned then 
in the state where both risky outcomes are preferred to the safe outcome, S  does not 
take the (constrained) ex-post optimal action, and likewise when she learns that the safe 
outcome is preferred to the outcome of r2 -
Hence S  prefers to see experimentation with arm r\ if n\U\ > /i2 W2-
T h e  M arg ina l Value o f In fo rm a tio n  Intuition may also be gained by considering 
the marginal value of information. Let MVi denote the marginal value of information 
on arm r,, i = 1,2. Since the model is Bayesian the value of information is always 
non-negative.
Consider first the case where S  is not willing to experiment with any of the risky 
alternatives ex-ante: Ui < y . z =  1,2. In this case the marginal value of information on 
arm r, is:
MVi  =  Hi(2ui),  2 =  1 , 2
that is learning about an alternative is beneficial because the player learns about out­
comes which are preferred to the safe outcome.
Next consider the case where S  experiments with /"2 , and chooses action s if the 
outcome she gets in period 1 is worse than the safe outcome. Furthermore she ranks 
action s above r\ in period 1. In terms of param eter restrictions this case is: U2  > 
f , ui < We have:
M V 1 =  f  M 2“ i “  0*22u2 +  (1 - /42)m2)1 i f  U2  < +
I fj, 1 [(1 — /i2 )^ 1] otherwise
M V 2  = - ( l - f i 2 )u2
The value of information on r\ (the lower ranked risky alternative ex-ante) is either 
(1) r\ is revealed to give an outcome which is preferred to the safe outcome, and this 
is preferred to experimentation on r-2 , (2) r\ is revealed to give an outcome which is 
preferred to the safe outcome, but experimentation on r 2 is preferred, if 7*2 yields an 
outcome which is worse than the safe outcome, then the player can switch to r\ in 
period 2. The value of information on n  is thus related to revealing outcomes which 
are good on r \ . It is related with more frequent play of that risky action. On the other 
hand, the value of information on r2  is related to the revelation of outcomes which are 
worse than the safe outcome. Thus learning more about a risky alternative which is 
preferred ex-ante is related to less frequent play of that risky alternative.
CHAPTER 2. WHOM SHOULD I OBSERVE? 34
Consider now the case k\ > u\ > U2  > Then we have:
MVi =  ^
[ Ml [(1 -  M2)wi]
MV 2  = (1 -  M2 ) [(mi2^! +  (1 -  Mi)Mi) -  M2 )]
Mi [2tii -  (m22u2 +  (1 -  M2)M2)] i f  U 2 < u i ^ f  +  ^
otherwise
Observe that the value of information on r\ is the same as the previous case. Learning 
about T2  is valuable when it is revealed that the outcome on r 2  is worse than the safe 
outcome. In this case information has value because it induces experimentation with r\. 
Finally consider u t > /c,, i =  1. 2. Then we have:
M V 2  =  (1 -  M2 )  [ m i 2 w i  +  (1 “  M i ) M i  -  (M2 +  u i ) ]
The value of information on ri is composed of a benefit when r\ is revealed to give 
an outcome which is preferred to the safe outcome. Now there is also an advantage to 
knowing when r\ is in a worse state, because S  is willing to experiment with r 1 , now 
she can switch to the safe action instead. The value of information on 7*2 is again that 
it improves decision making when the outcome of 7*2 is worse than the safe outcome.
The program:
gives an ex-ante ordering of alternatives to play in period 1, y a. Suppose the ordering 
is ri y a s y a rj. By sequential rationality learning stops once the player adopts the 
safe action. What is the value of learning about r t? Since is the ex-ante preferred 
action, learning that r; is indeed better than s, does not add to the marginal value of 
information, since the player would have learned this even in the absence of learning 
through observation. But learning that the outcome is worse than the safe outcome is 
valuable, since the player can switch to the safe action, with the ex-post ordering, y p, 
being: s y p r{, s y p rj, the latter following from independence.
W hat is the value of learning about rp. Learning that r3  is worse than s as she 
expected, ex-ante, does not have value, since she would never have experimented with 
the alternative, as learning stops in the event that she chooses s. The value then lies 
in observations which shifts the ex-post ordering of rj above s. Such an observation 
implies: rj y p s, and depending on the parameters either r.( y p rj or rj y p r-L. In the
otherwise
max W  (a)(7
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latter case the effect is a first-order effect, since it affects the choice of action in the first 
period. In the former case the effect is second-order, since the new information is only 
used if r, fails.
Now suppose the ex-ante ordering is r l y a rj y a s. Learning about rt has the same value 
as above, that is only observations which ensure: s y p ri add to the marginal value. New 
information about rj now adds to the marginal value regardless of the direction of the 
information. However information suggesting that rj y v ri is a first-order effect, whereas 
information suggesting s y p rj is a second-order effect.
More information on an alternative has value only in as much as the information 
affects the ex-post ordering of alternatives relative to the ex-ante ordering, with positive 
probability.
The insight tha t a decision maker may want to learn about a different alternative than 
that which she favours ex-ante can be related to the literature in information economics 
on biased contests (Meyer 1991). In this literature when a decision maker has to decide 
between which of two agents to promote, she performs sequential contests between the 
agents. In the final contest the decision maker optimally biases the contest in favour of 
the “current leader” , i.e. the one she would promote if there were no more contests. To 
see the intuition take the simplest example where the are two contests. If there is no 
bias in the second contest, then if the current leader does not win, then the last contest 
does not aid the decision maker. However if she biases the tournament in favour of the 
current leader, and the current loser wins it, then she should optimally promote her, 
and promote the leader otherwise. Along similar lines in our model a player may want 
to observe someone quite different from herself, i.e. introduce a bias between her own 
preferences and the person she is observing because of the information this may reveal. 
The bias may reveal valuable information about alternatives that she would not learn 
about otherwise.
In the following box we discuss how the insights developed here, generalises to the 
case where there are no revealing outcomes.
N on-R evea ling  O u tcom es To fix ideas suppose that a risky alternative may be 
in one of two states, H  and L, and that the outcome distribution generated under H  
is preferred to the safe outcome, whereas the outcome distribution generated under 
L is not (for a particular player). Suppose that some regularity condition (such as a 
MLR-property) is satisfied, such that if the state of an alternative is H  then the player 
is more likely to receive information to that effect.
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Suppose that there are no revealing outcomes that is even if an arm is in a H  state 
the posterior belief reaches one.
Consider first learning about the alternative which is ranked top ex-ante. Because 
we will have incomplete learning in general this means that receiving information in­
dicating that the state is H , will make experimentation with that alternative more 
persistent, thus the player is more likely to be staying with the alternative when the 
state is H. Alternatively information suggesting the state is L  will make experimenta­
tion less persistent, in expected terms. Thus information suggesting that the state is 
either H  or L now adds to the marginal value of information.
W hat about information on an alternative which is not preferred ex-ante? If the 
alternative is ranked below the safe alternative then information which pushes it above 
the safe action in the ex-post ordering is valuable. In the model examined in this paper 
only one piece of information is necessary for this to occur. Receiving information 
supporting that the state is H  is valuable in as far as it shifts the ranking of the 
alternative above the safe action. This ensures tha t some experimentation takes place 
with positive probability. On the other hand information suggesting L information is 
of no value in this case.
If the second ranked alternative is a risky alternative, then H  information could 
lead to the action becoming first ranked (1st order effect). Even if this does not 
happen if learning on the first ranked alternative stops it will make experimentation 
more persistent with the alternative (2nd order effect). L  information can either shift 
it below the safe action, or preserve the rank. In either case these effect are of the 
second order. They will in expected terms diminish the time spent on experimentation 
with the alternative.____________________________________________________________
E x am p le  3. Again consider utility functions of the typeu \\,U 2 \ > 0, u \ 2  < U2 2  < 0, and 
P1 1  — P2 1  — Also assume that ^ ^ u \ 2  < U2 2  < 0. Figure 2.3 illustrates proposition 6 .
O bservab le  A ctions
Suppose that only the actions taken by a friend, / ,  is observable. In this case the action 
taken in the second period by /  is only informative about whether /  liked the outcome 
she received in period 1 of her decision problem, but S  receives no new information 
about the outcome experienced by /  in period 2. Hence there are no ideal friends. 
Furthermore since the period 2 action is only informative about the period 1 outcome, 
the same can be learned from observing a player who is willing to experiment with at
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Figure 2.3: Choosing among Friends who use either strategy cr*(f) = r\ or a*(f) — r2 , and
q (h) — s after any history h such that the outcome on the arm that was played in period 1 
is worse than the safe outcome for f .  Drawn for pn  = P21 = Ab < ^ 2 2  < 0 fixed,
and ttn,U2 i > 0. The dashed lines intersecting axis at i = 1,2: if Ui lies to the right of
(alternatively above) the line then S  prefers to experiment with alternative r, conditional on 
knowing that the outcome on arm rj, i ^  j  is preferred to the safe outcome. Yellow: It is 
optimal to observe a*(/) = r\. Transparent: It is optimal to observe <r*(/) = v~2 .
most one alternative, as can be learned from a player who is willing to experiment with 
two alternatives.
The characterisation is then equivalent to the characterisation given in the previous 
section (with observable actions and outcomes), where S  can only choose among friends 
who are willing to experiment with at most one alternative. We thus present this result 
as a corollary to proposition 6.
C o ro lla ry  1. Suppose th a tS  can only observe the actions taken by her friends, and that 
she has friends with any admissible optimal strategy. Then
1 . Conditional on observing a friend with cr* =  r,-, i = 1.2 S  can learn the same
from observing a friend with oc(h) — s as she can from observing a friend with
a(h) = rj, j  ^  i after any non-trivial history h,
2. S  has no ideal friends,
3. Under the conditions stated in proposition 6 , i f  it is optimal to observe some f  G F, 
then it is also optimal to observe her when only actions are observable.
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2.4 Concluding Rem arks
This paper has investigated a specific reason for why people who live in an uncertain 
environment can benefit from associating with each other: they might learn from what 
other people do, which may improve decision making and welfare. There are two main 
insights of the paper. The first is that when choosing whom to associate with a player 
who is concerned about wide-ranging experimentation might want to associate with 
players that are different from herself, in the sense tha t they are willing to experiment 
with alternatives that she is not willing to experiment with herself. The other key insight 
relates to observability. The less a player can infer from observing others, i.e. the less 
conducive the environment is to learning from others, the more important becomes the 
consideration that players are similar. This ensures that the player will be able to make 
good inference from what she learns.
The predictions of the model lend support to some policy interventions. Particularly in 
many great cities of the United States where ghettoes, with associated bad outcomes of 
crime and unemployment, predominate, there has been several policy experiments aimed 
at improving access to economic opportunities.
The Gatreaux program in Chicago is one such program (see Rosenbaum (1992, 1995). 
See also Moffitt in Durlauf and Young (2001, chap. 3)). In these programs residents 
voluntarily put their names on a list in order to qualify for relocation. The empirical 
strategy was to make these as close to a natural (randomised) experiment as possible. 
However since reassignment was voluntary it is doubtful whether the identifying assump­
tion holds. Aside from such methodological problems Rosenbaum finds that residents 
who ended up (where randomised into) in relatively affluent suburban areas were more 
successful along a number of economic dimensions. Self-selection into such a programme, 
and associated good outcomes is indeed what the model presented in this paper deliv­
ers. But the model also offers an important caveat to these conclusion. If informational 
reasons is the main determinant of selection, then people who select into relatively af­
fluent neighbourhoods may not only benefit from from the move, but they may have 
exerted a positive externality in the neighbourhood they have left. In the context of the 
model presented here people moving under the program can be interpreted as players 
that are particularly willing to try  out behaviour different from the average behaviour of 
the population. These players thus benefit more from observing players that are doing 
something different, giving them a greater incentive to sign up for relocation. Resi­
dents remaining now become more constrained in whom they can observe, leading to
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the conjecture that they experience worse outcomes. If such feedback is present then the 
parameter of interest is not the average effect of treatm ent on the treated but rather the 
average effect of treatment 011 the population which had the opportunity to participate 
in the programme.
The insights of the paper may also be related to the literature on biased tournaments
In it’s current form the model is not well suited to address structural breaks; the state 
of the world is drawn at the beginning of play and remains fixed throughout play. Ex­
tending the model to allow for structural breaks, may help explain the determinants 
of social change. As an example of what we have in mind consider the seminal study 
of an American inner-city ghetto by Anderson (1990, 1999). Anderson explores how a 
relatively safe and vibrant city neighbourhood transforms as manually unskilled labour 
jobs gradually disappear. The residents had enjoyed safety and good job-opportunities 
for many years, but the neighbourhood gradually transformed into a ghetto centered 
around the drug-economy, as the relatively few who were successful in the conventional 
economy left the neighbourhood at a faster rate than they were moving in. Adolescents 
were now emulating behaviour of young and relatively “succesful” participants in the 
drug-economy. Concurrently they were rejecting the (moral) authority of “old heads” , 
who were still preaching decent (middle-class) values and a strong work ethic in the 
regular economy.




Why do people in a variety of social contexts give gifts-in-kind rather than a monetary 
gift? A standard microeconomic argument is tha t gifts-in-kind are inefficient since the 
gift might not be exactly what the receiver wants, tha t is the receiver knows her own 
preferences better than the giver does. By this argument giving a monetary gift is 
efficient, since a monetary transfer allows the receiver to buy what she likes best.
Following this argument, there has been some interest in estimating the welfare 
loss of the supposedly inefficient practice of gift giving. Waldfogel (1993) attem pts to 
empirically measure the welfare loss of christmas gift giving. Waldfogel bounds the 
welfare loss between 10% and 33% of the value of the gifts given1. Given the volume of 
gift giving (according to estimates presented by Waldfogel holiday gift expenditures in 
the US totalled $38 billion in 1992) this amounts to a significant welfare loss estimated 
between $4-13 billion2.
Waldfogel is merely interested in measuring the welfare loss of objects chosen, but 
leaves the possibility open that receivers may value the act of gift receipt. It is important 
for Waldfogel’s research methodology that these two questions can be separated. The 
question is whether it is meaningful, or in other words whether this is the parameter of
1 Along similar lines Waldfogel (2004) presents evidence that own purchases generate between 10% to
18% more value per dollar spent than do gifts.
2W aldfogel’s work spurred an in the main em pirical debate about th is purported welfare loss. The
debate can be followed in Solnick and Hemenway (1996), List and Shogren (1998), Ruffle and Tykocinski 
(2000), with replies in Waldfogel (1996, 1998). Using different, data and differing m ethodologies Solnick 
and Hemenway (1996) and List and Shogren (1998) find that gift giving is perhaps som ewhat surprisingly 
welfare-improving relative to giving money, i.e. the value of an object when given as a gift is valued 
higher than the m onetary equivalent of the object.
40
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interest, in the context of gift giving practices? In the model presented here the value 
of the gift has two components: an intrinsic value, that is the value of the gift in itself 
to the receiver, and an informational (extrinsic) value which arises endogeneously from 
the equilibrium being played, and comes from what the gift can achieve in terms of 
engaging in social interaction over and above what could be achieved in the absence of 
gift giving. This is an important correction to the recent empirical economic literature 
011 the practice of gift giving: gift giving takes place in a social context and it cannot 
meaningfully be studied in isolation from the social context in which it takes place. 
Simply observing that gift giving is inefficient seen as an isolated social phenomenon 
does not imply that the institution itself is inefficient: gift giving might be the first link 
in a longer chain of social exchange. As such this paper provides a theoretical challenge 
to the observation that giving gifts-in-kind is an inefficient practice.
There is however one sense in which Waldfogel (1993)’s estimates may be useful. If 
one takes the view that evolutionary pressures select efficient social institutions, then 
a possible interpretation of the estimated welfare loss in Waldfogel (1993) is that it is 
a lower bound on the value of social interaction itself. T hat is people are willing to 
trade-off inefficient gifts for more efficient social interaction.
Motivations for giving gifts varies. Transfers from parents to their offspring arguably 
contain an altruistic or perhaps consumption smoothing (i.e. mutual insurance) element. 
A reason for giving gifts-in-kind in such a context might be paternalistically motivated. 
There are other contexts where gifts-in-kind with a high generic element are given, such 
as the widespread practice in middleclass western societies of bringing chocolate, flowers, 
a bottle of wine, etc. in social encounters. In some contexts however it is important 
that a gift is kind is not generic, e.g. that the gift embodies that the giver has taken 
time to think about what the receiver might like. The ” wrong” gift might bring the 
relationship to a premature end, whereas the ’’right” gift might signal the beginning of 
a long relationship.
In a simple and stylised model we show that if there is some uncertainty about whom 
to engage in social exchange with then the practice of gift giving might increase the 
volume (and quality) of social interaction. Gift giving is seen here to occur at the initial 
stages of a possibly long-term relationship. Two players from separate populations, G 
and R, meet and may engage in a long-term relationship/joint project. They bring 
personal characteristics to the project and the match of these characteristics determine 
how productive the relationship will be. Personal characteristics (formally a type) are
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private information and cannot be directly communicated to the other player. Players 
know the prior distribution of types in the population; ex-ante social interaction is not 
worthwhile. During their first encounter G receives a signal about /?’s type. When they 
meet again she may bring R  a gift (at some exogenously fixed cost c > 0), which can 
be either in cash or a gift-in-kind. Next, G and R  simultaneously decide whether to 
engage in the long-term project. The project only goes ahead if both players agree that 
it should.
The model has multiple equilibria, which we interpret as different social conventions 
for how social exchange takes place. There are equilibria where gifts-in-kind are used to 
foster interaction, and equilibria with cash, and an equilibrium where G players in some 
circumstances give money and give gifts-in-kind in in other circumstances.
In terms of welfare equilibria differ along two dimensions: the intrinsic and infor­
mational (extrinsic) value of gifts. The intrinsic value of the gift is simply the value it 
has to the receiver. On this dimension equilibria with cash are preferred by the receiver, 
exactly because a receiver might sometimes get a gifts she does not like. The informa­
tional (or extrinsic) value refers to how much social interaction the convention fosters 
(quantity), and it’s ability to sort desirable social interaction from undesirable (quality), 
that is how much information about the beliefs of the giver about the receivers type 
the gift is able to convey. In the informational dimension equilibria with gifts-in-kind 
are generally superior to equilibria with cash. The basic reason is the following. In 
equilibrium G sends R  a gift to induce her to invest in the common project. By giving a 
gift-in-kind G is also able to communicate to R  something about her beliefs of .R’s type. 
Thus R  is able to condition her decision on whether to engage in the project on more 
precise beliefs about the beliefs that G had about i?’s type when she decided to give a 
gift. W ith a generic cash gift R  only knows tha t G thinks the project is beneficial, but 
R  is not able to infer which beliefs G had about R's type. On the other hand this is 
exactly what gifts-in-kind do. R  is able to make more precise inference about the beliefs 
that G had about R  when she decided to send a gift. This gives R  the choice to refrain 
from interaction, and benefits both players. By giving gifts-in-kind G allows R  relatively 
more discretion over when to implement the joint project to the benefit of both players. 
Thus in their ordering of equilibria (according to ex-ante expected payoff) R  players face 
a trade-off between intrinsic and extrensic efficiency.
Noise plays an important role in this argument. G must receive an informative yet 
noisy signal about the characteristics of R. If G was to learn R's  characteristics with 
probability one, then an equilibrium where cash is given is always at least as good as
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any equilibrium in which gifts in kind are exchanged.
Multiplicity of equilibria is problematic for the predictive power of the model. Ex­
istence of equilibria with gifts-in-kind does not generally rely on what is given. E.g. 
the model admits equilibria where G players give gifts-in-kind to R  players which they 
believe will not be liked by the receivers. If people have come to expect that they will 
receive gifts they don’t like from people they should continue to interact with, then this 
is self-confirming, and indeed the best a giver can do is to give such gifts. In a sense dif­
ferent social conventions support equilibrium. Such equilibria are not very intuitive. We 
address the potential problem of multiplicity by showing that for any upper bound on 
the quality of the signal that G receives, there is a sufficiently small cost of gift provision 
such that both players have the same ordering of equilibria w.r.t. expected equilibrium 
payoffs. In this case an equilibrium with gifts-in-kind is the efficient equilibrium. We 
appeal to an evolutionary argument to select among equilibria (following Kim and Sobel 
(1995)) and show that in the long run we will only observe G players who believe that 
the project is worthwhile giving efficient gifts-in-kind.
Literature Camerer (1988) gave the first contribution to the study of gift giving 
using game theoretic tools. Camerer studies gift giving in a signalling environment. 
There are two types of players, types who would like to invest if the other players 
invest (willing types), and types who free-rides on the investment of others (unwilling 
types). Types are private information. In this model willing types send costly gifts 
to distinguish themselves from unwilling types. The crucial modelling assumption is a 
sorting assumption: the marginal benefit of investment for two willing types, is greater 
than the marginal benefit to free-riding for unwilling types. Through this mechanism a 
signalling equilibrium is constructed, where willing types send costly gifts which exactly 
deter unwilling types to want to pose as willing types. Camerer’s model is silent about 
the nature and desirability of what is exchanged in equilibrium (i.e. whether e.g. cash or 
gifts in kind are and should be exchanged). Moreover the problem of multiple equilibria 
is unaddressed by his approach.
Carmichael and MacLeod (1996) study gift giving in an evolutionary model. In their 
model there are many types, but it suffices to think in terms of a willing (or cooperat­
ing) type and an unwilling (or free-riding) type. A player’s type is private information. 
Player’s can engage in long-term relationships, the termination/continuation of which 
the players have some discretion over. Players are matched over time to play a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game. The same basic mechanism as in the paper by Camerer is at play in
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this dynamic set-up: by conditioning continuation of the match by the early exchange 
of costly gifts, cooperating types can avoid being driven out by evolution, because co­
operating players can now exit bad matches prior to incurring large losses by requiring 
that gifts be exchanged prior to consenting to the relationship. Because defecting types 
are re-matched relatively more frequently, the pool of unmatched players are relatively 
abundant with defecting types. Accordingly they will often by matched with other de­
fecting types and will do worse in the population. In their model gifts must be relatively 
inefficient, since it must be costly to give a gift, but the value cannot be high because 
that would make defecting types survive by picking up gifts and then exiting. Hence 
the model gives a possible explanation for why gifts must be relatively worthless. In a 
sense in the model of Carmichael and MacLeod inefficient gifts is a consequence of the 
strategic environment: cooperating types cannot survive if gifts are too efficient. The 
model proposed here may be more suited at explaining gift exchanges in more mature 
relationships where the stakes are higher for the players.
Finally there is a more recent literature tha t explains gift giving via non-standard 
preferences such as altruism and by introducing emotions (Ruffle 1999, Ruffle and Kaplan 
2001).
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows. In section 3.2 the model is 
introduced. In section 3.3 we characterise equilibria and establish existence. In section 
3.4 we look at welfare. In section 3.5 we look at a stochastic evolutionary model, adapting 
Kim and Sobel (1995) ’s model of evolutionary cheap talk to our setting, and show that 
the process selects a relatively small set of states. In the final section some concluding 
remarks are provided.
3.2 M odel
There are two populations, Q and 1Z. Each member of a population has type 0 E 
© = {#o, #i, $2 , #3 ? #4 }- The distribution of types is identical in both populations. At 
the beginning of play Nature independently draws one individual at random from each 
population to play the game. The player drawn from Q assumes the role of G(iver) and 
the player drawn from 1Z assumes the role of R(eceiver).
T im ing  In period 1 G receives a signal realisation, r , about R ’s type. Then in period 
2 she chooses whether or not to give R  a gift. If she decides to give R  a gift, she can 
either give a monetary gift, m, or a gift-in-kind, k E 0 . Note that a gift-in-kind is
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identified with the set of types ©. We do this to save on notation. In period 3 G and R  
simultaneously decide whether to engage in a common project. Then payoffs are realised.
Type Space Each population member in Q and 1Z is one of 5 types. Types axe located
Each type is equally likely. At the beginning of play each member of the population 
knows their own type, but only knows the distribution of types in the other population. 
This is common knowledge.
Define a distance-measure d : © 2 —> N which simply counts the minimum number of 
steps between the types of G and i?, e.g. d{0\, O4 ) =  2.
Signal and Interim Types The signal f  is a random variable with the following 
distribution, conditional on 0 being the true type of player R.
6 , with P r =  p
and p =  |  < p < 1.
W ith probabilty p G learns the type of R  and with probability 1 — p the signal is not 
informative.
distance between her own type and R's type conditional on receiving r  is on d(r, 9) = 
0, d{r,9) =  1 and d(r,9) — 2 respectively. T  =  {to, £1 ^ 2 } is the set of interim-types of 
player G.
Payoffs Players have a vNM-utility function which represents preferences over outcomes 
of the game.
Gifts If G decides to give a monetary gift, denoted m, then we assume that she gives an 
amount c > 0, c being exogenously fixed, to R. We assume that a monetary gift yields 
utility c to R. If G decides to give a gift-in-kind then she pays cost c to provide the gift.
on a circle:
0', with P r =  i ^ . d ' ^ 9
Let tQ.t\ and 1 2 denote the interim-type of a G player whose modal belief about the
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G chooses the characteristics of the gift-in-kind. If R  is of type 6  and she receives a gift- 
in-kind k with 6  characteristics, then her payoff is c, and 0 otherwise. This assumption 
captures the potential inefficiency of gifts-in-kind. G may also decide not to send R  any 
gift. We denote this action rig.
Project Payoffs If i only engages in the project, then i suffers a payoff loss3 I < 0, and 
player j ,  i ^  j ,  gets an exogenous private benefit b > 0 independent of d.
If both players decide to engage in the project then the project is realised. Both 
players receive a project payoff, which is decreasing in distance, d:
B(d)  =  <
B  if d =  0
B  -  5 if d =  1
B - 6  if d = 2
We assume S > 5 > 0 and B  -  S >  b > B  — 6 . Hence the project is individually rational 
when d < 1. Players are compatible whenever d < 1.
If both players choose not to engage in the project then it is not realised and both 
players get payoff 0.
To make the problem interesting we assume:
B ~ 2 J l p i < b (A l)
5
(Al) implies that types must separate to make investing in the project worthwhile in 
equilibrium. (Al) together with B  — 5 > b implies 5 <  Let B  = 6 +b be the minimum 
level of H, and let B  = |  (# +  S) -f b be the maximum level of B. We make the additional 
assumption that b < 5 .
Our focus will be on c < c\ = f +  f b. c\ will tu rn  out to be the highest cost level such 
that for all parameter values there is some equilibrium which implements the project 
with positive probability4.
Equilibrium The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium. We shall restrict atten­
tion to a special class of sequential equilibria that we refer to as ’’symmetric interim-type 
equilibria” . The notion will be defined below.
Let the set of possible actions at the gift giving stage be G  — {ng} U 0  U {m} which 
includes the action to not give a gift, ng. A strategy for G of type 6  is a mapping from
3In what follows we shall think of the loss as being sufficiently ’’small”, but strictly positive, so that
when we state results we do not explicitly reference this parameter.
4A characterisation for all cost levels can be found in Appendix B.2.
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the space of signal realisations into the space of gifts and an associated action at the 
investment stage. Beliefs follow from Bayesian updating:
sG{0) : © —> G x {/, N I}
w (« )  : e ^ A ( e )
A strategy for R  of type 6  is a mapping from the space of gifts (including no gift) 
into an action at the investment stage. For each possible gift that R  can receive she 
forms a belief about the type she is facing, using Bayes Rule when it applies:
SR(V) : G  —> {/, iV/} 
m (e) : G  —* A (0 )
A strategy profile is a collection of strategies and beliefs of all types of players:
( ( s G ( 0 ) ,  H g { 0 ) ) 9^ q  , ( s r ( 6 ) ,  H R { 0 ) ) e e Q )
Symmetric Interim-type Equilibrium We now introduce a restriction on the set of strate­
gies of G that we allow. This entails a within interim-types restriction and an between 
interim-types restriction on strategies.
Let h : © —» © be any function which is one-to-one. The interpretation is that h is 
a convention for how either a signal realisation or a players type is mapped into the set 
of gifts-in-kind. Thus the mapping h(r) =  r ,  can be interpreted as a convention where 
G sends gifts th a t she thinks the receiver likes. Likewise the mapping h(0) — 9, can be 
interpreted as a convention where G sends gifts that she likes herself.
The set of interim-type U axe G players such that d(9,r)  = i, i =  0.1,2. We impose 
the following within interim-type restriction. Take a strategy profile. If this profile is a 
symmetric interim-type strategy profile then all U players at the gift-giving stage either 
do not send a gift (ng), sends a monetary gifts m, send a gift-in-kind which depend 
on the signal realisation, i.e. /i(r), or send a gift-in-kind which depend on their own 
(absolute) type i.e. h{9).
We also impose the following between interim-type restriction on strategy-profiles. 
Take a strategy profile and suppose that t, t' E T  send gifts-in-kind in this profile. Then 
(1 ) t and t' both use the same h and (2 ) t and t' either both send a gift-in-kind which 
depend on their signal realisation or on their (absolute) type.
We refer to a strategy profile which satisfies the restrictions above as a symmetric interim- 
type strategy profile. A symmetric interim-type equilibrium is then a sequential equilib­
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rium where the strategy profile is restricted to being a symmetric interim-type strategy 
profile.
These restrictions are mainly imposed for reasons of tractability. Since gifts serve as a 
vehicle for communicating the quality of the match between the receiver and the giver, 
from an efficiency perspective it is desirable e.g. that all G players of a given interim type 
use the same convention. However ideally one would like this to come out of the model, 
perhaps via some selection story, rather than assume it. Implicitly we have thus assumed 
that the process of coordinating on which convention to use has already converged. In 
this sense within the context of the model considered here, the present analysis provides 
an upper limit on what can be achieved through gift giving. We do find the restrictions 
plausible in that they imply that strategies are relatively simple.
Comments A crucial modelling ingredient is that both players face uncertainty about 
the other player’s type. In particular an otherwise identical model, except that the 
receiver knows the giver’s type, but the giver is uncertain about the receiver’s type there 
is no scope for an efficiency gain to giving gifts-in-kind. This follows since R  will never 
invest if she knows that players are not compatible, independent of whether she receives 
a gift or not. When she knows that players are compatible then a gift from G is sufficient 
to induce her to invest, because G reveals that she thinks the players are compatible 
as well, and thus G will also invest. But then equilibrium behaviour is not affected by 
what is transferred as long as it is sufficiently costly to sort types of G who are willing 
to invest from types that are not willing to invest. In such a set-up it is indeed efficient 
to transfer money.
The model presented here makes no claim to generality, we attem pt to provide the 
simplest model to study the question of interest. It can easily be extended to deal with 
any finite number of types of players, as well as a more general signal distribution.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we characterise symmetric interim-type equilibria and establish existence. 
First we find necessary conditions for behaviour strategies to constitute an equilibrium 
of the game.
Then in the following sections we look at sufficient conditions. We first look at 
strategy profiles where gifts are constrained to monetary gifts. Then we look at strategy 
profiles where gifts are constrained to gifts-in-kind. Finally we look at hybrid equilibria
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where gifts-in-kind and monetary gifts are given by different interim types.
3.3.1 N ecessary  C onditions
The following proposition summarises necessary conditions for type-specific behaviour 
strategies in equilibrium where the project is implemented with positive probability. At 
this stage we say nothing about what gifts are used in equilibrium.
P ro p o s itio n  7. Suppose c > b > 0. The necessary conditions for Equilibrium where the 
project is implemented with positive probability are:
Equilibria with no gifts
1 . t 2  play (ng, NI ) .
2. I f  t\ play (n g , I ) and R  invests, then to also play (n g . I ).
Equilibria with gifts
1 . t 2  play (ng, NI ) .
2. I f  t\ send gifts and invest, then to also send gifts and invest.
3. I f  type t £ T  \  {<2 } does not invest then she sends no gift.
4- R  players only invest if they receive a gift.
The proof is via a series of lemmas, which can be found in Appendix B .l. The 
intuition is as follows. Interim-types must separate for R  to invest in equilibrium. If 
they do not then by assumption (Al) expected project benefits are sufficiently low that 
R  does not want to invest.
In equilibria with no gifts and where the project is implemented with positive prob­
ability (that is some interim type of G invests in the project) R  invests unconditionally. 
Therefore t 2  types optimally respond by not investing in the project, to types invests 
in the project. Whether t\ types finds it worthwhile to invest depends 011 whether the 
expected project payoff exceed the benefit to free-riding, b.
In equilibria which involves gifts, t 2  types expectations of project payoffs are lower
than the benefits to free-riding, but for R  to invest they must send gifts. Since the
marginal cost of inducing investment from R , c, is larger than the marginal benefit of 
free-riding, b, t2  types do not send gifts in any equilibrium. If t\ types expectations of 
project payoffs are sufficiently high to make them want to separate from t 2  types and 
send a gift and investing in the project, then this also applies to to types since to have 
higher expectations of project benefits than t\  types.
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3.3.2 Equilibria w ith  no G ifts
In this section we characterise all equilibria in which no gifts are sent in equilibrium 
but where the project is implemented with positive probability. Let the set of strategy 
profiles where play is constrained to not involving any gifts, but where at least one 
interim type of G invests, be denoted S n g -
E qu ilib rium  I First we construct an equilibrium where only to types invest in the 
project whereas other interim types free-ride. In this equilibrium R  invests when she 
does not receive a gift.
Consider the following strategy profile s*j NG G Sng'-
G -players:
• t 0  play (ng, I)
• ti, t 2  play (ng, N I )
R -players:
• If ng is received at gift giving stage then play / ,  otherwise play NI .
We define threshold levels for every B: p < p ( B ) < p(B)  < 1, with the property that 
threshold levels are decreasing in B  (see appendix B.2.1 for details).
We then have the following characterisation: We have the following characterisation.
P ro p o sitio n  8. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s*j NG:
1. For any c > b > 0 s*j NG is an equilibrium profile if  and only if  p < p < p.
2. There is no b > 0 such that for all B  and p sj NG is an equilibrium profile.
E q u ilib riu m  II Next we construct an equilibrium where both to and t\ types find it 
worthwhile to invest in the project:
Consider the following strategy profile s*n  NG G S /vg:
G -p layers:
• to and t\ play (ng. I)
• t 2  play (ng, NI )
R -players:
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• If ng is received at gift giving stage then play 7, otherwise play N I.
We have the following characterisation.
P ro p o s itio n  9. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s*jj NG:
1. For any c > b > 0 s*jj NG is an equilibrium profile i f  and only if  p > p.
2. There is no b > 0 such that for all B  and p s*n  NG is an equilibrium profile.
By proposition 7 there are no more strategy profiles in S n c  which are candidates for 
equilibria.
It follows directly from propositions 8  and 9 that there is a non-empty set of para­
meters which does not support an equilibrium with no gifts.
C o ro lla ry  2. There is no b >  0 such that for all B  and p there is some equilibrium with 
no gifts.




Figure 3.1: The set of Equilibria with no Gifts. Illustrated for the case 45 = 5. Darkgrey: 
Equilibrium s*ING exists. Lightgrey: Equilibrium s)j NG exists. Non-Coloured: No investment 
in equilibrium.
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3.3 .3  E quilibria w ith  M onetary  G ifts
In this section we find and characterise all equilibria where only monetary gifts are used 
with positive probability in equilibrium. Let the set of strategy profiles where play is 
constrained to only involving monetary gifts be denoted 5m -
E q u ilib riu m  I First we construct an equilibrium where only to types invest and send 
gifts. Consider the following strategy profile s*j M G 5 m  :
G -p layers:
•  tQ play (m, I)
• t i. t 2  play (ng, N I )
R -p layers :
• If m  is received at gift giving stage then play / ,  otherwise play NI .
In this profile only to types send monetary gifts and invests, while any other type 
does not invest. R  players only invest if they receive a monetary gift.
We define threshold levels for every B: p < p(B) < p(B)  < 1, with the property that 
threshold levels are decreasing in B  (see appendix B.2.2 for details).
We then have the following characterisation:
P ro p o s it io n  10. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s*t M:
1. For fixed b < c < c\ and for any fixed B  s* M is an equilibrium profile if and only 
i f p e { p ( B ) J [ B ) ] .
2. There is no cost level c > b > 0 such that for all B  and p s*j M is an equilibrium 
profile.
The intuition for the result is as follows. For fixed B  and c the quality of the signal 
(parametrised by p) can neither be too low nor too high. If it is too low then to types 
will not find it profitable to try and induce investment, since too much probability is 
placed on the true state of the world being d = 2. If it is too high then t\ types cannot 
be deterred from sending a gift as well, since too little probabiltity is placed on the true 
state of the world being d = 2.
E q u ilib riu m  II Now we construct an equilibrium where both to and t\ types invest. 
Consider the profile s*n  M G Sm-
G -players:
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• t0, 1 1 play (m,J)
• t 2  play (ng, NI )
R -p layers:
• If m is received at gift giving stage then play / ,  otherwise play NI .
In this profile t\ interim types also sends a monetary gift.
For any b < c < c\ we define B < 5(c) < B  (see appendix B.2.2). J5(c) has the property 
that it is increasing in c.
We have the following characterisation:
P ro p o s itio n  11. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s*jj M :
1 . For fixed b < c < c\ s*n  M is an equilibrium profile if  and only if  B  £ [B(c),B)
and p £ (p ( B ), 1 ).
2. There is no cost level c > b > 0 such that for all B  and p s*jj M is an equilibrium 
profile.
This equilibrium corresponds exactly to the case where the quality of the signal is 
sufficiently high tha t t\ types cannot be deterred from sending a gift.
Since we have restricted G-players to only sending monetary gifts, by Proposition 7 
there are no other equilibria where only monetary gifts are used in equilibrium.
By combining this observation, with the statements of propositions 10 and 11 we 
have:
C oro lla ry  3. For any b < c < c\ there is a non-empty set of values of B  and p such
that there is no s £ S \j which is an equilibrium profile.
R e m a rk  8 (Robustness). This remark comments on the robustness of our results.
Consider first the possibility that players can only send a fixed amount of money, but 
that different denominations are available. In this case equilibria with money will be at 
least as efficient as any other equilibrium, provided that the cardinality of the space of 
combinations of money that sums to c is at least equal to the cardinality of the space of 
types.
Alternatively one could think of an equilibrium construction where to players send 
m o and t\ players send m \ < mo. This profile is not an equilbrium since to types will 
want to pose as t\ types.
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Finally, observe that equilibria with monetary gifts may fail to exist is partially driven 
by our assumption that the cost of gift provision, c, is not a strategic variable. I f  we relax 
this assumption we can have equilibria in where different types send different- amounts 
of money e.g. an interim type to of type 6  sends mo, where niQ mo>, 0 -f O', provided 
that equilibrium transfers between neighbouring types are not too different. In such an 
equilibrium there will be no inefficency loss for the receiver from receiving gifts that she 
does not like. This type of equilibrium breaks down in the limit as p, the quality of the 
signal, approaches one. Details may be found in Appendix B.3. Such equilibria treat 
different player types asymmetrically, in events where the expected project payoff are 
identical. We do not find such equilibria plausible from an ex-ante perspective.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the equilibria with monetary gifts for cost level c =  c\.
Figure 3.2: The set of Equilibria with Monetary Gifts. Illustrated for the case b < c = c\, and 
4£ = 5. Darkgrey: Equilibrium s*j M exists. Lightgrey: Equilibrium s*n  M exists. Non-Coloured: 
No monetary gifts are sent in equilibrium.
3.3 .4  Equilibria W ith  G ifts-in-K ind
We now turn to equilibria which only makes use of gifts-in-kind. Let the set of profiles 
which only use gifts-in-kind be denoted S k • It will turn out that the equilibrium condi-
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tions in this section are invariant to the convention used i.e. the h-function. To save on 
notation we shall therefore be stating results under the restriction that h is the identity 
mapping. We then state a lemma (lemma 2) which makes the connection clear.
Equilibrium I Consider the following strategy profile, s*j K , where we initially restrict
h(-) to be the identity mapping:
G-players:
• to play (r, / ) ,  where r  is the signal realisation.
• *i- t 2  play {ng, N I )
R-players:
• If JR is of type 6  and d(r, 6 ) < 1 then play / ,  otherwise play N I .
That is an R  player only invests if the gifts she receives has characteristics that she 
or one of her neighbours like.
Before characterising equilibrium for every c < c\ we define R < B{c) < B  with the 
property th a t B{c ) is decreasing in c. Also for every B  we define p <  p{B)  < 1 with the 
property th a t p{B)  is increasing in B  (details are in appendix B.2.3).
We have the following characterisation:
Proposition 12. Suppose play is according to the profile s *i , K  •
1. For fixed b < c < c\ s*j K is an equilibrium profile if  and only if B  < B (c ) and 
p e [ p ( B ) .  l).
At first sight it may appear slightly surprising that for high quality of the signal 
realisation it becomes easier to deter t\ players from sending gifts. The reason is the 
following. The optimal deviation for a t\ interim type is for her to send a gift-in-kind 
which has characteristics that she likes herself. Given the behaviour of R  players this 
has the consequence that in equilibrium the project is never implemented when the true 
state is d = 2, for any p. Now suppose the signal quality is close to 1. Thus a t\ type is 
almost certain tha t the project will be implemented but she also knows almost certainly 
that the true state is d =  1. As p decreases she knows the true state of the world is 
now more likely to be d =  0 (with an associated higher payoff), while the project is still 
not implemented when d =  2. Therefore for fixed B  it becomes harder to deter t\ as p 
decreases.
We can now comment on equilibrium conditions if players who send gifts do not use 
the identity mapping.
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Lemma 2. Any one-to-one function h does not change equilibrium conditions.
Proof. Suppose h is one-to-one. A R  player is able to invert the gifts she receives to 
recover the underlying signal. Thus for any h: /i_1(ft(r)) =  t .  □
Given our restriction to equilibria with gifts-in-kind, there are no other equilibria 
where only to types send gifts-in-kind.
Equilibrium II (Type Revelation) We now construct equilibria where both to and 
t\ types send gifts.
Consider the following strategy profile, s*u  K . Again assume that h(-) is the identity 
mapping:
G-players:
• to, ti play (6 , / ) ,  where d is G’s type.
• t 2  play (ng, N I )
R-players:
• If R  is of type 9' and d(9,6') < 1 then play / ,  otherwise play N I .  That is an R  
player only invests if the gifts she receives has characteristics that she or one of 
her neighbours like.
When h is the identity mapping then we can interpret the equilibrium behaviour of G 
as dictating th a t if G believe that she is compatible with R  then she gives R  something 
that G likes herself.
We have the following characterisation:
Proposition 13. Suppose play is according to the profile s *jj  K :
1. For fixed b < c < c\:
(a) For fixed B < B(c): s*n  K is an equilibrium profile if  and only if  p E (p,p(B)).
(b) For fixed B  > B(c): s]j K is an equilibrium profile for any p.
Thus whenever there is no equilibrium I, there is an equilibrium II (type revelation) 
where types who send gifts gives gifts that they like themselves.
Again note that the characterisation holds for any one-to-one function h.
Equilibrium III (Signal Revelation) Finally we construct an equilibrium of the 
following form:
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Consider the following strategy profile, s*UI K . Again assume that h(-) is the identity 
mapping:
G-players:
• to, t\ play (r, /) , where r  is the signal realisation.
• t 2  play (ng, N I)
R-players:
• If R  is of type 6  and d (r ,6 ) — 0 then play 7, otherwise play N I.  That is an R  
player only invests if the gifts she receives has characteristics that she likes.
We can think of G players in this equilibrium as following the rule: if you think that 
you are compatible with R , then give her something that you think she will like.
We define for every B  E (B(c). +  5) +  b): p < p(B) <  1 (see appendix B.2.3 for
details). We have the following characterisation:
Proposition 14. Suppose the interval (B(c), ^(5 +  5) +  b)  is non-empty. Also suppose 
play is according to the profile s*n i K :
1. For fixed b < c  < c\ s*in  K is an equilibrium profile if  and only if  B  E  (B (c ), |(c> +  
6 ) +  b) and p E  [p{B), 1).
By proposition 7 and our restriction interim-type symmetric strategy profiles there 
are no other equilibrium profiles in the set S k • Before graphically illustrating equilibria, 
we note th a t for b <  c  <  c \  there is always some s E  S k  which is an equilibrium profile.
Corollary 4. For any b < c  < c \ ,  for any B  and p there is some s* E  S k  such that s* 
is an equilibrium profile.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the set of equilibria with gifts-in-kind for c  — c \ .
Above we established that equilibrium conditions do not depend on h. This means 
that ex-ante there is no convincing reason why people should either give gifts that they 
like themselves or gifts that they think the receiver likes. For a given equilibrium with 
gifts-in-kind receivers (weakly) prefer equilibrium outcomes generated under conven­
tions where h is the identity-mapping. In section 3.5 we analyse whether evolutionary 
pressures may lead to efficient payoffs.
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Figure 3.3: The set of Equilibria with Gifts-in-Kind. Illustrated for the case where 5 — A5 and 
b <  c =  Ci. Darkgrey: Only Equilibrium I exists. Lightgrey: Multiple Equilibria: Equilibrium II 
(Type Revelation) and Equilibrium III (Signal Revelation) co-exists. Non-Coloured: Equilibrium 
II (Type Revelation) exists.
3.3 .5  H yb rid  Equilibria
In this section we construct equilibria where monetary gifts and gifts-in-kind are used 
by different interim types. Let the set of hybrid strategy profiles be S h -
Consider the following strategy profile, s*H:
G-players:
• t 0  play (m ,I).
•  ti play ( t ,J ) .
• <2 P ^y  (ng, N I)
R-players:
• If R  receives m  at the gift giving stage then she plays I. If R  receives a gift-in-kind 
and d(r, 9) =  0 then play / ,  otherwise play N I.
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In s*u to types send money, whereas t\ types send gifts that they think the receiver 
likes. R  invests whenever she gets a monetary gift, but if she receives a gift-in-kind she 
only invests if she likes the gift.
For every B  we define p < p(B) < 1, with the property that p(B) is decreasing in B  
(see appendix B.2.4 for details).
Proposition 15. Restrict attention to s G S h •
1. I f  B >  § +  b for all B  then no s G Sh  is an equilibrium profile.
2. For b < c < c\ and B  < |  +  b for some B:
(a) s*H is an equilibrium profile if and only if  B  G [B (c ), |  +  b] and p G [p(B), 1).
(b) The set of hybrid equilibrium profiles S*H C S h  is either empty or S*H = {*'!/}.
Note again th a t this holds for any h which is one-to-one.
B
B
", f ; u "  .I,. V:
 (.---
~'k ’.f , , v r--\
B
P 1 P0
Figure 3.4: Hybrid Equilibria. Illustrated for the case where b <  c — C\ and 6 — A5. Lightgrey: 
Hybrid Equilibrium (Signal Revelation) exists. Non-Coloured: No Hybrid Equilibrium exists.
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3.4 W elfare
In this section we establish welfare properties of equilibria. Welfare is evaluated ex-ante, 
before players are informed of their own type.
One can think of the ordering of equilibria along two dimensions: an intrinsic and 
an informational (extrinsic) value of gift giving. The intrinsic value of gift giving refers 
to the value of the gift in itself, separate from the social interaction that the gift giving 
practices generate in equilibrium. The extrinsic value refers to how well the gift is at 
realising the potential of social interaction. The extrinsic value can be separated into 
two parts: (1) How good is the practice at generating interaction when it is beneficial to 
do so? (2) How good is the practice at helping players to avoid engaging in the project 
when it is beneficial to do so?
3.4 .1  T h e Inform ational Value o f G ift C onventions
In this section we highlight two different ways in which to think about the informational 
value of gift conventions. It is possible to think abstractly as a gift giving convention 
as an information structure, where the state of the world, which in our context is the 
distance between the giver and the receiver, is correlated with the gift that the receiver 
gets. Blackwell’s ordering of information structures then say something about which gift 
conventions a receiver prefers, when considering only the informational value. We first 
offer a brief review of the Blackwell Ordering of information structures. Then we present 
the Blackwell ordering in the context of our model. Finally we shall think of gift giving 
conventions in terms of a standard statistical test subject to type I and type II errors. 
Blackwell Ordering Consider two random variables and x u which are both corre­
lated with an unobserved state of the world s E S  =  { 1 , . . . ,  V}, N  being finite. Let X  
be the finite sample space of the random variables. Then we can identify the matrices:
H u  i • •, P i n V\\  , ■
T  =
I • j L^riN
, V =
Vn 1 i • • , VnN
where the entries:
Hij -  P r(xM =  x l \s = Sj) > 0 
Vij =  Pr(aj„ =  xi\s = sj) > 0
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are the probability of receiving signal Xi conditional on the state of the world being Sj
when observing x M and x u respectively. We shall refer to ^  and v as the information
structure generated by x/t and x u respectively.
x fl Blackwell dominates x v if and only if there exists a stochastic transformation 
m atrix Q :
<7ll > • • • > Q l n
q =  : •.  ;
Qnl  > • ■ • 5 Qnn
where qtJ >  0, Y a =i =  ^  such that:
v = Qfi
The m atrix Q is sometimes called a garbling of [i, since the transformation Qfi garbles 
the information contained in ft.
Blackwell’s Theorem shows that if Blackwell dominates x v then independent of 
the underlying decision problem a decision maker prefers to observe rather than x v 
ex-ante5. If x M is Blackwell preferred to x u then we write x ^ y  x u. Blackwell’s result is 
weak in the sense th a t the Blackwell ordering is an incomplete ordering. Two information 
structures x M and x v cannot be ordered if: x M x v and x v )f x^.
In the context of our model one can think of each equilibrium strategy involving gift 
giving as inducing a particular information structure which the receiver makes her in­
ference from. In the context of the model the states of the world are the possible types 
of the gift giver. Since only distance between the types of R  and G is payoff relevant, 
then the possible states of the world are: d = 0 ,1,2. The sample space of the signal is 
the gift space (including no gift). Thus the receipt of a particular gift will depending on 
which equilibrium being played, be correlated with the state of the world.
We denote an information structure associated with an equilibrium of the game as 
Tli(j). i refers to the medium of exchange used in the equilibrium, i.e. either gifts in 
A'(ind), M(oney) or a i/(ybrid) equilibrium, j  refers to the type of equilibrium that is 
either type /, II  or III.
The ordering is displayed in the following table6.
5See e.g. Kihlstrom  (1984).
6A sim ple exercise in a system  of linear equations. Details is available upon request
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n  * ( / / ) n  k ( i i i ) n * ( / ) n  M( ii ) n  M(i) II//
T.Ik  (II) - y N.A. y y y
n  k ( i i i ) * - N.A. y * +
n * ( / ) N.A. N.A. - N .A . y N .A
n  M ( i i ) ¥■ N.A. - N .A . *
n  M (i) N .A . - *
n H * * N.A. y -
An entry >- indicates that the information structure in the row entry black- 
well dom inates the colum n entry. N. A.  indicates that the two inform ation  
structures do not co-exist.
The table shows the Blackwell ordering of information structures for the gift giving 
game. The receiver prefers Equilibrium II with gifts-in-kind with type revelation (s*n  K), 
whenever it is available. When the information structure is not available then any 
decision maker prefers to observe the information structure generated under Equilibrium 
I with gifts-in-kind (s) K ).
Note tha t conditional on sending a gift G and R  players preferences over the action of 
the gift receiver at the investment stage are aligned. In particular if the signal indicates 
a good match then both players prefer that R  invests, whereas if the signal indicates a 
bad match then it is in the interest of both players that R  does not invest (the decision 
to invest would give both players expected negative payoff, whereas not investing yields 
a small benefit to R  and a small loss to G ).
The intuition why equilibria with gifts-in-kind blackwell dominates equilibria with 
money is roughly that gifts-in-kind is a ’’richer language” for G to communicate her 
beliefs about R's type to R. The comparative richness of the language gives R  the 
possibility to condition the investment decision on a richer set of signals, in particular 
when a gift reveals that teaming up would probably be bad, R  has the opportunity to 
term inate the relationship. Both players prefer this to ending up in a bad match, the 
small loss tha t G suffers from the termination being preferable to the larger loss involved 
in being tied up in a bad match.
H y p o th e s is  T esting  an d  In fe rence  E rro rs  Another useful way to compare infor­
mation structures comes from looking at inference errors associated with information 
structures. Take a particular information structure II, and let a n  denote the probability 
that a G player does not send a gift even though the players are compatible (a type I
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error). Let pu be the probability with which the project is implemented even though 
players are not compatible (a type II  error).
Since the signal is noisy with positive probability G will be making a type I  error, 
that is failing to send a gift even though players are compatible. This error probability 
a  is the same across equilibria with gifts in kind and with money which involves the 
same intensity of gift giving. On the other hand the equilibrium with gifts-in-kind leaves 
R  some discretion over whether to implement the project or not, i.e. depending on the 
particular gift th a t she receives. Consequently equilibria with gifts-in-kind involve fewer 
type II  errors, i.e. the probability P that the project is implemented eventhough players 
are not compatible.
Conditional on gift reception players share the same interest, so leaving some discre­
tion to R  benefits both players. This observation relates to the informational value of 
gift giving, and confirms the Blackwell ordering.
Thus R  players ordering of equilibrium outcomes essentially involves a trade-off be­
tween the informational and the intrinsic value. Because the intrinsic value of gifts de­
pend on the equilibrium played R  players have a preference for gifts conventions which 
involves money.
3.4.2 O rdering o f  Equilibrium  O utcom es
In this section we first partially characterise G and R ’s ordering of equilibrium outcomes 
for any b < c < c\. We show that for some parameter values which admit multiple 
equilibria then G and R's ordering are not identical. Players disagree about which 
equilibrium they would like to play.
Next we show that disagreement is limited in the following sense. For any fixed 
level of signal quality p* < 1, and when the cost of gift giving is just sufficient to deter 
freeriding, i.e in the limit as c =  6, there is a sufficiently small cost c* such that if 
b = c < c* then for all levels of B  and p < p* the players ordering of equilibrium 
outcomes coincide.
Partial Ordering of Equilibria
In this section we partially characterise G and R's  ordering of equilibrium outcomes for 
any b < c < c\ .
We first present the partial ordering of equilibrium outcomes for G players. We 
consider two cases. In the first case we restrict attention to welfare in equilibria that
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involves gift giving. In the second case we consider welfare in all equilibria. The proofs 
of the statements of this section are all relegated to appendix B.4.
Proposition 16. Consider any fixed c and b such that c\ > c > b.
1. Consider the set of equilibria in which gifts are sent.
(a) I f  s*j K is an equilibrium profile, then G achieves her highest equilibrium payoff 
under sj K , independent of h.
(b) U s*ji K is an equilibrium profile, then G achieves her highest equilibrium 
payoff under s*n  K , independent of h.
2. Consider the set of all equilibria:
(a) I f  s i ,k  is an equilibrium profile then there is p < 1 such such that an equilib­
rium with no gifts is preferred by G to all other equilibrium profiles if  p > p.
(b) I f  s ji  k  then there is p < 1 such such that an equilibrium with no gifts is 
preferred by G to all other equilibrium profiles i f  p > p.
The first part follows from the Blackwell Ordering and the observation that condi­
tional on gift giving R  always takes the decision that G would like her to conditional 
on receiving a particular signal. The fact that conditional on existence each information 
structure has the same cost, implies that the Blackwell ordering includes all payoff rel­
evant information. Also note that the condition for equilibrium s*j K to exist is exactly 
that s*jj K does not exist.
To see the intuition for the second part note that as p approaches 1, then G ’s signal 
reveals R 's  type almost perfectly. Therefore the probability that the project is imple­
mented when the match is bad approaches 0 as p goes to one. But G is sending costly 
gifts in order to exactly avoid bad matches. Therefore G prefers that R  invests uncon- 
ditonally rather than having to send a costly gift.
The next proposition shows the partial ordering of equilibrium outcomes for R  players. 
It shows that when parameters are such that only Equilibrium I (either with gifts or 
money) exists, then R  players prefer the equilibrium with gifts-in-kind, where h is the 
identity mapping, that is G players give gifts that they think R  likes (and in fact like 
themselves). When parameters are such that equilibrium I with gifts-in-kind does not 
exist, then for every B  and c < c\ there is some sufficiently large threshold for the signal 
quality, such that when signal quality is below this threshold then equilibrium II (type
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revelation), using some h, is the preferred equilibrium outcome. When the signal quality 
is above the threshold then some other equilibrium is preferred.
Recall that welfare is evaluated ex-ante before players know their own type. We 
assume that the welfare criterion treats each of the types of R  symmetrically. That 
is among any h which is one-to-one we can restrict attention to h which do not treat 
different types of R  asymmetrically. To this end let h° be the identity mapping. Let h+ 
be the mapping which for all 9 G © is mapped to 9', where 9' is located distance one 
from 9 going clockwise around the circle. Likewise define h~ going counter-clockwise.
P ro p o s itio n  17. Suppose c\ > c>  b. Consider the set of all equilibria.
1. Suppose s*j K is an equilibrium profile. There is a p' sufficiently large and a B_ < 
B ' < B(c), such that for all B 1 < B  < Biff) and p > p' then R  achieves her highest 
equilibrium payoff under s*j NG. Otherwise R  achieves the highest equilibrium 
payoff under s*j K where h = h°.
2. Suppose s*j K is an equilibrium profile.
(a) For B  < B ff) :  R  achieves her highest equilibrium payoff under s*jj K , where 
h is either h°, h+ or h ~ .
(b) For B  >  B ff):  There is p(B) < 1 such that i f  p < p (B ) then R  achieves 
her highest equilibrium payoff under s*jj K where h is either h°, h+ or h ~ . I f  
p > p(B) then some other equilibrium profile achieves a higher payoff.
The intuition for the result that when S*I.K  is an equilibrium profile, then R  may 
prefer the equilibrium payoff from s*jj NG is as follows. In s*r K only to types invest and 
send gifts, whereas in s*n  NG both to and t\ types invest. Thus it is the relatively high 
cost of gift provision that deters t\ types from sending gifts and investing, eventhough 
expected project benefits are strictly positive. The benefit then of playing according to 
s*n NG is tha t good matches reach the project stage. The drawback is that more bad 
matches also reach the project stage, and that R  does not receive gifts. As p approaches 
one the probability that a bad match reaches the project stage approaches 0, therefore 
eventually R  will prefer the higher project intensity associated with s*u  NG rather than 
receiving gifts.
For the second part note that when s*n  K is an equilibrium profile then t\ types also 
invest and send gifts. Compared to a no gift equilibrium, a gifts in kind equilibrium is 
preferred on the grounds that gifts help sort bad matches from good matches, and the
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receiver gets gifts which may give positive utility. Therefore a no gift equilibrium can 
never be preferred by R  to s*jj K .
To gain some intution for the trade-off between Equilibrium II (Type revelation) (restrict 
attention to the case where h is the identity mapping) and Equilibrium II (Money) note 
the following. In the type revealing equilibrium, the gift’s intrinsic value is less than in 
the money equilibrium. The probability of an cx-error, is identical in the two equilibria. 
But whereas the probability of a (3-error is 0 for the type revealing equilibrium it is 
positive in the money equilibrium. Now fix B  and p such that we are at the indifference 
point between the two equilibria and let B  increase. As B  increases the cost of making 
a /5-error decreases, whereas the intrinsic value is kept fixed as p is fixed. Hence we 
must move into the region where the equilbrium with money is strictly preferred as B  
increases.
Consider now the trade-off between Equilibrium II (Type revealing) and Equilibrium 
III (Signal Revealing) equilibrium. The /3-error is 0 in both equilibria. However the a- 
error in type revealing equilibrium is less than in signal revelation. Again fix B  and p 
such tha t we are on the indifference point between the two equilibrium outcomes. Now 
increase B. As B  increases the cost of making an cx-error increases, hence we must move 
into the region where Equilibrium II is preferred.
In sum, R  players face a trade-off between efficient extrinsic gift equilibria and effi­
cient intrinsic gift equilibria.
Propositions 16 and 17 show that for some parameter values players disagree about 
which equilibrium they prefer. The intuition is straightforward. In equilibria with gifts, 
and for a given level of gift giving intensity G players are only concerned about how well 
the convention is at sorting desirable interaction from undesirable interaction. However 
they may be willing to trade-off a few bad matches for not having to give gifts. R  
players however are also concerned about the gift which they receive, thus they will 
only be willing to trade-off not receiving gifts if the equilibrium leads to more intensive 
investment. However for a given level of gift giving intensity, the higher the intrinsic 
value of the gift the more willing they are to trade-off informational efficiency (type 
revealing equilibrium) for intrinsic efficiency (money, signal or hybrid equilibria).
Partial Ordering - A Limit Case
In this section we ask a different question. Suppose we impose an upper bound on the 
signal quality p < p* < 1. Is there some sufficiently small c* > 0 such that if the cost of
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the gift is just sufficient to deter free-riding, i.e. we look at the limit as c = b, then for 
every B  and p < p* among all equilibrium profiles there is some profile such that both 
G and R  achieve their highest equilibrium payoff?
The following proposition show that this is the case.
Proposition 18. Take any p* < 1, and suppose that the cost of gifts is just sufficient 
to deter free-riding. There exists a c*(p*) > 0 such that if  c = b < c*(p*) then for 
any B  and p < p* both G and R  achieves their highest equilibrium payoff, among any 
equilibrium profile, under s*jj K and where h is either h°, h+ or h ~ .
Proof. First note tha t in the limit as c =  b we cannot sustain s*j K as an equilibrium 
profile. For all param eter values of B  and p s*jj K is an equilibrium profile.
Now fix some p* < 1. We establish an upper limit on the cost of gift giving c*(p*) 
such that if c < c*(p*) then both G and R  achieves their highest equilibrium payoff 
under s*n  K .
It follows from proposition 16 that the relevant comparison for G is between the 
equilibria s*jj K and s*jj NG. For G to prefer the equilibrium payoff under s*jj K to s*jj NG 
c must be below the following threshold7:
We now tu rn  to R  The threshold values for c* are as follows: If c < c*riI K then 
s)i K , h  €  { h ° , h +  , h ~ }  is preferred to s*n i  K where:
Now let c*{p*) be equal to the smallest of these thresholds. It then follows that if
If c < c*H then s *jj  K , h  G { h ° ,  h + , h  }  is preferred to s*H where:
h  e  { h ° ,  h + , h  }  is preferred to s where:
c < c* then s*jj K , where h  is either h ° ,  h +  or h  yields the highest equilibrium payoff
to both players. □
7Follows from comparing the welfare under the two different equilibria, see proof of proposition 16 in 
appendix B.4, and setting b =  c and noting that the loss from not sending gifts is lowest when p =  p* 
and B  attains it m axim al value B.
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To gain some intuition for the result note that in S *I I . M  the probability that R  makes 
a /3-error is decreasing in the signal quality p. Fix p and B  such that we are on a point 
of indifference between the two equilibrium outcomes. Now lower c to d  < c. As d  
decreases the marginal intrinsic value of the money equilibrium falls relative to type 
revealing equilibrium. Hence at d  we must now be in the region where type revealing 
equilibrium is preferred.
The argument is similar when R  prefers s*IU K to s*u  K . The probability that R  
makes an c*-error is decreasing in p. As the cost falls from c to c' <  c the marginal 
intrinsic value of of s*in  K (signal) falls relative to s*jj K (type). Hence at d  we must 
now be in the region where equlibrium II (type) is preferred.
Proposition 18 says that for any level of the signal quality (strictly less than one) there 
is cost of gift giving sufficiently small, such that if the cost exactly deters the incentive 
to free-ride then the efficient equilibrium outcome involves the transfer of gifts-in-kind. 
Irrespective of this result there are still multiple equilibria. In the next section we ask 
whether an evolutionary process will select strategy profiles that gives rise to efficient 
payoffs.
3.5 E volu tion  and Selection
Why might we expect that we are more likely to observe equilibria with gifts in kind 
rather than  equilibria with monetary gifts? In this section we explore the possibility 
that evolution selects efficient equilibria. In particular we follow Kim and Sobel (1995) 
and extend the gift-giving game by allowing a round of cheap-talk prior to the gift- 
giving game. We then look at an evolutionary adaptive process and show that the only 
equilibrium outcome of the gift giving game which will be observed in the long run is 
the efficient equilibrium outcome.
Is it reasonable to expect that evolution will have any cutting-power in this set-up? 
There are several reasons why this might be so. First, the institution of gift-giving has 
a very long history in human culture (Mauss 1990). This allows evolutionary arguments 
a sufficient time-scale to operate. Second, we frequently engage in gift-giving, thus we 
might expect that evolutionary pressures can operate relatively fast. The underlying 
argument of Waldfogel (1993) is that giving gifts in kind is an inefficient institution and 
tha t we should expect in time to see it replaced by the more efficient institution of cash 
giving. The interpretation that we have in mind is imitation of more succesful strategies 
rather than reproductive success. Since money in terms of the history of human evolution
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is a relatively recent development, one might argue that social evolution has not yet had 
sufficient time to operate on this particular institution. The argument developed here is 
stronger and shows tha t even if the institution of cash giving had preceded the institution 
of giving gifts in kind, then giving gifts in kind will eventually emerge and will be the 
dominant institution supporting social exchange in the long run.
3.5 .1  A  M od el o f  E volu tion
In this section we adapt the model of Kim and Sobel (1995) to our setting. Kim and 
Sobel’s main result however refer to games with common interest. Below we argue that 
the gift giving game is not a game with common interest, so that we have to extend Kim 
and Sobel (1995)’s result to our setting.
Suppose th a t we extend the gift giving game with a round of cheap talk, where only 
7? players are allowed to talk. We refer to this extended game as the communication 
game. Prior to learning their type a R  player may send a message to G from some finite 
set of words W . W  contains at least two words. After R  has sent the message the gift 
giving game is played (which we refer to as the underlying game). A strategy for G 
maps each statem ent in W  to a strategy in the underlying game. For R  a strategy is 
some statem ent in W  and a strategy in the underlying game.
Suppose there are 5N  (finite) players in each Q and TZ respectively. Each player in a 
population is matched in a round robin fashion with every player in the other population. 
The payoffs to the players is the sum of payoffs for each match in the underlying game.
D y n am ics  Time is discrete: s =  1,2, . . .  Assume that the population starts in an 
arbitrary strategy profile. At each time instance each player meets all of the other 
players in the other population and plays the communication game once.
At the end of each round one member is given the opportunity to revise her strategy. 
A strategy for player role i, i = R ,G , Zi, improves upon another strategy, z', if zi gives 
rise to a payoff which is at least as high as the payoff to z\ against the current population. 
We follow Kim and Sobel in assuming that the strategy revision obeys:
1. Exactly one member of the population may change her strategy after each round.
2. A player who has performed worst in her population in a round revises her strategy 
with positive probability.
3. Any strategy that improves upon the strategy being replaced is adopted with 
positive probability.
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4. A strategy tha t does not improve upon the revising player’s strategy is not adopted.
Let a strategy profile be denoted 2 . Let A {z) be the set of strategy profiles that can 
be reached when the process is started at 2 . Extend this notation to sets of population 
profiles Z, such tha t A (Z) is the union of A(2 ) for 2  E Z.
Following Kim and Sobel (1995) a set Z* is stable if A(Z*) =  Z*.
G am es w ith  C o m m o n  In te re s ts  Following Kim and Sobel (1995) a game has com­
mon interests if in the set of feasible payoffs (of the underlying game) there is a unique 
point tha t strongly Pareto-dominates all other feasible payoffs. The canonical example 
of game with common interest is a two player 2 by 2 coordination game, where one of 
the equilibria strongly pareto-dominates the other equilibrium
I11 our context the strategies supporting the efficient equilibrium payoff of the under­
lying game does not have this property. To see this note th a t e.g. when c =  b and play 
is according to strategies that lead to efficient equilibrium payoffs then there is another 
strategy for G players tha t are preferred by R  players, namely that keeping the behav­
iour of to and t\  types unchanged, £2 types instead of not sending gifts and not investing 
send money gifts and invest. This improves K  s expected payoff, since compared to the 
efficient equilibrium strategy she gets a money transfer and gets to free-ride. Thus R  
earns a strictly positive payoff from a match with t 2  types, whereas when play is accord­
ing to the equilibrium profile leading to efficient payoffs she gets payoff 0. Moreover the 
behaviour of 1 2 types do not affect the payoff she gets when faced with either to or t\ 
types since these players do not send money.
C o m m en t Note that we only allow R  players to talk. The reason is that G players are 
indifferent between equilibria which differ only by which h is used. However R  players 
are not indifferent. By only allowing R  to talk we give her maximum scope for choosing 
her preferred equilibrium profile. If both players were allowed to talk then the process 
could visit equilibrium profiles (by drift) where h £ {hP,h+,h~}. In a model with two 
sided gift giving allowing both players to talk would allow both players to receive efficient 
gifts-in-kind.
3.5 .2  S election
The plan of this section is as follows. First we establish that from any starting configu­
ration with positive probability the process will end up in a configuration that leads to 
payoffs corresponding to an efficient equilibrium payoff in the underlying game. Thus 
strategies that lead to efficient payoffs are stable. While we are not able to show that
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once the process hits such a configuration then it will remain there forever, we are able 
to show that in any element of a stable set G players of type to and t\ play according to 
the efficient equilibrium profile for sufficiently low level of the cost of gifts c. The process 
will also visit states where e.g. t 2  types send gifts and invests. However as this is not an 
equilibrium of the underlying game G players will eventually update their strategy and 
the process will return to the efficient equilibrium profile of the underlying game. Thus 
such a stable set is relatively small.
We focus our analysis on the case where the cost of the gift is just sufficient to deter 
free-riding th a t is ci > c =  b. This facilitates the analysis without losing the qualitative 
message. In particular this means tha t equilibrium s7/ K exists for all parameter values, 
and consequently S*I,K  does not exist.
Let Z* be the set of all strategy profiles where R  sends some message and plays according 
to her part of the strategy profile s7/ K where h £ {h°, h+, h~}, in the underlying game, 
and where G for any message that she receives plays according to her part of s7/ K .
We first show th a t from any starting strategy profile with positive probability the 
process hits a strategy profile in Z*.
P ro p o s it io n  19. Suppose 0 < b = c < c*{p*). Z* is contained in a stable set.
Proof. S tart from any arbitrary strategy profile where play in the underlying game is 
not currently according to s*n  K . One by one, while G  players strategies remain fixed, 
let R  players revise their strategies such that they respond optimally to the current G 
population. Suppose this leads them to send message w '. Now let role G players adjust 
their strategies, one by one, such that they all respond optimally to the strategy of R  
players. In particular suppose that for any message t2  types do not send gifts and do 
not invest (recall that this is a dominant strategy for t 2  types). Further suppose that 
in response to some unsent message w" they play according to their part of s |7 K . By 
proposition 18 s7/ K leads to efficient equilibrium payoffs. Now let R  players revise their 
strategy such that they send w" and play according to their part of s*n  K . Finally let 
G players update their strategy such that in response to any w they play according to
The next proposition shows that if the process is started in a strategy profile con­
tained in Z* then via drift the process will leave it again. However for any B  and 
p < p* < 1 there is a sufficiently low cost level 0 < b =  c < c**(p*) such that in any 
other element of a stable set to and t\  types play according to K in the underlying 
game.
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P ro p o s it io n  20. For any B  and p < p* <  1 there is a c**{p*) > 0 sufficiently small, 
such that i f  b = c < c**(p*) then a strategy profile z is an element of a stable set i f  and 
only if  to and t\ types play according to s*j K in the underlying game.
Proof. The proof is in two steps. In the first step we show that via drift we can transit 
to a state where to and t\ play according to s*j K , while £2 types do not play according 
to s*j K, but play such that inference from to and t\ types are unaffected (e.g. let them 
send money and invest) and that we can return to a strategy profile in Z* again. Then 
in the second step we show that we cannot transit to other profiles. Details can be found 
in appendix B.5. □
Taken together the two propositions show that the only states which are stable are 
states such th a t to and t\ types give gifts-in-kind according to an efficient convention.
C o ro lla ry  5. Suppose b = c < c**(p*). Then in any stable state G-players of type to 
and t\ earn the efficient equilibrium payoff of the underlying game. R-players earn at 
least a payoff corresponding to the efficient equilibrium payoff of the underlying game.
C o m m en ts  Kim and Sobel (1995) show that in games of common interest play will 
eventually settle down on equilibrium profiles which gives rise to efficient payoffs. The 
gift giving game presented here is not pure common interest, but shares many of i t ’s 
features. In particular both players have a common interest in using gifts-in-kind as a 
vehicle for generating social interaction, at least if the signal quality is not too good. 
However R  players are also interested in extracting gifts and free-riding on £2 types, 
even when it is not in £2 types interest. That is we can find parameter restrictions such 
that R  have common interests with gift giving to and £1 types but never with £2 . This 
disagreement is the reason why we are not able to select for profiles which generate the 
efficient equilibrium payoff.
3.6 C onclusion
This paper has provided a stylised argument supporting the social practice of giving 
gifts-in-kind as a more efficient convention than a social convention which involves the 
exchange of money. We identified a trade-off between the extrinsic and intrinsic value 
of an equilibrium with gifts. We also presented an evolutionary argument which when 
applied to our model selects an equilibrium with gifts-in-kind. In our model with no gift 
giving there is no social interaction. Moreover it is important that the gift is given away.
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If one could simply signal one’s type by wearing a Rolex, then supposedly free-riders 
could enter a population, buy themselves a Rolex, and then use it repeatedly to free-ride 
on other players.
An equilibrium with gifts-in-kind is more efficient along the extrinsic dimension rel­
ative to equilibria with money, because of how it affects the receiver’s beliefs about the 
giver’s beliefs about the receiver’s type. When a player receives money she only knows 
that the giver thinks that the players are compatible, however with positive probability 
the giver’s signal was not correct. When she receives a gift-in-kind e.g. according to 
the rule: give-her-something-that-you-would-like-yourself then when she receives the gift 
she is able to distinguish (perfectly) between the event tha t the two are compatible or 
not. The personal gift reveals something about the giver’s ’’absolute” type, not just her 
relative type. This is beneficial to both players because it allows the receiver to avoid 
interaction in cases where i t ’s in both players interest to do so.
The model presented here does not explain the widespread practice of generic gifts, 
such as chocolate, flowers etc. But such gifts rarely serve more purpose than to perhaps 
signal to the receiver tha t the giver is an interested party and would want to continue 
interaction. As relationships mature, and the stakes become higher the nature of gift 
giving changes profoundly into one where what is given becomes important for the 
decision to continued interaction. According to Caplow (1982, 1984) the wrong gift may 
put severe strains on a relationship, and may sometimes be the cause of i t’s termination.
The model may ultimately provide a way of estimating the value of social interaction. 
E.g. the welfare loss found by Waldfogel (1993) can be interpreted as a lower bound on 
the value of social interaction.
Chapter 4
R evisiting Schelling’s Spatial 
Proxim ity M odel
4.1 In troduction
Segregation in residential areas is often claimed to be associated with bad economic 
outcomes. Several empirical studies has shown that neighbourhood effects are important 
determinants of human capital accumulation, crime-rates, level of unemployment, etc. 
(Borjas (1995), Topa (2001)). At the same time although the process is clearly dynamic 
and subject to change, residential segregation is a recurring and remarkable stable social 
phenomenon in many larger cities in western societies, and is perceived by the polity to 
strike at the very foundation of social justice.
Schelling’s (1969, 1971, 1978)1 model of local interaction in neighbourhoods is as 
stunningly simple as the results are striking. Schelling shows that weak incentives for 
residents to live with people like themselves at the micro-level can lead to remarkable or­
der and relatively high segregation at the macro-level. Segregation emerges in Schelling’s 
model although none of the residents have a strict preference for segregated local neigh­
bourhoods.
In Schelling’s model residents live on a line. There are two types of residents A  and 
B. Each resident is concerned about the composition of her local neighbourhood. Her 
preferences are such that she prefers to have at least one of the two neighbours adjacent 
to her to be of the same type as herself. Schelling then considers an adaptive procedure 
through which residents are given the opportunity to revise their current choice of loca­
tion. The adjustment process ends when no individual can move to a location where she
1 Schelling (1978) considers interaction in two dim ensions and allows for em pty locations.
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will get higher utility. The process admits many stable neighbourhood configurations 
ranging from fully integrated to fully segregated configurations. By simulation with 
pen-and-paper Schelling shows tha t when the process has converged the composition of 
local neighbourhoods are often relatively segregated.
In this paper I revisit Schelling’s spatial proximity model of interaction in one-dimensional 
local neighbourhoods2. The main question that the paper addresses is: How robust is 
segregation? In particular how does it depend on the preferences of agents? How does it 
depend on the behavioural assumptions about how agents find new locations when they 
decide to leave their current location? Does it depend upon whether location revision 
is noisy? How long do we have to wait for segregation to obtain, and does it depend 
on the preferences of the agents? Young (1998, 2001), Panes and Vriend (2003) have 
previously revisited Schelling’s model using some of the techniques used here3. I defer 
the discussion of these papers and the differences with this paper to a later section.
In a stochastic variant of Schelling’s model, where agents occasionally make loca­
tion mistakes, I show that segregation remains robust under two different assumptions 
about the preferences of agents: when they have Schelling type preferences and when 
they have a strict preference for integration. However the time for segregation to obtain 
depends on preferences. Evolutionary forces tend to push neighbourhood evolution to­
wards segregation, but when agents have a preference for integration waiting times are 
much longer. The basic reason is the following. W ith Schelling type preferences in order 
to transit from a stable state  to a (fully) segregated state it is sufficient that agents make 
relatively costless mistakes moving from one cluster of agents like themselves to a single 
cluster containing all agents like themselves. When agents have a strict preference for 
diversity these relatively costless opportunities arise more seldomly, as agents must now 
move from integrated locations to the border of a large cluster of agents which offers 
an integrated location. Thus it is the supply of integrated locations which largely de­
termines how fast the segregated state is reached. W ith Schelling type preferences it is 
the (much larger) supply of locations which offer (weak) majority neighbourhoods that 
determines waiting times.
2Schelling (1971, 1978) also looked at tw o-dim ensional neighbourhoods but the study of these is
outside the scope o f th is paper.
3M obius (2000) considers a hybrid m odel of Schelling’s neighbourhood tipping m odel allowing for
local interaction. In th is m odel instead of relocating w ithin the residential area unhappy residents leave 
the area and are replaced w ith  residents from a pool of potential residents. M obius uses this m odel to  
explain rapid ghetto  form ation in Chicago.
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How can the numerical simulation results be reconciled with the empirical observation 
that we tend to see segregation in a wide variety of settings? In our model the main 
reason why states that are not fully segregated tend to be observed for long periods 
of time is that players are boundedly rational in a specific way. In particular they do 
not attem pt to make any predictions about the evolution of neighbourhood structures; 
but instead optimise myopically. A more sophisticated player who tried to predict the 
evolution of her local neighbourhood might not only be motivated by living with someone 
like herself, but also how many others like herself who lives close by. Intuitively since 
residents sometimes make errors in their location decision, living in clusters with more 
people like yourself might be more desirable since the probability of ending up living 
with people different from yourself sometime in the future decreases. I show that if 
players care about their local neighbourhood composition and the size of the cluster of 
players like themselves they belong to enters lexicographically, then convergence to the 
set of segregated states vastly speeds up. One interpretation is tha t the fear of isolation 
leads to segregation.
Is the segregation result robust to small pertubations of preferences in the pop­
ulation? In large populations it is reasonable to think tha t there is some degree of 
heterogeneity. I assume that a small fraction of residents are “social activists” . These 
residents strictly prefer diversity, but prefer to live in a minority rather than living only 
with people like themselves (formally I flip their 2nd and 3rd ranked alternative relative 
to the rest of the population). For the case where all other players have a preference for 
diversity the presence of just one “social activist” is sufficient to upset the result that 
segregation obtains in the long run. In fact only integrated states are now stable. This 
suggests a significant role for “social activists” in creating better outcomes. A single 
social activist is needed in order for pareto-superior outcomes to be selected in the long 
run. This suggest that the model where players have a preference for diversity is not 
robust against a small pertubation to the distribution of preferences in the population. 
The model with Schelling type preferences is robust to this pertubation.
R e la te d  L i te r a tu re  Since this paper is not the first paper to revisit Schelling using 
the technique of stochastic stability I will give a relatively thourough outline of the main 
differences to this paper.
Young (1998) presents a formal analysis of a model similar to Schelling’s. Again 
there are two types of residents, and residents have the same preferences as in Schelling. 
Young considers an adjustment process through which two residents can agree to swap
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flats, specifically they exchange locations if at least one of the residents are better off 
and the other is no worse off after the swap. This adjustment process has many stable 
states, but importantly in every stable state all residents will have at least one neighbour 
like themselves. Young then introduces a small amount of noise into the system so that 
unfavourable trades may sometimes take place by mistake. As the noise vanishes there 
is strong selection among the stable states. Young shows tha t the only stable states that 
survive this refinement are precisely the segregated states.
Young (2001) considers a variation of Young (1998) where residents have a strict 
preference for integration, th a t is their most preferred outcome is to live in an inte­
grated neighbourhood with one of each type. Young shows tha t with these preferences 
segregated states remain the only stochastically stable states. Thus even though resi­
dents prefer to live in integrated neighbourhoods the end up living only with their own 
type. To see how Young reaches his result and to motivate a different formalisation 
of Schelling’s model I look more closely at Young’s model. In Young if a resident has 
only neighbours different from herself then she is discontent, if she has only neighbours 
like herself then she is moderately content and if she lives in a mixed neighbourhood 
then she is content. There are no empty locations in the model, instead residents may 
exchange locations with one another, and they will do so with positive probability only 
if the exchange is pareto-improving. This assertion is true provided that residents are 
perm itted to give side payments to one another. In particular in order to show that the 
unperturbed dynamic process will converge to a state in which all residents have at least 
one neighbour like themselves, Young relies on a side payment between two residents of 
opposite types: one resident who is discontent and one resident who is content (so that 
after the exchange of locations the content resident is now moderately content, while the 
discontent resident is content). Schelling’s original model does not involve pair-wise flat 
exchanges, rather discontent residents make unilateral moves (residents simply squeeze 
in between two other residents). Pair-wise exchanges may be a better “real” world ap­
proximation, than Schelling’s assumption. However I prefer a formalisation as close to 
Schelling as possible in order to be able to isolate the separate effects of the building 
blocks of the model. The formalisation presented here focuses on how individual actions 
lead to segregation more clearly than  in Young. In my model individuals make location 
decisions unilaterally.
Young does not numerically simulate the model. One may wonder how long it takes 
before the set of stochastically stable state is reached. The simulations presented in this 
paper suggests th a t the model a long the lines of Young may display very long waiting
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times, making the medium run behaviour of the process more interesting.
Panes and Vriend (2003) also study Schelling’s model. Their paper may be viewed as 
an attem pt to isolate the crucial assumptions, responsible for driving the segregation re­
sult in the one- and two-dimensional version of Schelling’s model. For the purposes of this 
discussion I focus on the one-dimensional setting. In their variant of Schelling’s model 
Panes and Vriend show that segregation occur under quite mild assumptions about pref­
erences over neighbourhood composition. In particular segregation obtains even when 
residents have a strict preference for perfectly diverse neighbourhoods. Although our 
behavioural assumptions are quite different this paper delivers the same message, with 
certain qualifications outlined below. Thus our approaches may be viewed as compli­
mentary.
Our papers differ in our behavioural assumptions about how agents find new loca­
tions. Panes and Vriend consider a stochastic non-noisy best-response dynamic4, and 
show that the dynamics always converges to the set of segregated states. I consider a 
better reply dynamics, which I find more appropriate for this low rationality environ­
ment5 and implicitly assume (as did Schelling) th a t there is some small cost of changing 
locations. Panes and Vriend on the other hand not only assume that this is costless, but 
that players move with positive probability to locations which leaves utility unchanged. 
This assumption partially drives their segregation result.
Whereas Panes and Vriend assert th a t “A sufficient condition [for segregation] on 
the utility function is that it implies a strict preference for perfect integration” (Panes 
and Vriend 2003, pp. 42-43) this is not the case in our set-up. In our set-up if all players 
strictly prefer integration to being in a minority to being in a (local) majority, then the 
only stable outcome is th a t of perfect integration. This suggest that segregation is non- 
robust to the behavioural assumptions. Specifically our results differ because Panes and 
Vriend consider a best reply dynamics, whereas I assume that strategy revision follows 
better reply. This is crucial in the one dimensional set-up, since segregation in Panes 
and Vriend is driven by the fact th a t a perfectly integrated location, is strictly preferred, 
and exists in any configuration (as it does in my set-up). This implies that how players 
order low ranked neighbourhoods is inconsequential. In contrast when players follow 
better replies this is no longer the case.
4T he stochastic  elem ents concern who gets to  up date  and conditional on updating a residents m ixes
between all o f her best responses.
5Schelling also seem ed to  favour th is interpretation, stating  that a resident moves to the closests
location where she is better off.
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Perhaps the most im portant difference between our papers is th a t the present paper 
also considers the robustness of segregation when there is some heterogeneity in pref­
erences. In particular I show that slightly perturbing the population composition away 
from a homogeneous population where players have a strict preference for integration, 
results in the perfectly integrated state being the only stable configuration. In Panes 
and Vriend's set-up such a pertubation would have no effect on their segregation result; 
effectively a consequence of the best reply dynamics they consider. Supposing tha t inte­
gration is desirable from a social perspective (and thus supposedly that at the individual 
level integration is desirable), Panes and Vriend (2003) argue th a t the forces driving seg­
regation cannot easily be stopped. The current paper has a more positive message: a 
few “social activists” may indeed help to signficantly overcome segregation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 4.2 I first study ana­
lytical properties of Schelling’s spatial proximity model when players live on a circle. 
I numerically quantiyfy how the model performs in terms of time to convergence and 
properties of equilibria which axe selected by the model. I then introduce noise to how 
residents make location decision and show th a t the only stochastically stable states are 
the segregated states. I also present numerical results which show that for the model at 
hand stochastic stability is misleading about what neighbourhood patterns which will be 
observed within an economically reasonable time horizon. I then present an alternative 
model where convergence to the stochastic stable states is relatively fast.
In section 4.3 I assume th a t residents value diversity per se. Nevertheless I show that 
in the long run neighbourhoods will be segregated. To test the robustness of this result 
I allow for heterogeneity in agents neighbourhood preferences. The segregation result is 
not robust to this pertubation.
In section 4.4 I provide some concluding remarks.
4.2 Local Interaction  w ith  Schelling Preferences
In this section I first revisit Schelling’s (1969, 1971) model of interaction where residents 
live on a line. I find conditions for a neighbourhood configuration to constitute a Nash 
Equilibrium. I also show th a t the process converges to a Nash Equilibrium starting from 
any configuration. I complement the analytical results with simulations.
Next I introduce noise to the location decision of residents. I set-up the model in 
a Markov framework which allows me to use stochastic stability (Young 1993) to select 
among equilibria of the game. I show that in the long run the process will spend almost
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all of its time in the set of segregated states. Then I show via simulations th a t the 
model performs poorly in the sense tha t the wait until a segregated state is reached, 
starting from a randomly drawn configuration, is so long as to make it meaningless from 
an economic perspective. I suggest an alternative model with better properties in terms 
of the wait until a segregated state is reached. This naturally comes at a cost: I have to 
make a stronger assumption about the preferences of residents.
4.2 .1  S ch ellin g ’s M odel
Schelling (1969, 1971) originally modelled interaction on a line. I follow him closely 
here except th a t I connect the line at both ends to form a circle. This allows me to 
abstract from specifying particular conditions at the two ends of the line, while leaving 
the qualitative results unchanged. Since I am particularly interested in what elements 
of the model th a t drives the selection of equilibria away from diverse neighbourhood 
structures I limit the analysis to the case where there is an equal (and even) number of 
residents of each type, such tha t a (fully) integrated equilibrium exists.
M odel
There are two types of players A  and B. There are n > 1 of each type, so that the 
total number of players is 2n. Each player occupies a relative position on the circle, 
and have preferences over her local neighbourhood composition. Let R  be the set of 
players/residents.
Let L  be the set of locations with typical element lj, i — 1 , . . . .  2n, that is there are 
exactly as many locations as there are residents. The neighbourhood of location li are 
all locations which are within r  >  1 steps of location I f .
Ni = {lj G L : \i — j\ < r}
Note tha t li is itself contained in the neighbourhood of k. I refer to the players contained 
in iVt (apart from the player at U) as the neighbours of li.
A  configuration a  is an assignment of all players to a position on the circle such that 
no two players occupy the same position. Given a configuration a let #iV*(cr) be the 
number of players of type t in the neighbourhood of k, t = A :B. I sometimes omit a 
when there can be no misunderstanding. Let the set of all possible configurations be E.
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P re fe ren c e s  Each player cares about her local neighbourhood composition. In partic­
ular a player of type t currently residing on location k  gets the following payoff:
Note that the player counts herself in the neighbourhood. Let the set of players who 
have utility 0 in a be R {a ) C R.
D y n am ics  Schelling specifies the following adjustment dynamics. Let time be discrete 
r  =  0.1. 2 . . . .  . Let the configuration at time r  be cr(r). S tart with an initial (randomly 
selected) configuration cr(0). In each period r  pick one player in ^(o-(r)) by some 
exogenously specified procedure e.g. pick the player in R{cr{r)) who has the lowest 
location number. Let her insert herself at a position in which she gets utility 1, such 
that she has to travel the fewest steps from her current position. If the player vacating 
li inserts herself at position l y  the new configuration < j ( t  + 1) is as follows: if the fewest 
number of steps from U and ly is accomplished by moving counter-clockwise then all 
players who resided on locations l j , j  = i ' , . . .  , i  — 1 are moved one position clockwise so 
that the new location of a player who resided at location l3 is now E.g. the player 
living on /;_i lives on li in the new configuration. And equivalently if the fewest number 
of steps can be accomplished by moving clockwise.
In this section I give analytical results for neighbourhood size r  =  1. When I present
simulation result I also examine the case where r > 1.
As a first step in the analysis I look for patterns tha t are stable with respect to the 
adjustment process. Then in the next step I establish tha t from any initial configuration 
Schelling’s model converges to the an element in the set of stable configurations.
S ta b le  C o n fig u ra tio n s  I will say tha t a configuration o  is stable under Schelling’s 
adjustment procedure if no player will want to change her location, given her current 
location and the assignment of the other players to locations on the circle.
D efin itio n  3. A cluster is a contiguous group o f at least two players of the same type. 
A cluster is minimal i f  it is of length 2.
D efin itio n  4. A configuration is in tegrated i f  all residents belong to a minimal cluster.
A configuration is segregated i f  all A players belong to the same cluster.
2r + l  ^  2
otherwise
A nalysis
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Throughout I will assume that n > 2 is even. This is a necessary condition for inte­
grated configurations to exist. Note that n even is not required for the characterisation 
of stable configurations, nor to establish convergence.
I now characterise stable configurations:
Proposition 21. Suppose r =  1 and n > 2. A configuration is stable with respect to 
Schelling’s dynamics i f  and only if  all players have at least one neighbour of her own 
type.
Proof. Suppose a player does not have any neighbours of her own type. Since the player 
can insert herself between any two players, independent of the configuration, she can 
move to a location where she has at least one neighbour of her own type.
Now suppose all players have at least one neighbour of her own type. Then she gets 
utility 1 and has no strict incentive to change her location. □
Let the set of stable configurations be denoted E* C L
Remark 9. Note that i f n >  4 and even the set of stable configurations contain the fully 
integrated configuration, in which all players live in a diverse neighbourhood:
■ ■ A A B B A A B B  ■
and the segregated configuration:
• • • A A A A B B B B • • •
I now establish th a t Schelling’s model with dynamic adjustment converges to some 
configuration in £* starting from any initial configuration, cr(0) G S.
Definition 5 (Convergence). The process has converged i f  at any period r ,  when play­
ers change locations according the dynamic adjustment process, the following holds:
a ( r  +  1) =  <t(t)
Given a configuration a, let a' be the configuration which is constructed from a by 
moving player i from location Oi to some location h a '  — cr^.iy
D efinition 6 (Pivotal). I f  fo r  some j  G N ai(o) \  {i} : Uj(o) ^  Uj{a') then player i 
is ex-ante pivotal, P ~ , for player j .  I f  u j(a )  =  Uj{cr') for all j  then she is ex-ante 
non-pivotal, Pq .
I f  for some j  G N ai(cr) \  {i} : u j(o )  ^  u j(a ') then player i is ex-post pivotal, P +, 
for player j  . I f  u j(o )  =  u j(o ')  fo r all j  then she is ex-post non-pivotal, Pq .
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In words, if i is ex-ante pivotal then the utility of one i ’s neighbours in a changes by 
i ’s move. If i is ex-post pivotal then the utility of one i ’s neighbours in o' changes by i ’s 
move.
I now show that Schelling’s dynamic process indeed converges:
Proposition 22. Suppose r =  1. Sta,rting frorri any initial configuration a £ S the 
process converges to some (j 6 S*.
Proof. Suppose <t ( t ) is not stable, otherwise we are done. Let the total number of 
players who receive utility 0 at time r  be m (r). For any configuration we must have 
0 < m (r) < 2n. Let one of these players be i. i lives on location cr*. i only has neighbours 
of the other type. Let her move to the location nearest to ai such that she has utility 
1. Such a position must exist since n  >  1, denote it k. By the rule of movement by 
inserting herself a t li she now has one neighbour of each type. Let this new configuration
( 7  <T(a i , l i )  •
i is either P + (for the player of her own type) or Pq . If i is P + for j  £ Nifia') \  {t} 
then the utility of j  is now 1. i is either P~  (for either both or one of her neighbours) or 
Pq . If i is P~  for some j  £ N ai(cr) \  {?} then the utility of j  is now 1. Hence the lower 
and upper bound on the number of players with utility 0 in the next period, m (r +  1), 
is:
m (r) — 4 <  7?t(t + 1) < m(r )  — 1
The process converges if for any r: m(r )  =  0. Thus after at most m(0) steps the process 
has converged. □
Remark 10. Note that the convergence result does not rely on the order in which players 
who have utility 0 move.
Simulations
In this section I present results from numerical simulations of the model. Simulations 
were programmed in F o r t r a n  95 (Compaq Visual Fortran v6.6)6.
In the actual implementation of the dynamic process I used the following procedure. 
For each simulation the starting configuration is drawn as follows. I make n  draws from 
the set of locations, without replacement, with each location being equi-probable. Then
6T he Fortran programs are available on m y website: http://homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpvOO.
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the n players of a particular type are allocated to these locations. The n  players of 
the other type are then allocated to the remaining available locations. The dynamic 
adjustment process is implemented as follows: in each period I find the first player who 
does not have any neighbours like herself starting from location 1. This player then 
moves to the location nearest to her current location where she will have at least one 
player like herself. This ends the period, and the adjustment process is repeated until 
all players have at least one neighbour like themselves.
Neighbourhood Radius 1 I now provide some simulation results which shed further 
light on the analytical results above. In particular I show that the adjustment dynamics 
described above select a subset of the stable configurations.7
Eye Balling I first simulate a few randomly drawn starting configurations, and see 
where the process ends up. I let n =  10. A dot over a player indicates that they player 
currently has utility 0. Recall that the player a t the first position has neighbours at 
position 2 and 20.
Each succesive line represents one ” dotted” player starting from the left who updates 
her location.
A B A B B A A A B B A A B B A B A A B B
— b a a b b a a a b b a a b b A b a a b b
— B A A B B A A A B B A A B B B A A A B B  
with 4 clusters of each type.
b A b b A b A b a a a a b a a b b A b b
b b b a a b A b a a a a b a a b b A b b
b b b a a a b b a a a a b a a b b A b b
b b b a a a b b a a a a a a b b b A b b
B B B A A A B B A A A A A A A B B B B B
with 2 clusters of each type.
7I w il l  s o m e t im e s  r e fe r  t o  a  s t a b l e  c o n f ig u r a t io n  a s  a n  e q u il ib r iu m .
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As can be seen the adaptive process leads to relatively segregated states, but seldomly 
states with full segregation.
Table 4.1 gives descriptive statistics about the number of moves to convergence sta rt­
ing from a randomly drawn starting configuration8. The standard deviation, and the 
min and max of the distribution is also reported. The number of residents of each type 
in the simulations n = 10,20,50,100. The number of simulations in each column is 
100.000 .
Table 4.1: Convergence Time (Schelling)
Number of Residents of each Type
n  =  10 s II to o n = 50 n  =  100
Mean 2.931 5.767 14.273 28.081
Std. 1.176 1.635 2.588 3.646
Max 8 13 26 43
Min 0 0 4 13
N o t e :  1 0 0 .0 0 0  O b s e r v a t io n s  p e r  c o lu m n .
It can be seen from the table that convergence to an equilibrium is fast. Moreover the 
number of moves to convergence seems to increase linearly in the number of residents.
Table 4.2 shows the mean, standard deviation, the min and max number of clusters 
for different sizes of the interacting population. Again the number of residents is varied: 
n — 10, 20, 50,100. Note tha t an equilibrium with cluster size k = % is a (fully) integrated 
equilibrium where all players have one neighbour of each type, and that an equilibrium 
with cluster size equal to 1 is a (fully) segregated state. Any state with cluster size 
between k = 1 and k = |  is an equilibrium.
8 A s  p o in t e d  o u t  a b o v e  t h e  s t a r t in g  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  a r e  c h o s e n  in  t h e  fo l lo w in g  w a y : n o u t  o f  t h e  2n 
p o s i t io n s  a r e  c h o s e n ;  a l l  lo c a t io n s  h a v in g  e q u a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  b e in g  d r a w n . E a c h  o f  t h e  n p o s i t io n s  a re  
t h e n  p o p u la t e d  w i t h  o n e  t y p e  r e s id e n t s ,  w h i le  t h e  r e m a in in g  n p o s i t io n  a r e  p o p u la t e d  w it h  t h e  o th e r  
t y p e .  T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  is  a d o p t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p a p e r .
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Table 4.2: Number of Clusters in NE (Schelling)
Number of Residents of each Type 
n = 10 n =  20 n = 50 n — 100
Mean 2.338 4.491 10.972 21.783
Std. .591 .831 1.229 1.825
Max 5 8 16 29
Min 1 1 6 14
N o t e :  1 0 0 .0 0 0  O b s e r v a t io n s  p e r  c o lu m n .
It can be seen from the table that only a subset of the set of equilibria of the static 
game is selected.
In the following figure the frequency with which some equilibrium with k clusters 
of each type is selected under the dynamic adjustment process is graphed for 100.000 
randomly drawn starting configurations. It can be seen tha t the process selects a relative 
small set of the possible equilibria.
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Figure 4.1: D istribution of clusters in NE. Neighbourhood radius =  1. Number of 
residents of each type: n  =  10,20,50 and 100. 100.000 Observations per graph.
The distribution of clusters in the selected equilibria gives a straightforward proxy 
for how local neighbourhoods are composed. Even more informative is the distribution 
of local neighbourhoods. In the next table I report the median fraction of residents 
who have respectively 1 and 2 neighbours like themselves in their neighbourhood across 
simulations. Note that in any equilibrium all residents must have at least one neighbour 
like themselves. Also note tha t in the fully segregated state the fraction of players 
with 2 neighbours like themselves is 80%, 90%, 96% and 98% for n  =  10,20,50 and 100 
respectively.
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Table 4.3: Composition of local neighbourhoods in NE (Schelling)
Number of Residents of each Type
n — 10 n = 20 n  = 50 n  =  100
Number Like 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Median .4 .6 .4 .6 .44 .56 .44 .56
Min .2 0 .1 .2 .24 .36 .28 .42
Max 1 .8 .8 .9 .64 .76 .58 .72
Note: 100.000 O bservations per colum n.
It can be seen from the table tha t as the number of residents increase the median 
fraction of players who live in neighbourhoods only with residents like themselves de­
crease. The distribution also becomes less dispersed around the median as the number 
of residents increase.
Changing the Neighbourhood Radius I now illustrate how changing the size of 
how residents conceive of their local neighbourhood affects convergence time and the 
distribution of the local composition of neighbourhoods. When the neighbourhood radius 
is greater than  one, our clustering measure is no longer reliable as a configuration which 
is not an equilibrium when r  =  1 will be an equilibrium when r  > 1. E.g. when r  =  2 
the configuration where types alternate is now an equilibrium.
The following graph illustrates the convergence time to reach equilibrium. I have 
fixed the number of residents of each type to n =  100, and the neighbourhood radius is 
varied between r =  2, 3,4 and 5. As can be seen the number of moves to convergence is 
increasing in the size of neighbourhood radius. This relation is likely to be non-linear, 
since if individual neighbourhoods equal the whole residential area then all configurations 
are stable.




Graphs by Neighbourhood radius
150 0 
Convergence Time
50 1 0 0 150
Figure 4.2: Convergence Time to NE. Number of residents of each type =  100. Neigh­
bourhood radius r  =  2 ,3 ,4  and 5. 100.000 Observations per graph.
The following table gives summary statistics about the distribution of local neigh­
bourhoods once an equilibrium has been reached.
Table 4.4: Composition of local neighbourhoods in NE (Schelling)
Neighbourhood Radius
Number Like 2






r =  4 
7 8 <9
r — 5 
9 10
Median .27 .24 .49 .37 .18 .46 .48 .14 .39 .49 .12 .4
Min .14 .14 .29 .2 .1 .23 .24 .07 .15 .24 .06 .12
Max .25 .33 .72 .55 .25 .7 .69 .2 .69 .74 .16 .7
Note: 100.000 O bservations per colum n.
As can be seen from the table there is a significant number of residents who only live 
with people like themselves. W hen r =  2 only 27% of the residents live in neighbourhoods
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that are truly diverse, whereas 49% live in segregated neighbourhoods. When r  =  5 this 
drops to 40% but nevertheless this is remarkably robust. The extreme distribution when 
we ask what the maximal fraction of residents who have only neighbours like themselves 
is also remarkably stable around 70%.
4 .2 .2  S ch ellin g ’s M od el w ith  M istakes
Above I established that from any starting configuration the dynamic process converges 
to some Nash Equilibrium. However the set of Nash Equilibria is “large” , leaving the 
predictions of the model relatively weak. In this section I again look at Schelling’s 
model, but now assume that players sometimes with small probability make location 
choices th a t are left unexplained by the model. This allow us to use relatively strong 
results from Markov Chain Theory. In particular I use the concept of s t o c h a s t i c  s t a b i l i t y  
(Young 1993) as the criterion for selecting among equilibria of the game. Intuitively a 
configuration is stochastically stable if it is relatively easy to get to the configuration, 
and relatively difficult to escape from it once the configuration has been reached, as the 
probability of making mistakes goes to zero.
I begin this section with a brief overview of the building blocks for the concept of 
stochastic stability. Then I present a variant of Schelling’s model with mistakes, and 
show that the stochastic stable states are precisely the segregated states. The section 
ends with some simulation results.
Stochastic Stability
This section gives an overview of the necessary building blocks for the theory of stochastic 
stability. The review largely follows the exposition in Young (1998, chap. 3.3-3.4).
Elem ents of Markov Theory Let P  : E —> E be a finite state (time-homogenous) 
transition matrix. Specifically for every pair a ,  a' E E, the probability of transiting at 
time t from a  to o' at time t +  1 is Paa>. Paa> > 0 if the process can transit from a to 
a' in one step. Otherwise Paai = 0.
Our interest is in how much time the process spend in various configurations. Suppose 
the initial state is <7°. For each t  > 0, //(cr|cr°) (a random variable) is the relative 
frequency with which state a  is visited up until period t .  As t  —> oo ^*(cr|cj0) converges 
almost surely to a probability distribution //°°(cj|(J0), which is the a s y m p t o t i c  f r e q u e n c y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  conditional on starting the process at a 0 . ^°°(cr|cr0) can be interpreted as
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a selection criterion since it tells us which states tha t have support in the long run 
frequency distribution. If p ° ° ( a \ a 0 )  is independent of cr° then the process is e r g o d i c .
A state a '  is a c c e s s i b l e  from <r, a  —» o '  if
for some integer t  > 0.
where P l  is the t-fold product of P .  Two states a  and a '  c o m m u n i c a t e  if both are 
accessible from the other, a  ~  o ' . This relation partitions E into a set of equivalence 
classes, called communication classes. A r e c u r r e n t  c l a s s  of P  is a communication class 
such tha t no state not in the class is accessible from the class. Let E \ , . . .  ,E k  be the 
K  distinct recurrent classes of the chain. A state a  is r e c u r r e n t  if it is contained in a 
recurrent class, otherwise it is t r a n s i e n t .  Another way to understand this partitioning 
of states, is to see th a t a state a  is recurrent if conditional on starting the process in a  
the probability tha t the state is visited infinitely often is equal to 1. If the process has 
only one recurrent class and this class is the entire state space, E, then the process is 
i r r e d u c i b l e .
Let p  be a solution to:
p P  =  p ,  where p  > 0 and E ^ ct) = 1
It can be shown that the solution is unique if and only if P  has a unique recurrent class. 
p  is then referred to as the s t a t i o n a r y  distribution of P . If P  has a unique recurrent 
class then p  describes the time-average asymptotic behaviour, and is independent of the 
initial state <r°, tha t is:
lim p ( c r \ a ° )  =  p ° ° ( a \ a 0 )  =  p ( a )
t — K X )
If the system is also a p e r i o d i c , then for t  large enough the position of the system can 
be approximated by p .  Let v l { a \ a Q )  be the probability that the state is a  at time t  when 
it was started in cr°. Hence we write:
vl(o\o°) = P‘o„
If the process is irreducible and aperiodic then P l  converges to the matrix P°° in which 
every row equals the stationary distribution p :
lim i/(<t|<t°) =  p { & )  for all a  G E.
t — > oo
that is with probability one ^ ( a |cr°) and p t ( a \ a ° )  converge to p ( a ) .
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P e r tu r b e d  M ark o v  C h a in s  This section looks at a family of perturbations of the 
Markov Process P ,  parametrised by the error rate e. P € is a regular perturbed Markov 
Process (of P ° )  if P e is irreducible for every e £ (0, e*], and for every a. a' £ £ , P *  , 




if P*a, > 0 for some e > 0, then 0 < lim P* , / er a^,a^  <  oo for some r(cr, a') > 0.
e—+0
r(a .a ') is the resistance of the transition a  —>■ a ’. Note th a t r{a ,a ') =  0 if and only if
p„V > o.9
For any e > 0 the process is now irreducible, and from the results of the previous it 
has a unique stationary distribution, denote it by fic. Following Young (1993) a state a 
is stochastically stable if:
lim ue(cr) > 0.
e—0
The main theorem of Young (1993) stated below establishes that for all a this limit 
exists and tha t for each state this limit equals the stationary distribution of the unper­
turbed Markov process: lim ^ o  p €{^) — The theorem also shows how to identify
stochastically stable states in terms of the stochastic potential of the recurrent classes 
of the unperturbed process. This is the final building block that I now introduce.
Suppose the unperturbed process has K  distinct recurrent classes, E \ , . . . ,  E ^ .  Take 
pairs of distinct recurrent classes Ei and E j , i ^  j .  An zj-path is a sequence of states 
£ =  {(ji,(7 2 - ■ ■ ■ -aq) th a t begins in Ei and ends in Ej. The resistance of the zj-path is 
equal to: r(£) =  r{cr 1 , 0 2 ) +  • • • +  r (crr/_ 1 , <r(y). Let r-ij — m inr(£) be the zj-path that has 
lowest resistance (note that >  0 since Ei and Ej are distinct recurrent classes).
Construct a complete directed graph with K  vertices (that is for each vertex k there 
is exactly one directed edge from k to each of the K  — 1 remaining vertices). The weight 
of the directed edge z —► j  is rij. A j-tree  is a set of K  — 1 edges that from every 
vertex different from j ,  has a unique directed path in the tree to j .  The resistance of a 
tree is the sum of the resistances along i t ’s edges. The stochastic potential of Ej is the 
minimum resistance among all j -trees. Intuitively the stochastic potential of a recurrent 
class says something about how “easy” it is to get to the state starting from any of the
9If P l at =  P®at =  0 for all e 6  (0, e*], then r(cr, a ') =  00.
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other recurrent classes10.
I now state a result from Young (1993) which characterises stochastically stable states 
in terms of stochastic potentials:
T h e o re m  1 (Young (1993)). L e t  P e b e  a  r e g u l a r  p e r t u r b e d  M a r k o v  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  l e t  /u,e b e  
t h e  u n i q u e  s t a t i o n a r y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P € f o r  e a c h  e > 0. T h e n  l im ^ o  / /  =  p P ,  a n d  i s  
a  s t a t i o n a r y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P ° .  T h e  s t o c h a s t i c a l l y  s t a b l e  s t a t e s  a r e  p r e c i s e l y  t h o s e  s t a t e s  
t h a t  a r e  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  r e c u r r e n t  c l a s s e s  o f  P °  h a v i n g  m i n i m u m  s t o c h a s t i c  p o t e n t i a l .
Technically introducing noise allows us to use the powerful results of the previous 
section for e r g o d i c  Markov processes. The system’s behaviour becomes independent of 
the starting conditions for sufficiently large t .  Moreover the stationary distribution tells 
us which states are likely to be visited in the long-run.
From an interpretative view one can think of perturbations as testing how robust 
equilibria are to the continual bombardment of small perturbations. Thus pertubations 
are a selection device, to select among recurrent states. Bergin and Lipman (1996) 
show that with state-dependent m utation rates, any recurrent state (of the unperturbed 
process) can have support in the set of stochastically stable states. Therefore assump­
tions made about how fast error-rates converge to zero is in no way innocuous.
Schelling’s M o d e l w ith  M is tak es
Consider the following modified version of Schelling’s model.
In each period r  =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . .  a player is randomly selected. All players are equally likely 
of being chosen. Suppose player i  at location l j  is chosen, i  has the opportunity to move 
to a randomly selected location I (moving either clockwise or counter clockwise), not 
identical to her current location, with all locations I ^  U being equally likely of being 
chosen.
The probability tha t player i  moves to I depends on utility difference between the 
utility at her current location and the utility she would get if she moved to I. Assume 
that there are numbers 0 < a < / 3 < 7 < o o .  For e G (0,e*], the decision to remain or 
move occur with the following state dependent probabilities:
10Ellison (2000) shows how the m axim al w aiting tim e can be bounded by using the concepts of radius 
and co-radius. Intuitively a recurrent sta te  is stochastically  stable if it is easy to  enter the basin of 
attraction  of the sta te  starting from any o f other recurrent sta te  of the unperturbed dynam ics, and if it 
is relatively difficult to  exit its basin of attraction  when the process is found in this state.
CH APTER 4. REVISITING SCH ELLING’S SPATIAL P R O X IM IT Y  MODEL  94
1. If i ’s utility increases a t I then she moves there with probability 1 — eQ 
and remains at her current location with probability eQ. The decision to 
remain is termed a m i s t a k e .
2. If i is indifferent between her current location and I then she stays at 
her current location with probability 1 — and moves with probability 
e*
3. If i ’s utility decreases at I then she stays at her current location with 
probability 1 — e7 and moves with probability e7.
Mistake probabilities are chosen such tha t the greater the loss in utility from the 
mistake the less likely the player is to make it.
Analysis
The first result in this section shows tha t the only recurrent states are the stable con­
figurations.
Proposition 23. S u p p o s e  r  =  1. U n d e r  t h e  u n p e r t u r b e d  d y n a m i c s ,  P ° ,  a  s t a t e  i s  
r e c u r r e n t  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  i t  i s  a  s t a b l e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  M o r e o v e r  a n y  r e c u r r e n t  s t a t e  i s  a l s o  
a b s o r b i n g .
P r o o f .  =>: Suppose a  E E n e  . Then all players have at least one neighbour like them­
selves, and all players have utility 1. Accordingly no player will want to vacate her 
current location.
<=: Suppose a ^ E n e  . Therefore there must be at least one player who does not have 
any neighbours like herself. W ith positive probability this player will be drawn for 
revision and be matched with a location where she will have at least one neighbour like 
herself. Hence she will move there. Let this state be a '. At her former location she must 
have had two neighbours different from herself. Therefore after she moves these player’s 
utility must weakly increase. Also at her new location the utility of her neighbours must 
weakly increase: if she has two neighbours like herself then their utility is unchanged. If 
she has a mixed neighbourhood then the utility of the neighbour different from herself 
remains unchanged whereas the utility of the neighbour like herself is either unchanged 
or has increased. Thus in o' there are at least one player whose utility has increased 
(the player who has relocated) and no player whose utilty has decreased. Hence either
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o' G E n e  or there is another player who does not have a neighbour like herself. But 
then we can apply the same procedure again. Since the number of players is finite under 
P° the process arrives at an equilibrium in a finite number of steps.
Finally note tha t under P° if the state is an equilibrium then the process will not leave 
this state, since no players have a strict incentive to change their location. Thus the 
state is absorbing. □
Next I show that the stochastically stable states are precisely the segregated states.
Proposition 24. Suppose r = 1. A state is stochastically stable i f  and only i f  it is 
segregated.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C .l. □
The intuition for the result follows from the observation in lemma 10 that it is easier 
(i.e. cheaper) to reduce the number of clusters than it is to increase it. That is from any 
initial state transitions which tend to reduce the number of clusters are relatively more 
likely than the reverse. The rest is just accounting.
To get some intuition for how minimal cost trees are constructed using lemmas 10 
and 11 consider the simplest case where K  = 2. The following picture shows two minimal 
cost trees, the first rooted at z\ G Z \, i.e. a segregated state, the other rooted at Z2  E Z 2
i.e. an integrated state.
Tree rooted at z\ Tree rooted at Z2
A minimal cost tree is constructed in the following way. Horizontal costs are given 
by lemma 11 and vertical costs are given by lemma 10.
Remark 11. The claim of proposition 24 would also hold under the weaker (but less 
plausible) assumption that mutation rates are independent of the magnitude of utility
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loss. Suppose that mistakes which involve moves which leaves the player indifferent or 
worse off than at her current location both has cost {3. Then the claim above still holds 
since:
E 3  >  0
k<k'
holds for all k! > 2.
Simulations
In this section I present numerical simulations of the model for various param eter value of 
the number of residents and the noise level. The section has two main parts. In the first 
part I tu rn  off the noise, i.e. I set e =  0. This allows us to compare how the stochastic 
selection procedure affects the convergence time, and clustering in the equilibria selected 
by the process and compare it to the deterministic version of Schelling. In the second 
part I examine how the model behaves when there is a positive level of noise present. I 
contain the simulations to the case r = 1.
No Noise Schelling’s model contains two deterministic components that are given 
stochastic counterparts in our model. First, Schelling assumes that residents who enjoy 
low utility get to update their choice of location in a deterministic way. In Schelling 
in each round first all players that have no neighbours like themselves are marked out. 
Then starting from the right end of the line any player tha t was marked updates her 
location, until all marked players have either moved to a new location or they have at 
least one neighbour like themselves. After this a new round begins. Second, Schelling 
assumes tha t when a player moves she moves to a location closets to her current location 
where she has a t least one neighbour like herself.
In order to see whether the stochastic counterpart of these rules play any role for 
convergence time and the clustering in the equilibria tha t are reached I simulate the 
model when the noise level is turned off, i.e. e =  0.
The first table shows the convergence time to Nash.
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Table 4.5: Convergence Time (Stochastic Schelling)
Number of Residents of each Type 
n =  10 n =  20 n =  50 n  =  100
Mean 44.6 123.9 444.0 1088.9
Std. 36.4 76.0 205.2 417.8
Max 365 666 1977 4112
Min 0 0 61 261
Note: e =  0, 10.000 O bservations per colum n.
Comparing the results to Schelling’s original model, it can be seen that convergence 
is slower for the stochastic version. This is not surprising since players who are never 
selected under Schelling’s procedure is selected for revision in the stochastic version. In 
particular as the configuration comes close to an equilibrium, with only a few players 
needing to update their locations, the probability tha t these players are selected decreases 
in the stochastic version. Thus convergence rates slow down when the configuration gets 
close to an equilibrium. Nevertheless convergence is fairly rapid.
I now investigate whether the way players update their location choice has any bear­
ing on what equilibria are eventually reached by the process. The next two tables gives 
details on this.
Table 4.6: Number of Clusters (Stochastic Schelling)
Number of Residents of each Type 
77, =  10 77, =  20 77, =  50 77, =  100
Mean 2.29 4.34 10.51 20.86
Std. .70 1.01 1.60 2.25
Max 5 8 17 29
Min 1 1 5 13
Note: e =  0, 10.000 O bservations per colum n.
Comparing with the results from simulating Schelling’s original model, it can be 
seen that the mean number of clusters in the equilibria that are reached under the 
stochastic version is slightly lower than  in Schelling’s model. However the difference is 
not significant. This observation is confirmed by the next table.
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Table 4.7: Composition of local neighbourhoods in NE (Stochastic Schelling)
Number of Residents of each Type
n = 1 0 n = 2 0 n — 50 n — 1 0 0
Number Like 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Median .4 .6 .4 .6 .44 .56 .42 .58
Min .2 0 .1 .2 .2 .32 .26 .42
Max 1 .8 .8 .9 . 6 8 .8 .58 .74
Note: e =  0, 10.000 O bservations per colum n.
I conclude tha t the stochastic updating and selection of potential allocations does 
not have a significant impact on the distribution of equilibria th a t are reached. The only 
significant impact is on the time to convergence.
In the next part I tu rn  on the noise.
Noise I showed analytically th a t in the long run the process will only visit the segregated 
states. However the result is silent about how long we have to wait before the long run 
kicks in. In this case simulations are a useful means of examining whether the selection 
of stochastic stability is economically meaningful. I am interested in how the model 
behaves with respect to three time aspects of the model: the short, medium and long 
run.
Definition 7. The short run is the time interval: {0 , . . .  ,T  — 1}, where T  >  0 is the 
random time where the process hits a recurrent class for the first time. The medium  
run is the time interval: {T , . . .  ,T } , where T  > T  > 0 is the random time where the 
process hits an element in the set of stochastically stable states for the first time. The 
long run is t : t > T
For the purpose of the simulations I fix: (a ,/ 3 , 7 ) =  (1,2, 3) . 11
The Short Run The following tables show the descriptive statistics of the time of
convergence to a recurrent class.
11 T h is  c h o ic e  is  c le a r ly  s o m e w h a t  a r b itr a r y . T h e  c h o ic e  a f fe c t s  t h e  r a t e  a t  w h ic h  m is t a k e  r a te s  g o  t o  
z e r o  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  a f f e c t s  w h e n  t h e  p r e d ic t io n  o f  s t o c h a s t i c  s t a b i l i t y  is  v a lid .
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Table 4.8: The Short Run (Stochastic Schelling)
n 1 0 2 0 50
€ . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1
Mean 42.9 45.2 49.1 123.5 124.8 135.8 454.5 483.3 489.5
Std. 35.8 36.0 37.7 75.8 77.0 81.6 202.4 224.1 238.4
Max 256 228 219 451 507 616 1533 1677 1658
Min 0 0 0 6 1 2 4 108 1 1 0 1 0 1
N o t e :  ( a ,  3 , 7 ) =  ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ,  5 0 0  O b s e r v a t io n s  p e r  c o lu m n .
The M edium Run The following table shows statistics of the duration of the medium 
run and the fraction of time spent in states th a t are visited before the process hits one 
of the stochastically stable states for the first time.
Table 4.9: Duration of The Medium Run (Stochastic Schelling)
n 10 20 50
t .02 .05 .1 .02 .05 .1 .02 .05 .1
(xlO3) (xlO4) (xlO5)
Mean 134.5 21.4 4.8 127.9 21.5 5.06 168.8 26.5 7.85
Std. 148.0 24.6 5.1 1 1 1 . 0 18.3 4.19 120.2 18.6 5.75
Max 140.2 153.0 28.9 919.2 116.9 29.6 603.7 1 1 1 . 1 39.4
Min 0 0 0 1.94 0 .047 18.0 2.25 .386
N o t e :  ( a ,  3,7 ) = (1 ,  2 , 3 ) ,  5 0 0  O b s e r v a t io n s  p e r  c o lu m n .
From the table above it can be seen tha t the duration of the medium run increases 
exponentially in the number of residents.
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Mean 89.5 9.0 1 . 6 89.8 9.6 . 6 86.7 1 2 . 1 1 . 2
Max 1 0 0 99.6 64.6 99.9 79.7 5.1 98.5 68.9 2.7
Min 0 0 0 18.1 0 .06 30.1 .6 .7
Obs. 449 499 500
N o t e :  c =  .0 5 ,  ( a ,  $ , 7 ) =  ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ,  O E = O u t  o f  E q u i l ib r iu m . T o t a l  n u m b e r
o f  o b s e r v a t io n s  p e r  c o lu m n :  5 0 0 . O b s e r v a t io n s  w h e r e  p r o c e s s  t r a n s i t s  
d ir e c t ly  t o  lo n g  r u n  n o t  in c lu d e d .
Before transiting to the segregated states the process spends the majority of its time 
in states which are relatively segregated. Although the duration of the medium run is 
very long the process spends most of its time in states which are also very segregated.
T h e  L ong R u n  The following table gives statistics about the waiting time until the 
process hits a stochastically stable state for the first time.
Table 4.11: The Long Run (Schelling)
n 1 0 2 0 50
6 . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1
( x l O 3 ) ( x l O 4 ) ( x l O 5 )
Mean 134.5 21.5 4.8 127.9 2 1 . 6 5.08 168.8 26.5 7.86
Std. 148.0 24.6 5.1 1 1 1 . 0 18.3 4.19 1 2 0 . 2 18.6 5.75
Max 140.2 153.0 28.9 919.2 116.9 29.6 603.7 1 1 1 . 1 39.4
Min . 0 1 .0 1 .0 1 1.94 .018 .060 18.0 2.26 .392
N o t e :  (a, 3, j )  =  ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ,  5 0 0  O b s e r v a t io n s  p e r  c o lu m n .
Since the short run is very short compared to the medium run most of the behaviour 
of the process is already picked up by the medium run behaviour in table 4.9.
L ong R u n  B e h a v io u r  The analytical selection result of stochastic stability is a limit 
result in the sense th a t if the noise level goes to zero then the process will spend almost 
all i t ’s time in the set of stochastically stable states. In many real life situations factors
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which are unobserved to the modeller affect the decisions of agents. Therefore we might 
be unwilling to assume that the noise is vanishing. An alternative is to simulate the model 
starting from a stochastically stable configuration and then observing the time path  of 
the system for a relatively long period. This allows us to numerically quantify the fraction 
of time that the process spends in the stochastically stable states. It also provides a way 
to quantify a threshold for the noise level where the prediction of stochastic stability 
gives a good approximation of where the system is at any time for a sufficiently long 
time horizon.
The table below shows the fraction of time spent in various configurations, when the 
process is started in a stochastically stable state. I track the process over 107 periods.
Table 4.12: Fraction of Time Spent in Stochastically Stable States (Schelling)
n 1 0 2 0 50
e . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 .0 2 .05 .1
S t o c h a s t ic a l ly  S t a b le  S t a t e s 99.99 99.79 94.9 99.98 89.1 84.7 99.96 55.1 34.3
O th e r  R e c u r r e n t  S t a t e s  (* ) 0 0 3.4 0 10.4 11.4 0 43.6 55.8
O u t  o f  E q u il ib r iu m . 0 1 .2 1 1 . 8 . 0 2 .5 3.9 .04 1.3 9.9
N o t e :  ( a , / ? ,  7 ) =  ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ,  N u m b e r  o f  P e r io d s :  1 0 7 . (* )  T h e  p r o c e s s  o n ly  s p e n d s
t im e  in  r e c u r r e n t  s t a t e s  w i t h  le s s  t h a n  4  c lu s t e r s .
It can be seen th a t the validity of stochastic stability as the prediction of the long 
run behaviour of the model depends naturally on e but also on the number of residents. 
In fact for e =  .1 and n = 50 the process spends a larger fraction of time in recurrent 
states with cluster size 2 (39.3%) than  it does in the stochastically stable states. Our 
results indicate th a t given our somewhat arbitrary choice of a , 0  and 7  choosing e < . 0 2  
yields sufficient predictive power of stochastic stability for n <  50.
C o m m en ts  a n d  a  C r itiq u e  The medium run is in fact very long. This suggest 
that the medium run behavior provides a better approximation of how neighbourhood 
evolution takes place.
Why does stochastic stability do such a poor job at predicting where we can find 
the process for reasonable time horizons? The basic intuition is as follows. Suppose 
the process is started  at a state where there are two clusters of each type. The process 
hits the a stochastically stable state when all players are contained on one of the two
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locations. Due to our assumption about mistake probabilities we need consider only the 
events where a player moves from one cluster by mistake to the other cluster. Therefore 
we can approximate the process by a random walk where the process roughly changes 
state with probability . This base probability has to be modified by how large the 
cluster is: residents who live in small clusters are less likely to  be drawn for revision 
than residents who live in a larger cluster. Thus as the size of a cluster shrinks the less 
likely that a player from that cluster is chosen. This introduces a bias towards clusters 
of equal size.
Take one of the two clusters which is currently of size m t at time t. The probability 
with which this cluster grows or shrinks is governed by the following probabilities.
The cluster grows with the following conditional probabilities.
0  for m t € {0 , n}
(n~md e3 for o < m t < n  — 1P r(m t + 1  =  m t +  l|m*) =  <
and it shrinks with the following probabilities
for m t = n  — l
Pr(nit+i = rrit — Mrnt) = <
i  for m t = 2  
for 1 <  m t < n71 °
0  for m t € {0 ,n}
The process above is a relatively complex object to analyse. Instead I consider a 
simplified process.
Consider the following random walk on the set of integers Z  =  { 0 ,... ,m}, m  > 0. 
W ith probability a the process moves up and with probability b the process moves down, 
where a > b > 0 and a +  b < 1 . Note th a t the process exhibits a positive drift towards 
m. The following figure illustrates the process:
m — 2
I am interested in the conditional waiting times Wk, 0 < k < m  until the process hits
0.
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These can be determined from the following recursive relation:
wk =  a(wk + 1 +  1 ) +  b(wk - 1  +  1 ) +  ( 1  -  a -  b)(wk +  1 )
and the following two boundary conditions:
^o =  0
Wrn = b(w7n- 1 +  1) +  (1 -  b)(wrn +  1)
This is a second order non-homogenous difference equation with constant coefficients, 
which can be solved explicitly by standard techniques (see e.g. Sydsaeter and Hammond 
(1995, p. 750)). Results are summarised in the following lemma.
L em m a 3. Consider a random walk on the integers between 0 and m . The process 
moves up with probability a and moves down with probability b, where a >  b > 0  and 
a +  6  < 1. The conditional waiting time wk, 0 < k < m , until the process reaches 0 is:
Proof. A particular solution to the equation follows from the guess: wk =  D k  for some 
constant D. This leads to the particular solution:
The characteristic equation for the homogenous second order equation is:
ar2  — (a +  b)r +  6  =  0  
which leads to roots: r\ =  1 A r 2 =  £. So th a t the general solution is:
where A  and B  are constants. The result then follows from the boundary conditions.
This shows tha t for the random  walk with drift the waiting time until the process 
reaches 0  increases exponentially in m.
The connection to Schelling’s model is as follows. Consider a recurrent state of the 
unperturbed dynamics which contains two clusters of each type. For the purpose of
The waiting time until the process reaches 0 is bounded above by —^z^m  +  o ((f  )m)-
The second observation follows from the fact tha t wm > wk, 0 < k < m. □
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illustrating the connection we need only concern ourselves with one type of players. 
Also for small e we need only consider the possibility th a t 0  mistakes occur (recall 7  >  0  
thus for small e 0 -mistakes becomes exponentially more likely than  7 -mistakes. T hat is 
the only movements that we need consider is th a t one player, by mistake, moves from 
one cluster to the other cluster. Let the two clusters be denoted c and c respectively A 
stochastically stable state is reached whenever say all players from cluster c has moved 
to c. All such moves (except the last for r =  1) must occur via a 0  mutation. More 
importantly the process is biased towards selecting some player from a larger cluster 
rather than a player from a smaller cluster. To see this note th a t the probability that 
the some player from cluster c is selected equals ^ , since all players are equally likely of 
being drawn for revision, and with remaining probability some player from cluster c is 
chosen. Thus as the cluster shrinks the probability th a t a player from the other cluster 
is chosen increases. That is the probability th a t the cluster grows (via a player from 
cluster c making a location mistake becomes increasingly higher as the cluster shrinks. 
Thus the process is biased towards clusters of equal size. The main simplification is that 
for the random walk above I have assumed th a t the bias does not depend upon the state 
of the walk, whereas in the Schelling model the closer the state moves to 0 the more 
unlikely is a downward jum p and the more likely an upward jump.
The key observation is tha t the selection dynamics exhibit a drift towards clusters of 
equal size. Therefore the maximal waiting time until a stochastically stable state is 
reached increases exponentially in the number of residents.
This observation leads to a specific criticism of the related work of Young (1998, 
2001). The results developed here are equally applicable to Young’s variant of Schelling’s 
original model. T hat is the wait until the process hits a stochastically stable state is so 
long as to make it uninteresting except for a relative small number of residents.
There is a literature on the speed of convergence to the set of stochastically stable states 
(Young (1998), Ellison (1993, 2000)). The understanding of tha t literature is that local 
interaction greatly speeds up convergence to the set of stochastically stable states. This 
seems to be at odds with our findings and some comments are in order.
Ellison (2000) introduces the concepts of radius and co-radius to bound waiting times 
until the process hits the stochastically stable states. Formally he considers a model of 
evolution with noise by the triple (Z, P, P (e)), where Z  is the finite state space, and a P  
is a Markov transition m atrix on Z  in discrete time. P(e) is a family of markov transition 
families on Z  indexed by e >  0, with the property tha t P(e) is ergodic, continuous in e
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such th a t P (0) =  P. Furthermore Ellison defines a  cost function: c : Z  x Z  —*■ R+ IJoo 
such tha t for all pairs of states z ,z '  G Z, lime_*o P z z '{ ^ ) l^ z'z'^  exists and is strictly 
positive if c(z, z1) <  oo (with Pzz/(e) =  0 for sufficiently small e if c(z, z') =  oo).
The innovation of Ellison (2000) is to characterise the set of stochastically stable 
states in term  of the relation between i t ’s radius and co-radius. This allows him to 
provide a bound on waiting times. Roughly the radius of a recurrent class (of the 
unperturbed dynamics) says something about how difficult it is to escape the basin of 
attraction of the class. The co-radius captures the size of the basin of attraction of 
the class, and says something about how easy it is to reach the class from other classes. 
Intuitively if the co-radius is smaller than  the radius then we are likely to find the process 
there for small e. Formally, let 17 be the union of one or more recurrent classes. The
basin of attraction  of 17, 77(17), is the set of initial states from which the unperturbed
process converges to 17.
The radius of 17, 72(17), is the minimum cost of leaving the basin of attraction of 17. 
Let a path out of 77(17) be a sequence of distinct states (z \,Z 2 , • • • , z t ) ,  where z\ G 17, 
z t i Z \  77(17), 2 < t < T  — 1, and z t  € Z  \  77(17). Let 5(17, Z  \  77(17) be the set of all 
such paths. Then the radius is defined as:
T - 1
72(17) =  min y ^ c ( z t ,z t+1)
(zi , . . . , zT ) € S ( i l , Z \ D ( i l ) ) f ^
Ellison then defines the co-radius:
T - 1
C 72(17) =  max min > c(zt ,z t+1 )
x<£n (z!....zT)zs{x,n) ^
W ith these definitions in place Ellison Theorem 1 can be stated:
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1, Ellison (2000)). Let (Z ,P ,P (e)) be a model of evolution with 
noise, and suppose that some set 17 which is a union of recurrent classes 72(17) > C72(!7). 
Then:
(a) the long-run stochastically stable set o f the model is contained in 17;
(b) for any y <£ 17, W (y, 17, e) =  0 (e~ CRW ) as e ^  0.
Unfortunately the theorem has no bite in our context, except for small n. We already 
know that the set of segregated states are precisely the stochastically stable states. Let 
this set be denoted 17. The radius counts the cost of escaping the basin of attraction of 
the segregated states. Hence 72(17) =  7  +  (3 as a 7  mutation is required for a player to
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leave the single cluster of players of her own type, and then a 0  mistake is required by 
some other player in the cluster. To find the co-radius we have to find the state x  such 
that among all minimal cost paths from x  and into D{LL), x  is the state which maximises 
this minimal cost. In our model with n  players of each type the co-radius is at least of 
size /? ( | -  1 ). Since this is the minimum cost of starting from an integrated state and 
reaching a segregated state. But for R (S7) > CR(Cl) requires tha t 7  > — 2) which
fails for large n.
However Ellison also introduces the modified co-radius, which is found by subtracting 
from the cost of the path  the raidus of intermediate limit sets (or recurrent classes). Let 
L \ , . . . ,  L r c  0  be the sequence of limit sets through which the path  passes consecutively, 
where Li <£ Q, i < r .
T - l  r - 1
CR*(Q) =  max min c(zt, zt+i) ~ /   ^R{LA
x & l  (z i,....z r )€S(x ,H ) “  f r i
W ith this concept Ellison provides a tighter bound on the waiting time:
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2, Ellison (2000)). Let (Z, P, P(e)) be a model of evolution with 
noise, and suppose that some set Q which is a union of recurrent classes R(D) > CR*(Q). 
Then:
(a) the long-run stochastically stable set o f the model is contained in Q;
(b) for any y   ^ D ,  W (y ,Q ,e ) — 0 (e~ CR ^ ) as e —> 0.
Using the modified co-radius we can establish that the segregated states axe stochas­
tically stable. CR*(Q) =  0  such tha t f?(f2) > CR*(Sl). The theorem also suggest that 
the maximal waiting time is of the order O (js), which is independent of n.
Both stochastic stability and the radius-co-radius approach ignores how players are 
selected for strategy revision, all that m atters is that all players get to update with some 
small probability. A sequence of ’’right” m utations has to happen for the system to 
reach the long-run stochastically stable states. For a fixed size of the system, the closer 
the process gets to a stochastically stable state the more biased is the process against 
selecting players ’’required” for the process to transit to the stochastically stable states. 
As the system grows the bias increases, and the waiting time increases exponentially in 
the size of the system.
Ellison (1993) and Young (1998, chp. 6 ) consider local interaction when players play 
two person coordination game. Both show that the waiting time until the stochastically
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stable state  is reached is independent of the size of the system. The mechanism through 
which this is established differ between the two papers.
Ellison (1993) considers an adjustm ent dynamics a la Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 
(1993). T hat is in each period all players update or adjust their strategy so that their 
strategy is a best response to play in the previous period. W ith small probability players 
tremble. In each period a player plays a two person coordination game with all the other 
players. Players may weight payoffs differently from different players. In particular El­
lison considers the case where players are located on a circle and a player only assign 
positive (equal) weight to here k nearest neighbours on either side. In the k nearest 
neighbour model for small enough perturbations the expected waiting time until the 
process reaches i t ’s long-run steady state  distribution, which puts probability mass one 
on the risk-dominant equilibrium, is independent of the size of the system. The intuition 
for the result is as follows. It is already well-known that the risk dominant equilibrium 
has a larger basin of attraction  than  the other pure equilibrium. This completely de­
termines what will be selected for in the long run. Now suppose we start the process 
in the equilibrium which is not risk dominant. In order to transit to the risk dominant 
equilibrium it is sufficient th a t a suitable '’small” group of players (who are connected) 
m utate to the risk dom inant strategy. In the next period this will lead their neighbours 
to switch to the risk dominant strategy as well. The play of the risk dominant strategy 
then spreads contagiously. Since the basin of attraction of the risk dominant equilibrium 
is of larger size, then as e becomes small the risk dominant equilibrium is selected for.
In contrast in my version of Schelling’s model there is no contagious element. When 
play has settled on an equilibrium which is not stochastically stable, all players will have 
at least one neighbour like themselves. A location mistake (a mutation) will lead at 
most one other player of the same type to revise her location. This occurs only if the 
m utating player belong to a cluster of size two (when r =  1 ).
Young (1998, clip. 6 ) also consider selection in two person coordination games with 
a risk dominant equilibrium. Young considers a stochastic process in continous time. 
Players update their strategies according to a Poisson process. When players update 
their strategy most of the time they play a best reply, and with small probability a non­
best reply. The process runs simultaneously for all players. Updates are independently 
and identically distributed across players. Players interact on a graph, however a given 
player mainly interacts within relatively small close-knit groups, loosely the group of 
players th a t a player interacts with are likely to mainly interact with each other as 
well. Young asks what the maximum expected wait until a large proportion 1 -  p of
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the population the risk dom inant equilibrium, this is called the p-intertia of the process. 
Young then shows that for sufficiently small mistake probabilities and if players interact 
in close-knit groups then the p-inertia of the process is bounded above, independently 
of the number of players.
The result relies on the following intuition. F irst note again th a t in Young’s model the 
risk dominant equilibrium is the only stochastically stable state. Now since all players 
live in close-knit groups of a given (small) size, starting  from the non-risk dominant 
equilibrium of the coordination game, the wait until a particular group switches to the 
risk-dominant equilibrium is bounded above, and crucially does not depend on the total 
number of players in the population. After this event if the probability that players make 
mistakes is sufficiently small then this group will continue playing the risk dominant for 
a long time. Since the process runs simultaneously for all players the waiting time until 
a large proportion, 1 — p, of the population is playing the risk-dominant equilibrium is 
bounded.
It is difficult to see how Young’s result can be related to our model. First, Young’s re­
sult applies to a very small class of games. Second, the result relies on players interacting 
in small fixed close-knit groups.
How do results depend on the particular distribution of starting configurations that I 
have chosen for the numerical simulations? In the simulations I have taken an agnostic 
view, i.e. all possible starting  configurations are are equally likely of being chosen. 
If one has a particular distribution in mind, perhaps for an application, this affects 
the estimates of convergence time. E.g. one might be interested in the wait starting 
from configurations tha t are relatively segregated. Along these lines one could ask the 
following question: How long is the wait conditional on the percentage of segregated 
residents in the starting configuration? The argument developed in this section shows 
that this is unlikely to lower waiting times significantly. This is because the process 
spends most of its time in configurations th a t are relatively segregated before eventually 
transiting to the (fully) segregated states.
One conclusion of the analysis is th a t the specific assumptions about preferences made 
in Schelling are not in themselves sufficient to explain why full segregation may occur 
within an economically interesting time span . 12 I propose a modified version of Schelling
12 A n o t h e r  r e s p o n s e  is  t o  a s k  w h e t h e r  s o m e  o t h e r  c o n c e p t  is  b e t t e r  a b le  t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  b e h a v io u r  o f  t h e  
p r o c e s s .  M o b iu s  ( 2 0 0 0 )  a ls o  f in d s  t h a t  s t o c h a s t i c  s t a b i l i t y  i s  b a d  p r e d ic t o r  o f  h o w  t h e  s t o c h a s t ic  p r o c e s s  
t h a t  h is  m o d e l  le a d s  t o  b e h a v e s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  q u i t e  d if f e r e n t  fr o m  t h e  o n e  e x a m in e d  h e r e . I n s t e a d  h e
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where players now also have a preference for living in larger clusters rather than small 
clusters. A motivation is th a t it might be seen as incorporating into static preferences 
that players care about more than  their current payoffs. If I live in a small cluster then 
I am more likely to be experiencing th a t my current co-residents move and thus I end 
up living in a neighbourhood which only has players different from myself. If I live 
in a larger cluster then this is less likely to happen and in expectations the wait until 
it happens is longer. By this argum ent players actions today are motivated by future 
payoffs.
4 .2 .3  A n  A l t e r n a t i v e  V e r s io n  o f  S c h e ll in g
The numerical simulations presented in the last section suggests that even for a rela­
tively small size of residential neighbourhoods the expected wait until the process hits 
the stochastically stable states are so long as to make them  economically uninteresting. 
Although the stochastic version of Schelling’s model is able to explain why some segre­
gation occur relatively fast, it is not able to explain convincingly why neighbourhoods 
segregate completely. The aim of this section is to present a model where complete 
segregation occurs relatively fast, while still being the only stable outcome that will be 
observed in the long run.
In this section I build indirectly into the preferences of the players some concern for 
future payoffs. More sophisticated players might try  to make some prediction about how 
their neighbourhood evolves over time. This might motivate some players to leave their 
current location for a new location where they in the short run receive the same payoff. 
Specifically a player who lives in a relatively small cluster of players that are similar to 
herself might want to leave her current neighbourhood in order to live in a larger cluster 
since this cluster is less likely to break up in the short to medium run. Thus the player is 
likely to enjoy higher payoffs in the future. I model this concern via introducing cluster 
sizes lexicographically into the payoffs of players, th a t is whenever two locations gives 
identical local neighbourhoods then the player evaluates her preference for the locations 
by comparing the cluster sizes and then she moves to the location which has the highest 
local concentration of players th a t are like herself.
I keep other details of the model unchanged from th a t analysed in the previous 
section. I present numerical simulations which show th a t this variant of Schelling leads 
to complete and rapid segregation.
r e lie s  o n  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  clustering, s e e  M o b iu s  ( 2 0 0 0 )  fo r  d e t a i l s .
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A Concern for Future Payoffs
Given a configuration a  G E let the cluster size at location I be the number of c o n t i ­
guously connected players of the same type as the resident on location I and such that 
location I is included in the cluster. Let ni be the size of the cluster which I is a part of. 
I endow a player of type t = A, B  with the following preferences:
M > i  and tOL < i  or
i . // . .  I 2 r + l  -  2 a n a  2 r + l  ^ 2  o r
l y l  < # N f  # N ‘, ^  j
5f+i - 2?+r ^  2 a n d  n i >  n i'
The dynamic process is identical to the one used in the previous section. That is 
in every period a resident and a potential location is drawn randomly. The resident 
evaluates utility at her current location and the potential location, and this determines 
the probabilities with which she remains or vacates her current location.
Suppose player i residing a t U is drawn for revision, and th a t she has the opportunity 
to move to I ^  U.
1. If i ’s utility increases at I then she moves there with probability 1 — ea 
and remains a t her current location with probability ea . The decision to 
remain is term ed a mistake.
2. If 2 is indifferent between her current location and I then she stays at 
her current location with probability 1 — e13 and moves with probability
3. If i ’s utility decreases if she vacates U for I then she stays with probability 
1 — e7  and moves with probability e7 .
I assume 0 < a < / ? < 7 < o o .
A nalysis
I begin by characterising the set of recurrent states, which I state without proof.
P ro p o s it io n  25 (Modified Schelling). Suppose r = 1. A state is recurrent under P° if 
and only if:
1. All players have at least one neighbour like themselves.
2. All type t clusters are o f the same size, t =  A, B .
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Moreover any recurrent state is also absorbing.
R e m a rk  12. The set of recurrent states under the modified stochastic version of Schelling 
is a subset of the set o f recurrent states of the stochastic version of Schelling. A recurrent
state with k > 1 clusters o f each type exists i f  mod (n, k ) = 0 .
1 now characterise stochastically stable states. Let {k*} be the sequence of natural 
numbers which satisfy:
mod (n, k*) =  0
n
I -  > 2k * ~
Since n is even note th a t the largest k* in the sequence, K*, equals K . Let S  denote 
the length of the sequence (S  naturally depends on n).
P ro p o s it io n  26 (Modified Schelling). Suppose r = 1. A state is stochastically stable if
and only i f  it is segregated.
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix C.2. □
S im u la tio n s
In this section I present numerical simulation results for the variant of Schelling’s model 
that I analysed above.
To stay as close to the stochastic model presented in the previous section I again fix: 
( o .5 .7 ) =  (1 ,2.3).
T h e  S h o rt R u n  The following tables gives descriptive statistics about the time to con­
vergence to a recurrent class. I also report the median, since for small n the distribution 
is skewed.
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Table 4.13: The Short Run (Modified Schelling)
n

















Median . 1 1 .1 1 . 1 2 .31 .32 .34 1.09 1 . 1 2 1 .2 1 2 . 6 6 2.77 2.99
Mean 1 1 . 1 .94 .23 1 . 2 .41 .36 1 . 1 2 1.16 1.25 2.74 2.85 3.10
Std. 71.2 5.38 .65 2 0 . 0 1.47 .18 .28 .29 .32 .56 .59 .6 8
Max 1321 126.8 16.1 1185 65.9 8.43 3.37 3.28 3.94 6.75 6.92 9.10
Min 0 . 0 1 .0 1 .08 .07 .07 .44 .47 .46 1.24 1.36 1.46
Note: ( a , d i 7 ) =  (1 .2 ,3 ) ,  1 0 . 0 0 0  O bservations per colum n.
Compared to the stochastic version of Schelling’s model the short run has a longer 
duration. This is not surprising since the equilibria of the modified version of Schelling 
are a subset of the equilibria of the stochastic version of Schelling.
T h e  M e d iu m  R u n  The following table shows the statistics about the duration of the 
medium run and the fraction of time spent in states tha t are visited before the process 
hits one of the stochastically stable states for the first time.
Table 4.14: Duration of The Medium Run (Modified Schelling)
n
e . 0 2
1 0
.05 .1  i . 0 2
2 0
.05 .1 . 0 2
50
.05 .1 . 0 2
1 0 0
.05 .1
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 288 43.1 4.03 0 0 .035 0 .046 .13 0 0 .39
Std. 8220 967 93.0 0 0 2.04 0 4.6 7.6 0 0 20.9
Max 482348 36305 4129 0 0 162 0 461 606 0 0 1895
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: (r*,/3 , 7 ) =  ( 1 ,2 ,3 ) ,  10.000 O bservations per colum n.
The duration of the medium run is generally short. In most of the simulations once 
the process has converged to an equilibrium of the game, it has converged to an element 
in the set of stochastically stable states.
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T h e  L ong  R u n  The following table gives statistics about the wait until the process 
hits a stochastically stable state  for the first time.
Table 4.15: The Long Run (Modified Schelling)
n



















Median .1 1 .1 1 . 1 2 .31 .32 .34 1.09 1 . 1 2 1 .2 1 2 . 6 6 2.77 2.99
Mean 11.3 .98 .23 1 . 2 .41 .36 1 . 1 2 1.16 1.25 2.74 2.85 3.10
Std. 71.7 5.46 4.33 2 0 . 0 1.47 .18 .28 .29 .32 .56 .59 .6 8
Max 1321 126.8 16.1 1185 65.9 8.43 3.37 3.28 3.95 6.75 6.92 9.10
Min .0 1 .0 1 .0 1 .08 .07 .07 .44 .47 .46 1.24 1.36 1.46
Note: (rv, ft, 7 ) =  (1 ,2 ,3 ) ,  10.000 O bservations per colum n.
The fact th a t the medium run is on average very short is reflected in the wait until 
the process hits an element in the set of stochastically stable states. The wait is very 
close to the duration of the short run. The simulations suggest that the wait is linearly 
increasing in n, the number of residents.
The table below shows the fraction of time spent in various configurations, when the 
process is started  in a stochastically stable state. I track the process over 107 periods.
Table 4.16: Fraction of Time Spent in Stochastically Stable States (Schelling)
n
e . 0 2
1 0
.05 . 1 . 0 2
2 0
.05 . 1 . 0 2
50
.05 . 1 . 0 2
1 0 0
.05 . 1
SSS 99.99 99.93 99.35 99.99 99.92 99.20 99.99 99.89 98.68 99.99 99.79 97.06
ORS (*) 0 0 .0017 0 .0003 .031 0 .0047 .3477 0 .0273 1.643
OE . 0 1 .07 .65 .0028 .0830 .76 . 0 0 1 2 .1055 .9772 . 0 0 0 2 .1798 1.297
Note: ( a , /3 , 7 ) =  ( 1 ,2 ,3 ) ,  Num ber o f Periods: 107. SS S= Stochastica lly  Stable States, O R S=O ther Re­
current S tates, O E = O u t o f Equilibrium . (*) T he process only spends tim e in recurrent states w ith  
less than 3 clusters.
As can be seen from the table compared to the stochastic version of Schelling, sto­
chastic stability is a good predictor of long run behavior even for levels of e =  .1 . Also
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the wait until the process enters an element in the set of the stochastically stable states 
is relatively short. This is a consequence two features of the dynamic process: (1 ) how 
easy it is to leave the basin of attraction  of the set of stochastically stable states once it 
has been reached, (2 ) how easy it is to enter the basin of attraction of the set of stochas­
tically stable states from any of the other recurrent states of the unperturbed dynamics. 
The analysis revealed th a t a single 3  m utation is sufficient to push the unperturbed 
process into the basin of a ttraction  of the segregated states, thus it is relatively easy to 
enter the basin of a ttraction  of the stochastically stable states. This accounts for the 
relatively fast transition to the stochastically stable states. On the other hand once the 
process has reached the set of stochastically stable states it is relatively difficult to leave 
it again. In particular more than  one 7  m utation is required in order for the process to 
leave the set of segregated states again. In the stochastic version of Schelling only one 
7  and a 0 m utation is needed. This accounts for the segregated states being relatively 
stable once they have been reached.
4.3 Local In teraction  w ith  P references for D iversity
In the models analysed so far residents are indifferent between living in integrated and 
segregated local neighbourhooods. In this section I assume that players have a preference 
for diversity. I am interested in whether individual incentives to avoid living in a local 
minority are sufficiently strong to have welfare consequences, th a t is whether a dynamic 
process will select equilibria th a t are relatively or fully segregated. I am also interested in 
how the model behaves before the process reaches i t ’s long run distribution over visited 
states. Therefore this section also contains numerical simulation results for the short 
and medium run.
4.3 .1  A  M od el w ith  P referen ce  for D iv ersity
To stay as closely to Schelling’s original model as possible I only modify the utility 
function13.
P re fe re n c e s  Given a configuration a  £ E a player of type t who resides on location li
13I have also investigated  a m odel where players cannot squeeze in betw een other players. Instead 
the circle has more locations than  residents, such th at there are em pty locations. A moving player can 
only move to  a location  which is em pty. In th is m odel I show th at only  the fully segregated states are 
stochastically  stable.
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has the following utility function:
\ 0
i f # Ni <2 r + l  -
1
3
Uiiv) = i f 1 .3 ^  2 r + l <  2 — 3
i  T i f * Nt >2 r + l  ^
2
3
where ^ < x < \.
That is players value diverse local neighbourhoods, but they prefer to live in a ghetto 
of players like themselves, to living in a ghetto of players who are not like themselves.
D y n am ics  In each period r  =  0 ,1, 2 , . . . one player and a location is chosen at ran­
dom, with all players and all locations having positive probability of being chosen. The 
probability th a t she moves to the location depends on the utility difference between her 
current location and the new location.
Specifically let player i , currently living on ln be drawn for location revision and let 
I be the location she has the opportunity  to  move to. Assume th a t there are numbers: 
0 < q < / 3 < 7  < 5 < ip < oo. For e E (0, e*] I assume th a t the decision to stay at or 
vacate /, for I is determined by the following procedure:
1. If i ’s utility increases at I then she moves there with probability 1 — ea 
and remains at /,■ with probability eQ. The decision to remain is termed 
a mistake.
2. If i is indifferent between her current location and I then she stays at 
her current location with probability 1 — e/3 and moves with probability 
e*.
3. If i currently currently has utility 1 and I gives utility x  then she stays
with probability 1 — e7  and moves with probability e7.
4. If i currently has utility x  and I gives utility 0, then she stays with
probability 1 — c6  and moves with probability e6.
5. If i currently has utility 1 and I gives utility 0 then she stays with prob­
ability 1 -  and moves with probabilty e0 .
A nalysis
I begin by characterising the the set of recurrent classes under the unperturbed dynamics, 
P°.
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P ro p o s itio n  27. Suppose r — 1 and that players have a players have a preference for' 
diversity. Under P® a configuration is recurrent i f  and only if  each player belongs to a 
cluster. Moreover:
1. For any a. o' E E, a  7  ^ o' such that both have k <  K  clusters and all players belong 
to a cluster then o and o ' are contained in the same recurrent class.
2. I f  a is integrated, i.e. k = K , then it is recurrent and absorbing.
Proof. I first show th a t the integrated sta te  is recurrent and absorbing. Then I show that 
under the unperturbed dynamcis any sta te  with k < K  clusters of players is recurrent 
and any other state  which also has k clusters belong to the same class. Finally I show 
that any other state  is transient.
S tep  l a  Suppose o  is integrated. Then o  consist of K  =  |  clusters players of each 
type, and each cluster is minimal, i.e. of length 2. Thus all players receive utility 1, and 
no player has a strict incentive to change her location.
S tep  l b  Take any sta te  o  with k < K  clusters. Let the size of clusters in o be 
rii(ap . . .  for some t. Suppose th a t k(o) is not minimal. I show that the process
can transit to any o' such th a t th a t n ^ / )  =  ^(o-) — 1 and and =  n +  1 , for
some 1 < k' < k. Since k(o)  is not minimal there must be a player who gets utility x. 
She can move to the edge of k '(o ) where she gets utility 1, thus the move occurs with 
positive probability, and the process has transited to a state  o' with k clusters of size
 n k'{a) T 1, • • • 1 rik(a) ~  1- Also note tha t the process can transit back to o since
in o' there must be a player in k '(o ') who gets utility x.
Notice th a t the process cannot transit to states with a different number of clusters 
of each type. For the segregated states this is obvious, so assume that o has 1 < k < K  
clusters. By the transition dynamics the process can transit to a state where we have 
K  -  1 minimal clusters, and one cluster containing the remaining players of type t. 
However any of the K  — 1 minimal clusters cannot be broken up by the dynamics since 
all players live in integrated neighbourhoods, and thus receive highest possible utility.
S tep  2 Finally assume th a t in o there is a t least one player who does not belong to 
a cluster. This player has utility 0. Thus with positive probability under P° she will 
be drawn for revision and move to a location where she has at least one neighbour like 
herself. The new configuration is o' ^  o. If there are more players who do not belong to 
a cluster then let them  update the location choice. W ith positive probability the process 
will arrive at a state  o" in which all players belong to a cluster. Once the process has hit
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a" it cannot go back to cr, since by step lb  above a cluster will never vanish. Moreover no 
player has an individual incentive to move to a location where she only has neighbours 
which are not like herself. This shows th a t a  is transient. □
R e m a rk  13. Notice that the only equilibrium of the game is the integrated state (k =  K ). 
Nevertheless configurations with k < K  clusters, and where all players belong to a cluster, 
are stable in the sense that the process will visit them infinitely often if  started in that 
configuration. That is although players have individual micro-incentives to relocate the 
macro structure is stable.
I now establish th a t set of segregated states are the only stochastically stable states.
P ro p o s it io n  28. A state is stochastically stable i f  and only i f  it is segregated.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.3. □
The construction of minimal cost trees is shown in the following graph for the case 
K  = 3. I show the trees for the segregated state  and a state  with 2 clusters.
Tree rooted at z\ Tree rooted at z2
There are two effects which drives the selection result. First players of one type do not 
internalise the positive externality which they have on players of another type. Second 
myopic optim ization means th a t players do not anticipate that if they move to a location 
which is currently unattractive other players of their own type may follow and a higher 
degree of integration may follow in its wake. However the last effect is less robust, since 
if players are able to anticipate the evolution of neighbourhoods then for a sufficiently
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long time horizon they will realise th a t with high probability their local neighbourhood 
will evolve from a diverse neighbourhood into a segregated neighbourhood. This might 
deter players from making the initial unattractive relocation move.
S im u la tio n s
In this section I present simulation results for the model analysed above. For the purpose 
of the simulations I have fixed: (a ,/? ,7 ,<S, V>) =  (1,2, § ,3 .4).
I begin by looking at the short run behaviour of the model.
T h e  S h o rt R u n  Table 4.17 shows the time until the process hits a recurrent class of 
the unperturbed dynamics for the first time.
Table 4.17: Time to Convergence - The Short Run (Diversity)
n 1 0 2 0 50
e . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1
Mean 31.3 35.8 34.5 88.3 86.4 98.9 303.5 307.4 336.8
Std. 23.1 25.9 28.0 50.0 45.2 54.0 117.9 117.7 150.6
Max 157 129 161 316 327 285 827 753 1166
Min 0 0 0 16 16 2 0 89 89 94
Note: (« , 3 , 7 , 8, VO =  (1 ,2 , §, 3 ,4 ) , 200 O bservations per colum n.
The next table details the number of clusters in the configuration when the process 
hits a recurrent state of the unperturbed dynamics for the first time.
Table 4.18: Number of Clusters (Diversity)
n 1 0 2 0 50
€ . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1
Mean 2.87 2.93 2.95 5.62 5.55 5.58 14.1 13.87 13.84
Std. .73 .72 .70 1.06 1.04 .98 1.57 1.58 1.64
Max 4 4 4 8 8 8 18 19 18
Min 1 2 1 3 3 3 1 0 1 0 1 0
Note: (a , (3, 7 , 8, xjj) =  (1, 2, f , 3, 4), 200 O bservations per colum n.
I now tu rn  to the medium run.
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T h e  M e d iu m  R u n  In the simulations I track the process for a maximum of 107 periods. 
The expected wait until the process hits the set of stochastically stable states for the first 
time is rapidly increasing in the number of residents in the neighbourhood. In particular 
for n > 2 0  the process does not hit the stochastically stable states during the period 
in which I track the process. Therefore the medium run behaviour of the process, i.e. 
the states tha t are visited in the medium run become the most economically interesting 
time period. Since the long run is reached within 107 periods for very few observations I 
report the fraction of time the process spends in the recurrent classes of the unperturbed 
dynamics, which are not stochastically stable.






4-5 6 - 1 0 OE 2 - 6 7-12
50
13-25 OE
Mean 75.40 24.49 .113 10.55 85.64 3.616 .188 0 95.01 4.54 .453
Max 99.96 80.14 .721 18.93 93.67 7.413 .223 0 98.99 10.76 .374
Min 19.69 0 .030 4.030 77.81 . 8 8 8 .146 0 88.76 .602 .544
Note: e =  .05, (a , (3, 7 , 5, ip) = (1 ,2 , §, 3 ,4 ) ,  O E = O u t of Equilibrium . For n > 10 the process does not
reach the set of stochastica lly  stab le  sta tes  in 107  periods. O bservations per column: 200.
T h e  L ong R u n  In the table below I s tart the process in the stochastically stable states 
and track it for 107 periods. I record the fraction of time which the process spends in 
the the different states.
Table 4.20: Fraction of Time Spent in Stochastically Stable States (Diversity)
n 1 0 2 0 50
e . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 .0 2 .05 .1
SSS 22.62 1.65 1.82 5.03 .491 .034 .648 .643 .107
2-3 C lusters 77.38 98.05 96.72 46.89 12.41 5.54 27.81 .815 .059
>  3 C lusters 0 .207 .706 48.07 86.94 92.99 71.53 98.06 96.38
OE .003 .091 .748 . 0 1 0 .163 1.44 .013 .480 3.46
Note: (a , /?, 7 ) =  ( 1 ,2 ,3 ) ,  N um ber of Periods: 107. SS S= Stochastically  Stable States,
O E =  O ut of Equilibrium  (transient sta te).
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For reasonable levels of noise stochastic stability is not a valid predictor of where 
the process will spend most of its time, even for relatively small sizes of the residential 
neighbourhood. Compared to  the stochastic version of Schelling presented in section 4.2 
the process spends much more tim e in states which are not stochastically stable. This is 
due to the change in the preferences of residents over local neighbourhood composition. 
In particular in the stochastic version of Schelling if the process is started in a segregated 
state and a resident by mistake moves to a location with players different from herself 
then no player like herself has a strict incentive to follow her. On the other hand if 
residents have a preference for diversity then a mistake opens up a “beachhead” from 
which a new cluster can form at least temporarily. Since the new cluster is small players 
from the old cluster is more likely to be drawn for revision and might get the opportunity 
to move to a diverse neighbourhood. Thus the process will spend a significant amount 
of time outside the segregated state.
C o m m en ts  From the simulations it can be seen tha t expected wait until the process 
hits the set of stochastically stable is indeed very long, even for a small number of 
residents. Thus stochastic stability is quite uninformative about the behaviour of the 
system for large time periods. Comparing the model where players have a preference for 
diversity to the stochastic version of Schelling’s model it is also clear that the expected 
wait until a segregated state  is reached is much longer when players have a preference 
for diversity14. Thus it appears th a t although for both models evolutionary pressures 
pushes the process towards segregated states, in the medium run individual preferences 
over outcomes play a significant role. Also for the prediction of stochastic stability to 
be valid the level of noise must be significantly smaller than in the stochastic version 
of Schelling. This is because starting  from a segregated state a location mistake now 
leads the process directly out of the segregated states, since the location mistake has 
opened up an opportunity for a player who only lived with players like herself to move 
to a diverse neighbourhood. Thus for a given level of noise it is relatively easier to leave 
the stochastically stable states.
4.3 .2  Som e A ltern a tiv e  M o d els
The simulations in the previous section showed th a t although the segregated states are 
the only stochastic stable states the wait until the process hits the set of segregated 
states increases rapidly in the number of residents. In fact the process spends most of
14The intu ition  follows th e  line o f lem m a 3.
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it’s time in relatively segregated states with around two clusters of each type. This is 
due to the fact th a t once the process hits a sta te  with two clusters of each type of player 
it can spend a very long time in states with relatively few clusters, because people who 
live only with players like themselves are m otivated by the edges where they can seek out 
diverse neighbourhoods. Therefore under the unperturbed dynamics a cluster will spend 
a long time oscillating between almost disappearing or almost being the single cluster of 
that type, before a m utation a t the “right” time will eventually lead it to either vanish 
or become the only cluster which contains residents of a particular.
If one is willing to make the additional assumption tha t residents care about the size 
of the cluster in which they live (a similar set up to the modified version of Schelling’s 
model analysed in an earlier section) then this is a sufficient condition for segregated 
states to be the uniquely stochastically stable states, and moreover convergence to the 
set of stochastically stable states is rapid. This is one route I take in this section.
A second question which comes out the model with preferences for diversity is that 
although the stochastically stable and segregated states take a very long time to arrive 
to, nevertheless in the medium run the process visits relatively segregated states. Evo­
lutionary pressures still favor relatively segregated states, even though players have a 
preference for diversity. This seems to be related to the fact th a t players are purely 
motivated by current utility. If a player of type t was willing to move to a ghetto of 
type t' players, then surely others like himself would eventually follow and diverse neigh­
bourhoods might form. One potential and realistic way forward is to assume that there 
is some heterogeneity in preferences. I introduce a small portion of players into the 
population who have different preferences from the majority of the population. I assume 
that these players most preferred neighbourhood is a diverse one, but that they prefer 
living with people different from themselves to only living with people like themselves. 
One interpretation of this type preferences is simply th a t they are “perverse” in some 
sense (relative to the m ajority of the population). However another interpretation is 
that these players are “sophisticated” in the sense that are willing to sacrifice short term 
utility for achieving better outcomes in the longer run - they are more patient than the 
rest of the population.
I continue to formulate the model in a perturbed Markov framework. However in 
the unperturbed dynamics only the integrated states are recurrent, so in a sense there 
is no equilibrium selection problem. It might however take a very long time to reach 
an integrated state, and the presence of a m ajority of players with “normal” preferences
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means that evolutionary pressures tend to work against integration. I therefore ask the 
question whether the presence of a small fraction of “sophisticated” players is able to 
push the population towards more integrated outcomes.
A M odel w h e re  p lay e rs  h av e  a  C o n c e rn  fo r F u tu re  Payoffs
In this section I formulate a model where the motivation is identical to the one given in 
section 4.2.3. T hat is whenever a player is drawn for location revision and the neigh­
bourhood composition is identical at her current and her potential location, then she 
compares the size of the clusters and chooses the location which offers the bigger cluster 
size.
A nalysis  In this section I first characterise the reeurrent states of the unperturbed 
process. Then I show th a t the stochastically stable states are precisely the segregated 
states.
P ro p o s it io n  29. Suppose r =  1 and that players have a preference for diversity and a 
concern for future payoffs. Under P° a state is recurrent i f  and only if  it is segregated 
or it is integrated. Moreover all segregated states are in the same recurrent class, and 
all integrated states are absorbing.
Proof. <=: Suppose a  is integrated. Then all clusters have the same size and all players 
live in diverse neighbourhoods. Thus no player has a strict individual incentive to devi­
ate. Suppose a is segregated. Then 2r players of each type have diverse neighbourhoods 
while the remaining players live only with people like themselves. Players who live with 
people like themselves will have individual incentive to move to the edge of the cluster 
they reside in. The new sta te  is also segregated.
=>: I now show th a t all other states are transient. Suppose a  is neither segregated nor 
integrated. Under P° we can transit to a state, a 1, in which all players who does not 
have at least one neighbour like themselves live with at least one like themselves. Thus 
in a' all players belong to a cluster of at least minimal size. If cr' is neither segregated nor 
integrated then o ’ has 1 < k < K  clusters. By the unperturbed dynamics we can then 
transit to a state in there are k  -  1 type t minimal clusters, and one cluster containing 
the remaining residents, which is at least of length 4, denote it k '. Now let one player 
from each of the k -  1 minimal clusters one by one be drawn for revision. Since the other 
clusters are minimal and k' is at least of length 4, when a player is drawn for revision 
and she has the opportunity to move to the edge of k' (such that she gets a diverse
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neighbourhood) then she strictly prefers this since at least 2  more residents of type t live 
in k' than in her current cluster. Thus by the unperturbed dynamics this player moves. 
Next let the remaining players from the k — 1 minimal clusters be drawn for revision. 
These players only have neighbours different from themselves. Thus they strictly prefer 
any location which puts them  in the k' cluster. Thus by the unperturbed dynamics we 
have transited to a segregated state. □
P ro p o s it io n  30. Suppose r =  1 , that players have a preference for diversity and a 
concern for future payoff. A state is stochastically stable if  and only if it is segregated.
Proof. Let Z\ denote the recurrent class containing all segregated states and let Z k  
denote the set of integrated states, with cardinality \Zk \. First I establish the stochastic 
potential of a segregated state. Take any integrated state. In an integrated state all 
players live in clusters of minimal size. Let a player from cluster k be drawn for revision 
and suppose th a t she has the opportunity  to move to an edge of cluster k ', k' 7  ^k, with 
players like herself. She will have the same local neighbourhood at both locations and 
the cluster size are identical. Thus she is indifferent between the two locations. Thus 
the move has cost 13. Now the process has transited to a state in which there is one 
cluster which is greater than  all other clusters of th a t type. Hence by the unperturbed 
dynamics, with positive probability the process transits to a segregated state. That is 
the stochastic potential of the set of segregated states is:
P\Zk \
I now establish th a t the stochastic potential of an integrated state is strictly larger. 
Take any segregated state. To transit to an integrated state  has at least cost 5 since 
all players either live with people like themselves or live in a diverse neighbourhood. 
Likewise the cost of transit from one integrated state to another distinct integrated 
state is at least (3. Hence the stochastic potential of an integrated state is at least:
(3{\ZK \ - l )  + 5
Since 5 > 3 it follows the only segregated states are stochastically stable. □
In now simulate the model.
S im u la tio n s  In this section I simulate the model.
I again fix: (c*, 0 , 7 , 5, t/;) =  (1, 2, §, 3,4), so as to make a direct comparison with the 
model presented in the previous section more straightforward.
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T h e  S h o rt R u n  The following tables show descriptive statistics about the time of 
convergence to a recurrent class.
Table 4.21: The Short Run (Modified Diversity)
n
e . 0 2
1 0
.05 .1 . 0 2
2 0
.05
( x l O 3)
.1 . 0 2
50
.05
( x l O 3)
.1
Median 860 837 980 5.577 5.976 7.464 47.28 62.33 395.9
Mean 982.9 991.8 1 1 1 0 6.339 6.849 9.306 52.76 81.28 558.3
Std. 642.3 675.9 759.6 3.596 4.345 7.007 31.33 62.08 565.6
Max 13 2 0 7 31.78 28.43 41.70 293.2 431.4 4081
Min 3442 4112 4858 .672 .704 .669 8.28 11.14 9.37
Note: (a , 3 , 7 , 5, xp) =  (1 ,2 , | , 3 , 4 ) ,  500 O bservations per colum n.
T h e  M e d iu m  R u n  The following table gives various statistics about the duration 
of the medium run and the fraction of time spent in states th a t are visited before the 
process hits one of the stochastically stable states for the first time.
Table 4.22: D uration of The Medium Run (Modified Diversity)
n 1 0 2 0 50
€ . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1
(x lO 3) (x lO 3)
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean .885 .052 .054 0 0 0 0 0 .026
Std. 15.6 .257 .265 0 0 0 0 0 .581
Max 340.8 2.89 2.79 0 0 0 0 0 13
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: ( 0 :, ft, 7 , J, Vd = ( b 2 , | ,3 ,4 ) , 5 00 O bservations per col-
um n.
The duration of the medium run is generally short. In most of the simulations once 
the process has converged to an equilibrium of the game, it has converged to an element 
in the set of stochastically stable states.
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T h e  L ong R u n  The following table gives statistics about the waiting time until the 
process hits a stochastically stable state  for the first time.
Table 4.23: The Long Run (Modified Diversity)
n 1 0 2 0 50
e . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 .0 2 .05 .1
( x l O 3 ) ( x l O 3) ( x l O 3)
Median .940 .897 1 . 0 1 2 5.557 5.976 7.464 47.28 62.33 395.9
Mean 1 . 8 6 8 1.044 1.164 6.339 6.849 9.306 52.76 81.28 558.3
Std. 15.61 .678 .755 3.596 4.345 7.007 31.33 62.08 565.6
Max 340.8 4.112 4.558 31.78 28.43 41.70 293.2 431.4 4081
Min .028 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 2 .672 .704 .669 8.28 11.14 9.37
Note: (a , 3 , 7 , 6, ip) =  (1 ,2 , | , 3 , 4 ) ,  500 O bservations per colum n.
The fact tha t the medium run is 011 average very short is reflected in the wait until 
the process hits an element in the set of stochastically stable states. The wait is very 
close to the duration of the short run.
The table below shows the fraction of time spent in various configurations, when the 
process is started  in a stochastically stable state. I track the process over 107 periods.
Table 4.24: Fraction of Time Spent in Stochastically Stable States (Schelling)
11 1 0 2 0 50
e . 0 2 .05 .1 . 0 2 .05 .1 .0 2 .05 .1
SSS 99.94 98.88 90.04 99.67 89.16 49.02 95.81 41.33 2.85
SNI .054 .933 8.40 .312 10.39 47.44 4.14 57.52 88.77
SI .008 .182 1.52 .017 .45 3.53 .045 1.15 8.38
Note: (a , 0 , 7 , <5, </') =  ( b  § 1  3 ,4 ) ,  Num ber of Periods: 107. SSS= Stochastica lly  Sta­
ble S tates, S N I= S ta tes  where no player is isolated , S I= S ta tes where players are 
isolated.
The model performs reasonably well for e < .0 2 .
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A M odel w ith  S o p h is tic a te d  R e s id e n ts
I assume that a small fraction of players have “sophisticated” preferences in the sense 
that while their most preferred neighbourhood is a diverse one, they prefer to live in 
isolated neighbourhoods rather than  living in ghettoes with people like themselves.
This leads to the following formulation of “sophisticated” preferences. Given a con­
figuration a £ £  a player of type t with “sophisticated” preferences residing on location 
U, has the following utility function:
f
X i f # Nt <2r + l  —
1
3
II■“sT 1 i f 1 .3 ^  2 r + l < 2  — 3
0 i f 2r + l  ^
2
3
where \  < x  < 1 .
I make the additional assum ption th a t all players only care about the type of the 
players th a t reside in their local neighbourhood, and not whether they are “sophisti­
cated” or not.
Apart from this modification the stochastic process is left unchanged.
A nalysis Let \y~\ denote the smallest integer greater than  or equal to y. I have the 
following result.
P ro p o s it io n  31. Suppose r =  1 and that \pn\ >  1 have “sophisticated” preferences, 
while n — \pn\ have a preference diversity, where 0 <  p < 1. Under P° a state is 
recurrent i f  and only i f  it is integrated.
Proof. *4=: It is immediate th a t an integrated state  is recurrent, since in an integrated 
state all players have utility 1 , thus no player has an individual strict incentive to move.
=>: I now show th a t the integrated states are the only recurrent states. First let a 
player of type t with “sophisticated” preferences be denoted t 8 while players who have 
“normal” preferences are simply denoted by their type, t. Take any state a which is not 
integrated. By the unperturbed dynamics the process can transit to a state in which 
all players of type t, t =  A, B  has at least one neighbour like themselves. Also by the 
unperturbed dynamics we can transit to a state  where all type t s players live in a diverse 
neighbourhood. Let this state  be a '. Note th a t o ’ must have at least
~[pnY  
2  r
clusters of each type to ensure th a t all “sophisticated” players live in a diverse neigh­
bourhood. Suppose th a t a ’ has k <  § clusters, otherwise we are done.
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I now show th a t we can transit to a sta te  with k -1- 1 clusters of each type. Since n 
is even and k < ^  there is a t least two players of each type who do not live in diverse 
neighbourhoods. Thus by the unperturbed dynamics we can transit to a state with k 
clusters and such th a t there is a cluster of each type which is at least of length 4 , and this 
cluster contains at least one “sophisticated” player. Let the cluster of a t least length 4 
containing type t players be denoted k \ . Suppose th a t in k\ the “sophisticated” player no 
longer lives in a diverse neighbourhood. If she does then let one of the other players in k[ 
who only have neighbours like themselves be drawn for revision and given the opportunity 
to move to the edge of the cluster taking up the location th a t the “sophisticated” player 
had. Now let the t s type player be drawn for revision and suppose tha t she draws a 
location contained in k 't, , t' ^  t, such th a t two type t' players live on either side (this 
is possible since k't, is of a t least length 4). Since the t s player prefers to live only with 
people different from herself to living only with people like herself she will move under 
the unperturbed dynamics. Now there is a second player in kt who only live with people 
like herself. Let her be drawn for revision and let her move next to the “sophisticated” 
player who just moved. Both these players now live in a minimal cluster and have a 
diverse neighbourhood. Also by their moves a new cluster of type t' players have formed. 
Thus we have transited  to a state  with k +  1 clusters. Since the moves did not rely on 
the size of k, if k +  1 <  ^ then we can repeat the procedure until we have reached an 
integrated state. □
R e m a rk  14. Note that the proof only requires that there is at least one “sophisticated” 
player. Thus the results holds even fo r the case where only one type of players has some 
player who is “sophisticated”.
Also note that the Schelling’s model in which players do not have a preference for 
diversity is unaffected by the introduction of a small fraction of “sophisticated” players.
S im u la tio n s  Since the unperturbed process has a unique recurrent class the process will 
spend most of i t ’s time in the integrated states for a sufficiently long time horizon, if e is 
sufficiently small. However there might be other reason for considering positive and non­
vanishing levels of noise: it might capture elements of reality which the model does not 
pick up, or the modeller do not wish to model. Therefore in this section I both simulate 
the model without noise and with noise. Simulating the model without noise gives us 
an estimate of the waiting tim e until the process hits an integrated state. Simulating 
the model with noise allows me to  see to what extent evolutionary pressures which
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tend to work against integration (for the m ajority of players) may be countered by the 
introduction of some heterogeneity in preferences over local neighbourhood composition.
N o N oise  I first simulate the model w ithout noise. I fix the proportion of “sophisti­
cated” players p =  .1  throughout.
In the first table I record the time when the process first hits a state in which all 
players who has a preference for diversity has at least one neighbour like themselves and 
all “sophisticated” players live in a diverse neighbourhood. Such states mimick recurrent 
states in a model where all players have a preference for diversity. I refer to them as 
“pseudo-recurrent” .
Table 4.25: Time of Convergence to Pseudo-Recurrent States (Heterogeneous Players)
n 1 0 2 0 50
Mean 63.3 262.7 2145.9
Std. 51.0 207.0 1517.8
Max 348 1695 10437
Min 0 5 137
Note: l — 0, p =  .1, 500 obs.
per colum n.
In the next table I report the number of clusters when the process first hits a pseudo­
recurrent state.
Table 4.26: Clustering (Heterogeneous Players)
n 1 0 2 0 50
Mean 3.14 6.40 17.10
S t d . .628 .870 1.51
Max 5 9 2 1
Min 1 4 1 1
N o t e : e =  0 , P = - l , 5 0 0  O b -
servations per colum n.
A straight forward comparison with the clustering in the diversity model with ho­
mogeneous agents shows th a t even in the short run the presence of actively diversity 
seeking players leads to significantly higher levels of integration.
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In the following table I s ta rt the process at a randomly drawn configuration and then 
track it for 1 0 7 periods or until the integrated sta te  is reached.
Table 4.27: Time of Convergence to Integrated State (Heterogeneous Players)
n 10 20 50
0XeoOX




Note: e =  0, p = . 1 , 500 O bserva­
tions per colum n.
The wait until the process reaches an integrated state increases rapidly as n  increases.
N oise The simulations without noise showed that for reasonable time horizons the 
process will be out of equilibrium most of the time, at least for large n. It therefore 
becomes interesting to see what disequilibrium states are visited by the process. Here 
noise is not used for selection purposes but is introduced to capture elements of the 
location decision process which are not captured by the specification of preferences. 
For the simulations in this section I fix e =  .02. As in the previous section I have 
fixed: (a, p, 7 . 5, ip) = (1,2, §, 3,4) for all simulations. Since the majority of players 
have diversity seeking preferences, evolutionary pressure tends to push neighbourhoods 
configurations towards segregated states. At the same time a small fraction of “sophisti­
cated” players are constantly opening up new opportunities for the formation of diverse 
local neighbourhoods, which tends to push the evolution of the system towards more 
integrated states.
In the following tables I show the mean fraction of time with which the process 
visits different states for n  =  10,20 and 50 respectively. I track the process for 107 
periods. Since I am mainly interested in how the presence of a few “sophisticated” 
players affect the welfare of the m ajority of players who have a preference for diversity 
the tables indicate the fraction of tim e th a t the process spends in a state with a particular 
distribution of local neighbourhoods for players who have a preference for diversity. E.g. 
in table 4.28 I simulate the model with n  =  10. Since the fraction of “sophisticated” 
players is fixed to .1  this leaves a to tal of 18 players who have a preference for diversity.
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The table is then read as follows. The time average fraction th a t the process spends in 
a state where all 18 players live in a diverse neighbourhood is 33.83. That is the process 
spends about a third of the to tal time in states in which all players live in a diverse 
neighbourhood. It spends 36.67% of the time in states in which 14 out of the 18 players 
have a diverse neighbourhood, the remaining 4 players live in ghettoes only with player 
like themselves.




. Integrated  
14 15-17 18 Sum
0 . 2 2 12.05 36.67 12.25 33.83 95.02
1 .07 1.87 . 2 1 2 . 1 1 0 4.26
2-18 .04 .53 .13 .0 1 0 .72
Sum .34 14.45 37.01 14.37 33.83 1 0 0
Note: p =  .1, e =  .02, (a , 3 , 7 , 5 , 4 ’) =  (1, 2, §, 3, 4). Num ber of periods: 
107
For n =  10 the process spends the m ajority of the time close to or at an integrated 
state. 85.2% of the time is spent in states where at legist 77.8% of the players live in 
diverse neighbourhoods. Hardly any players live in isoilated neighbourhoods.
I now increase the to tal number of residents to 40 players. That is 36 of the players 
have a preference for diversity.
Table 4.29: Visited States (n =  20) (Heterogeneous Players)
No. Isolated 0-19
No. Integrated
20-25 26-29 30-36 Sum
0 .24 26.83 42.41 16.62 8 6 . 1 0
1 . 1 0 3.59 5.71 1.90 11.31
2-36 .03 .92 1.34 .30 2.60
Sum .38 31.34 49.46 18.82 1 0 0
Note: p = .  1, e =  .02, (a , 3 , 7 , (5, ip) =  (1 ,2 , § , 3, 4). Num ber of periods:
107
States with full integration is now hardly reached, however the process still spends
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about 68.3% of its time in states where at least 72.2% of the players live in diverse 
neighbourhoods.
When n =  50 there are now 90 players who have a preference for diversity.
Table 4.30: Visited States (« =  50) (Heterogeneous Players)
No. Integrated
No. Isolated 0-59 60-69 70-75 76-90 Sum
0 4.94 42.60 17.98 1.79 67.32
1 1.85 16.33 4.88 .42 23.49
2 .70 5.11 1.46 .09 7.36
3-90 . 2 2 1.30 .30 . 0 1 1.83
Sum 7.71 65.35 24.62 2.31 1 0 0
Note: p =  .1, e =  .0 2 , (Of, 3,1, 5,ip) = (1, 2, | , 3 , 4). Num ber o f periods:
107
The process spends about 92.3% of its time in states where at least 66.7% of the 
players live in diverse neighbourhoods.
4.4 C onclusion
Residential areas may become segregated for a variety of reasons e.g. if everybody prefer 
to live with rich people then rich people can segregate themselves by outbidding their 
poor counterparts for residential locations.
In this paper people have preferences over whom they would like to have in their local 
neighbourhood. If they do not like their current neighbourhood then they can move to 
one which they like better. This is the basic model suggested by Schelling (1969, 1971).
In the basic formalisation of Schelling’s model of this paper, the fear of isolation 
eventually leads to segregation. This is true even if all residents prefer to live in mixed 
neighbourhoods. This is a rather bleak message. On the other hand I also showed 
that if residents prefer to live in mixed neighbourhoods then the presence of just a 
few “social activists” can have a significant impact on the overall composition of local 
neighbourhoods.
Attempts to understand the underlying process through which ghettoes form and develop 
can be found across the social sciences. Anderson (1990, 1999) gives a brilliant and lucid
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account of the dynamics of ghetto form ation in a US metropolis. A general change in 
the productive environment (the gradual disappearance of skilled labour jobs vs. the 
appearance of non-productive predatory behaviour of the underground drugs-economy) 
led to the the loss of authority of the older generation over the reproduction of social 
norms among youngsters. This process is then exacerbated by the black professional 
middle-class leaving the residential area in order to avoid the side- effects of the drugs- 
economy. In Anderson’s analysis this is crucial to  the formation of the ghetto. If these 
people remained in the community, they would become role models for how hard work 
and education can pay off in the new productive environment in contrast to the risky 
get-rich-fast schemes of the drugs-economy. Crucially his analysis reveals that ethnic 
homogeneity is not equivalent to the negatively charged ghetto. Ethnic homogeneity 
can be associated with a vibrant, healthy and dynamic community.
Schelling (1971) also considered neighbour interaction in a two-dimensional space. In­
vestigating how more general geometries affect the evolution of neighbourhoods is left 
for future research.
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A ppendix A
A ppendix for C hapter 2
This appendix deals with the case where the observing player can only learn about one 
of the risky alternatives. In the first section we establish general conditions under which 
an observing player prefers to  learn about alternative r i or r 2 ■ Then in second section 
we establish conditions such th a t any observing player who ex-ante prefers r\ will want 
to observe experim entation with r i ,  and any observing player who ex-ante prefers V2  
either prefers to observe experim entation with r i  or r 2 -
A .l  T he G eneral C ase
In this section we establish general conditions for given preferences of the observing
player to prefer to  learn about alternative r\ or alternative V2 -
A .1.1 2 =  1,2
Note in this case cr(tS) =  s. We have the following:
P( Event) 1 - ^ 2 ) ( l - ^ i ) / ^  (1 — A^i)(l — M2 )
r\ 2 u\ 2 u\ 0 0
T2 2 u 2 0  2 u 2 0
Thus and assuming wlog th a t u\ > U2 ,
Ci  =  (1 -  Ili)ll22u2
C 2  —  At i ^ 2(2 ,n i  — 2H2) +  Mi (1 — ^2)2^1
Such that it is optim al to observe cr(f) =  r\ iff:
H2 U2  < n \u \
and a( f )  =  r 2  otherwise.
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A .1.2 ( i i B i  <  ^  and  M 2 u 2  >  ^
C ase I: fi2u2 < HiXi+iiil +  im i
In this case we have:
P(Event) M1M2 A t i ( l - / i 2) (1 -  Mi)M2 0
7*1 2 wi 2 wi 2 w2
r 2 2 u 2 0  2 M2
We have:
Ci  =  ( 1  -  /y,i)(l -  / / 2 ) ( 0  -  w2)
C 2 — M1M2 (2fZi — 2t22 ) +  / i i ( l  -  
Hence 0 -(/) =  n  is optim al iff:
_ . _ M2 « 2 1 -  Ml
M2 ^ 2  <  « i  ^------------
2  Ml
and cj(/) =  r 2 otherwise.
C ase II: i^2 u 2  > “l(1-±^g} + ^
In this case we have:
P( Event) M1M2 / r i ( l - / i 2) (1 -  Mi)M2 (- 
r i  2 u 2 u 2 +  u\ 2 u 2
r 2  2  u2 0  2 w2
The only relevant case is when U\ -T w2 >  0. Then cr(f) -
_ . M2 ^ 2Viui  > - u 2  =  ---- —
1 — M2
and o{ f )  = r 2  otherwise.
A .1.3 H~ L <  fjLiiii and fi2u2 <
C ase I: Mi^i < l+£ l u 2  +
In this case we have:
P(Event) M1M2 M i M2 ) (1 -  Mi)M2 0 
r\ 2 u\ 2 u\ 0
r 2  2  u 2  2 u\ 2  u 2
~  M i ) ( l  -  M2)  
u 2  
0
H 2 ) 2 u \
~  M i ) ( l  -  M2)
U.2
0
r\ is optimal iff:
-  M1X1 -  M2)  
0
Mi
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We have:
Ci =  (1 — h \ )h22u2
C 2  =  / i i / i 2 ( 2 u i  -  2 u 2 ) -  (1  -  / z i ) ( l  -  yU2 )Wi 
Hence a ( f ) =  r\ is optimal iff:
_  _ 1 — M2fJ'lU 1 >  u 2   ------------
2 M 2
and a( f )  = r 2  otherwise.
Case II: paili > l- ^ u 2  +  ^
In this case we have:
P(Event) f in i 2  ^ ( 1  -  fj,2) (1 — /xi)/x2 (1 - / / i )( l  - /z2)
r i 212! 2 u\  0  0
r 2 222i 2l2i Uy +  u 2 U\
Only relevant case is U y +  u 2 > 0, we have:
C i =  (1 -  Mi)M2(Mi +  u 2)
C2 =  - ( 1  -  /ui)(l -  ii2)ui
Hence cr(f) =  r\ is optimal iff:
_ . KifJtlH2 u 2  < -Uy  =   -------
L — Hi
and cr(/) =  r 2 otherwise.
A . 1.4 HiUi  >  2 = 1 , 2
Case I: n \ U \  < ^ j r l u 2  +  and p2w2 <
We have:
P(Event) H1 H2  Hi( l  — H2 ) (1 — Mi)M2 (1 ~Mi ) ( 1 “ M2 )
r i  222i 2l2i 2 u 2 w2
r 2 2222 222i 2222 U \
If u\ > 22,2 and u 2  >  Mi then er(/) =  r i  is always preferred. The only relevant case is 
221 > u 2  and 0 > Mi > u 2  (alternatively u 2  >  221 and u 2  >  Mi)- Here we have:
Ci =  (1 - M i ) ( l - M 2 ) ( Mi - M2)
C 2 =  /iiM 2(222i -  2222)
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Thus if
-  ^  , K1 / i  \ 1 ~  Ml
M2W2 <  /J-2u l H ? r ( l  — M2 )
2  2  /i!
then c r ( /)  =  r i  is preferred. And c r ( / )  =  r 2 otherwise.
Case II: mi^i >  ^ u 2  + ^
In this case we have:
P(Event) M1M2 mi ( 1 - M 2 )  (1  — Mi)M2 (1 -  Mi ) ( 1  ~  M2 )
r i 2 -ui 2 n.i 2 u 2 M2
r 2 2 u i  2 u i  U\ +  U2 Mi
Suppose again th a t u\ > u 2 and 0 > Mi > M2 > then:
C i  =  ( 1  -  / z i ) ( l  -  M2XM1 ~  M2)
C 2  = (1 -  mi)M2(2u2 -  ( M i  +  tZ2))
Hence cr(f) = r 1 is optimal iff:
- ^  Mi(12U2 >  M2^2 -  -^--------- «1
1 -  Ml
and cr(/) =  r 2 otherwise.
Case III: M2 M2 >
We have:
P(Event) M1 M2 m i(1 _ M2 ) (1 -  Mi)M2 (1 -  Mi)(1 ~ M2 )
7' 1 2u2 M2 2u2 M2
r 2 2 u 2  2u\ 2 u 2  Mi
Thus unless 0 > u 2  >  Mi then c r ( / )  =  r 2 is always preferred. Hence suppose 0 >  M2 > Mi,  
then:
Ci =  mi(1 -  M2)(2wi -  (m2 +  ^ 1))
C2 =  ( 1  -  M i ) ( !  -  M2XM2 -  Mi )
Thus cr(/) =  r i  is optim al iff:
and cr(/) =  r 2 otherwise.
-  ^ M 2M1W1 < Mi^i — 1 K2
1 — M2
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A .2 P roo f o f P rop osition  6
The proof is by example. We take an observing player who in the absence of observational 
learning is willing to experiment with r 2  only. We fix < u 2  < 0, and then proceed 
to show that we can find pairs (iii, u2) such th a t the observing player prefers to observe 
experimentation with r\
Proof of Proposition 6 . Fix uj < u 2  <  0. Take the case where u\ < ^  and u 2  < 
which is the case tha t in the absence of observational learning the player is willing to 
experiment with r2  only. Further specialise to the case where p,2 u 2  < HlQ.+Jf.|)+M2«2 (case 
I in appendix A. 1.2). It then follows from A. 1.2 tha t it is optimal to observe a player 
experimenting with r\ iff condition (*) is satisfied:
_ . _ M2 « 2  1 -  MlM2 ^ 2  < u 1 -------------------2 fJLl
We now proceed to show th a t there are non-empty pairs (iii, u 2 ) such th a t this condition 
is satisfied. Fix u  1 at i t ’s upper boundary u\  =  Inserting this in the equation above
leads to the following condition on u 2:
_ . « i « 2  1 -  MlUo < ----------------------
2 m2 2  Ml
The lower bound on u 2  is The condition:
* 1  _  «2 1 ~  Mi >  ^ 2  
2 m2 2  mi 2
implies n\fii  >  k 2 (i2. Now note th a t (*) is increasing in u\. Thus if /ciMi > «2 M2 
then there are pairs {t i i ,u2) such th a t the player prefers to see experimentation with r\. 
Conversely if < K2 M2 then by a symmetric argument we can find observing players 
who would in the absence of observational learning be willing to experiment with r\ 
only, but prefers to see experim entation with r2. □
A ppendix B
A ppendix for C hapter 3
B .l  N ecessary C ond ition s  
B . l . l  P re lim in ar ies
We require some notation before proceeding. Let a strategy for a G  player who is interim 
type t £ T,  be denoted st £ G  x {I,  N I } ,  where we for ease of notation do not include 
beliefs, and have suppressed the fact th a t in general the strategy may depend on the 
signal realisation or the givers (absolute) type. Also let a strategy profile where the 
strategy of interim type t is removed be denoted
We first establish tha t for all interim  types the strategy: send gift and do not invest 
is strictly dominated by the strategy: do not send a gift and do not invest.
L em m a 4. For any interim  type t £ T  the strategy St = (g , N I ) ,  g £ G \ { n g }  is strictly 
dominated by the strategy s[ — (n g , N I ).
Proof. For any s~ l the maximal payoff from strategy s* is:
b — c < 0
This payoff accrues if the gift th a t the player sends leads R  to invest with probability 
one.
But for any s~l the minimal payoff from s't is:
0
which is the payoff to t if R  does not invest after not receiving a gift. □
R e m a rk  15. It follows from  the lemma above that we need only consider strategies for a 
type t player which takes the form : st £  {(n g , NI ) ,  (ng , I).  (g , I)  for some g £ G\{m?}}.
142
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L em m a 5. For t 2  types the strategy s t 2  =  (g, I )  fo r some g G G  \  {ng} is strictly 
dominated by s 't 2  =  (n g . N I ).
Proof. For any s ~ * 2 the maximal payoff from strategy s t 2  is:
— c <  0
since t 2  interim types have modal beliefs on d =  2  and thus expected project benefits 
are strictly negative.
But the minimal payoff from s't2 is:
0
which accrues if R  does not invest with positive probability conditional on not recieving 
a gift. □
R e m a rk  16. It follows from  the two lemmas above that in any equilibrium of the game 
t 2  interim types play either (n g , N I )  or (ng. I).
B .1 .2  E q u i l ib r i a  w i th  n o  g if ts
We now turn  to establishing necessary conditions for existence of equilibria where no 
interim types send gifts.
The following lemma establishes th a t in any equilibrium of the game where no interim 
types send gifts then t 2  types do not invest.
L em m a 6 . I f  there is an equilibrium where no gifts are sent, then t 2  play (ng ,NI ) .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an equilibrium where no interim 
types send gifts but t 2  types invest. In this equilibrium R  either invests or she does not 
invest conditional on ng.
Suppose first tha t she invests. But then t 2  recieves negative expected payoff from 
(ng,I)  whereas she receives payoff b >  0 from ( ng , NI ) .  Contradiction.
Suppose next tha t R  does not invest. Then (ng, I)  yields a small payoff loss I whereas 
(ng, N I )  yields payoff 0. Contradiction. □
L em m a 7. I f  there is an equilibrium with no gifts where R  and t\ types invests, then to 
types also invest.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an equilibrium with no gifts where 
ti types invests but t 0  types do not. Since t \  types invests in equilibrium it must be
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that their expected payoff from the project exceed the benefit of free-riding b, because 
R  invests. In the proposed equilibrium t0  earn payoff b. But then t 0  have a profitable 
deviation, since expected project payoffs are strictly higher for t 0  types than for t\ types. 
Contradiction. □
B .1 .3  E quilibria  w ith  G ifts
We now turn  to equilibria in which some types send gifts.
L em m a 8 . I f  there is an equilibrium where gifts are sent by at least one type t G T \ { t 2 } 
then t 2  types play (ng , NI ) .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. From rem ark 16 we need only consider the possibil­
ity that t2  types play (ng, I)  in the proposed equilibrium. Consider first the case where 
R  invests conditional on ng.  In this case 1 2  earns negative expected payoffs since she 
has beliefs modal on d = 2. Contradiction since by playing (n g , N I )  she can earn b > 0. 
Next consider the case where R  does not invest conditional on ng. In this case t 2  has a 
small payoff loss I, but if she deviates to (ng, N I )  she gets payoff 0. Contradiction. □
Next we note th a t if there is an equilibrium where t\ types sends gifts and invests then 
to types also sends gifts and invests. This statem ent is the equivalent of the monotonicity 
property of equilibria with no gifts (lemma 7).
L em m a 9. I f  there is an equilibrium where t\ types send gifts and invests, then to types 
also sends gifts and invests.
Proof. Proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an equilibrium where t\ types sends 
gifts and invests, but to types do not. From lemma 8  it follows tha t £2 types do not 
send gifts, thus R  does not invest conditional on ng. to types do not send gifts and 
earn 0  payoff. Note tha t since t\ types send gifts and invests, it must be tha t R  invests 
with positive probability. Also expected project payoffs for t\  are at least c, the cost 
of sending a gift. But then to types have a profitable deviation, which is to mimick t\ 
types. This follows since to types have strictly greater expected project payoffs than t\ 
types. Contradiction. D
We now complete the proof of proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is divided into two parts. The first part establishes 
the necessary conditions for an equilibria with no gifts, and the second part establishes 
condtions for equilibria with gifts.
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Equilibrium w ith no Gifts Claim 1 is simply lemma 6. Claim 2 is lemma 7.
Equilibrium w ith Gifts Claim 1 is lemma 8 . Claim 2 is lemma 9. Claim 3 is 
lemma 4.Claim 4 follows from lemma 8  which says tha t t 2  types do not send gifts in 
equilibrium. From assumption (Al)  it then follows th a t expected project payoffs from 
investing conditonal on not receiving a gift is strictly negative. □
B.2 Equilibrium  A nalysis
To ease the number of cases to consider we make the stronger assumption th a t 5 > 25. 
This assumption only affects the characterisation for cost-levels greater than  c \.
First define the following cost levels: c\ =  |  +  c2  = b+  |  — 15, C3 =  6 +  >
c2 , C3 >  ci, and C4 =  § ( £  +  5) +  b >  C3 .
B .2.1 E quilibria  w ith  no g ifts
In this section we show how the existence of equilibrium is invariant to the benefit to 
free-riding 6 , and only depends on the param eters 5 and 5. For ease of exposition we 
shall assume that the loss of being free-ridden on is neglible.
Definition 8. For b >  0 and B  £ (B , B ) define:
p(B,b)  = L | B - i ^ ( 5  +  5 ) = 6 |
and:
'p(B.b) =
Note that p < p, and th a t the threshold values are decreasing in B.  The first 
threshold value ensures th a t to players find it worthwhile to invest, whereas the second 
ensure that t\ players find it worthwhile to invest.
Equilibrium I
Interim Incentives of G players The incentive constraints of to are:
B - h = A < 5  +  «) >  b
The incentive constraints for ti  are:
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If t\ types are deterred from investing then so are t 2  since project benefits are decreasing 
in type subscript.
Interim Incentives of R  players The incentive constraint of a R  player who receives 
ng is:
B - ^ i d  + d) > b
We now conclude th a t if:
B - ^ ( 5  + 6 ) > b (B .l)
< b (B.2)4 _ 2 '
arc satisfied then Equilibrium I with no gifts exists. The first constraint ensure that
the expected project benefits are sufficiently high for to types to invest. The second
constraint says th a t project benefits cannot be too high, otherwise t\ types will want to 
invest.
Proposition 32. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s*j NG:
1. For any c > b > 0 s* NG is an equilibrium profile if  and only i f  p < p < p.
2. There is no b > 0 such that s*j NC is an equilibrium profile for all B  and p.
We shall show the last statem ent. Fix B  a t the lower bound, B = 5 + b. We now 
show that the intersection is for some p > p.
S + b - ^ - ^ - i d  + S) =  b
Solving for p gives:
5 - 5
p  — ------ ----------
> P
which implies tha t > 5 which follows by assumption.
Equilibrium II
Interim Incentives o f G players Since the expected value of project benefits decreases 
monotonically in type subscript the binding incentive constraint is for t\ types.
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Interim Incentives of R  players Since R  players receive a convex combination of 
project payoffs from to and t\ types in the proposed equilibrium, whenever a t\ type find 
it worthwhile to invest, then R  also finds it wort while.
We conclude tha t if
B -  i ± ^ « 5  -  i — ^  >  b 
4 -  2
then an Equilibrium II exists.
Proposition 33. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s *j j  N G :
1. For any c > b > 0 s*n  NG is an equilibrium profile i f  and only i f  p >  p.
2. There is no b > 0 such that s *jj NG is an equilibrium profile for all B  and p.
B .2.2  E quilibria  w ith  M o n ey
In this section we show th a t there are two types of equilibria where money is used as 
a medium to induce investment from R  players. In the first equilibrium only G players 
who receive a signal realisation th a t R  is of the same type as G sends gifts, in the other 
equilibrium G players who receives a signal realisation suggesting tha t the players are 
compatible send gifts.
Define:
Definition 9. For b < c < c\ define:
Note that in their common domain p < p, and th a t the threshold values are decreasing 
in B  for fixed c. The first threshold value ensures th a t to players find it worthwhile to 
invest, whereas the second ensure th a t t\ players find it worthwhile to invest.
Equilibrium I
Interim Incentives of G players The incentive constraints of to are:
mm
For b < c < C3 define:
mm
B - T - E ( 5  +  S )  > c
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from which it follows that a neccesary condition is c > 6 . 
The incentive constraints for t\ are:
0  > b — c
c
If 1 1 types are deterred from sending gifts then so are t2, since the first constraint is 
type-independent, and project benefits are decreasing in type subscript.
In te r im  In ce n tiv e s  o f R  p la y e rs  The incentive constraint of a R  player who receives 
m  is:
Note that in equilibrium an R  player who does not receive a gift expects G to play N I,  
therefore her incentive constraint is non-binding.
We now conclude tha t if c > b and:
then Equilibrium I with money exists. The first constraint ensure tha t the expected 
project benefits are sufficiently high for to types to invest. The second constraint says 
that project benefits cannot be too high, otherwise t\ types will want to send gifts (and 
induce investment).
P ro p o s itio n  34. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, S*I ,M '
1. I f  c > c' 4 then there is no B  and p such that s) M is an equilibrium profile.
2. t f  e3 < c < c'4 then s*j M is an equilibrium profile i f  and only if  B  £ (c, B) and
and p < p < p.
4. There is no cost level c > b > 0 such that s*I m is an equilibrium profile for all B
B - f i - - ( 5  + 5 ) > b
1 +  3p . 1





3. I f  b < c < c;, then s) m is an equilibrium -profile i f  and only if  B  G (nm x(B . c) , B )
and p.
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Equilibrium II
Interim Incentives o f G players Continue to  assume th a t c > b. Since the expected  
value of project benefits decreases monotonically in type subscript the binding incentive 
constraint is for t\ types.
B -  6 > c
4 ~ 2 ~
A t2  player should not send gifts in equilibrium:
B - L l £ s - D J £ s < c
2 -  4 -
Which is not binding under assum ption (A l).
Interim Incentives of i? players W hen the incentive constraint of t\  ty p es  are 
satisfied then R's  incentive constraint is autom atically satisfied since conditional on 
investing when she receives m  she gets a convex combination of the project payoffs from 
to and t\ types and project payoffs are decreasing in type subscript.
Thus we find th a t when c > b then:
B _ 1 ± 3 P 6 _ 1 ^ £ $ > C
4 “  2 ~
is a necessary condition for Equilibrium  II. The left hand side is the m arginal bene­
fit of the project, conditional on receiving a signal realisation suggesting players are
compatible. The right hand side is the marginal cost of the project, c.
Define B(c)  =  S +  c.
Proposition 35. Suppose play is according to the strategy profile, s*11M:
1. I f  c >  c3 then there is no B  and p such that s*1] M is an equilibrium profile.
2. I f  b < c < c3 then s*n  M is an equilibrium profile if  and only if B  E (B ( c ) , B ) and 
P> P-
3. There is no cost level c > b > 0 such that s*U hl is an equilibrium profile fo r  all B  
and p.
B.2.3 Equilibrium w ith Gifts-in-Kind  
Equilibrium I
Here we construct an equilibrium where only to types send gifts, whereas the  two o ther 
types t i ,< 2  do not send gifts.
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Interim Incentives of G players Assume c >  b. The incentive constraints of to is:
The constraint says that the marginal benefit from sending the gift should be greater 
than the marginal cost of sending the gift.
A t\ type should not send gifts in equilibrium. She might consider two possible 
deviations: (1 ) Send k =  r  and / ( nvest), (2 ) Send k = 0, i.e. distort the signal, and 
/(nvest). It turns out that we only need to deter the second deviation. This is so because 
the prior probability of the project being implemented is the same for both deviations, 
but with deviation (1 ), with positive probability the project will be implemented even 
when d = 2. Thus we have:
and to deter her from sending a gift but not investing:
If a t\ player is deterred then so is 1 2 .
Interim Incentives of R  players The incentive constraint of a R  player of type 0 
who receives d(r. 0 ) =  1 is:
B  — 5 > b





Definition 10. The problem is regular at c* if
is convex. Let c be the largest c such that the problem is regular.
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Note that if the problem is regular a t c* then it is regular for all c < c*. W ith our 
assumptions the problem is regular for all c < c\.
P ro p o s itio n  36. Suppose the problem is not regular at c =  0 3 . Also suppose play is 
according to the profile s*j K :
1. For c > c'4 there is no B  and p such that s*j K is a,n equilibrium profile.
2. For ct, < c < C4  then s*j K is an equilibrium profile if  and only if  B  E (max(J3, c), B) 
and p > p{B).
3. For c\ < c < C3 :
(a) For any c > c: s*j K is an equilibrium profile i f  and only if  B  £ (c, B) and
E q u ilib riu m  I I  (T y p e  R e v e la tio n )
In this equilibrium G players follow the rule: if you think you are compatible with R, 
then give her something you would like yourself.
In te r im  In c e n tiv e s  o f G p lay e rs  Given the behaviour of R  players t\ should want 
to send gifts:
i ± f . B - 1-± ^ - S > c  
2 4 - ~
and to induce her to invest conditional upon sending a gift:




is an equilibrium profile i f  and only if  B  G (R, B(c)) and
p e \ p ( B ) A ) .
4- For c < c\ s*j K is an equilibrium profile if  and only i f  B  < B (c ) and p £ [p(B), 1).
B  — 5 > b
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holds by assumption, we can now sum up the equilibrium conditions:
>  c (B.8 )
< c (B.9)
Proposition 37. Suppose the problem is not regular at c = C3 . Also suppose play is
according to the profile s*jj K :
1. For c > C3 then there is no B  and p such that s*n  is an equilibrium profile.
2. For c < C3 :
(a) For c > c: s*jj K is an equilibrium profile if  and only if  B  E (B ( c ) , B ) and 
p G \p{B). 1).
(b) For c < c and B  < B( c ) s*jj K is a.n equilibrium profile if  and. only i f  p G 
[p{B). 1). For B  > B(c ) s*n  K is an equilibrium profile for any p.
Equilibrium II (Signal R evelation)
Interim Incentives of G  players As we shall see in equilibrium R  players cannot 
invest after learning tha t d(g~l (k), 0) = 1. Otherwise t\ types will be tempted to distort 
their signal. The incentive constraint of a t\ player is:
p(B — 5) > c
to induce her to send a gift. To induce her to send the gift expected in equilibrium, and 
not k =  6  ( 6  is G ’s own type), we must have:
1 ~  P  ^ - B  < c4
and to induce her to invest, conditional upon sending the gift:
pb < c
Interim Incentives of R  players Now consider the incentives of a I? player who 
receives d(g~ 1 ( t ) ,0)  = 0. She will invest if:
B  — - 5  > b 
3 -  “
which holds by assumption. A R  player who receives d(g~1 (r),0)  =  1 should not invest 
in equilibrium:
APPENDIX B. APPEND IX FOR C H APTE R 3 153
B - ^ ( S  + d ) < b  
We can now sum up the necessary conditions for equilibrium:
P(B -  6 ) > c (B.10)
< c (B .ll)
Pb < c (B.12)
1
B - - ( 6  + S) < b (B.13)
Or alternatively if (B .ll)  does not hold:
< p(B -  S)
provided that (B.10) holds.
Define for fixed B  and c:
p(B,c)  = max (^{p\]- ^ - B  = c}.{p\p{B -  6 ) = c}^
Proposition 38. Suppose the problem is not regular at c =  C3 . Also suppose play is
according to the profile
1 . For c > C2  then there is no B  and p such that s*n i  K is an equilibrium profile.
2. For c < C2  and B (c ) <  +  5) +  b:
(a) For B (c ) < B  < ^(5 + 5) + b s*in  K is an equilibrium profile if  and only if
p e  [p (B ), 1 )
B .2 .4  H ybrid  E quilibrium
Profile 1  Consider first an equilibrium construction where G sends a gift-in-kind if 
she receives a signal which indicates tha t both players are of the same type, and where
she sends money if she believes tha t players are of different, but compatible types. We
show that such an equilibrium does not exist because G has a profitable deviation, in 
the event th a t she is supposed to send money.
t\ should send money. In equilibrium R's beliefs about the true distance between 
the players, conditional on receiving money, are:
Pr(d = 0 |m)  =   ^ 2 4 =   ^ Pr(d  =  l|m ) =  Pr{d. =  2|m) =   ^ ^
5
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Supposing these beliefs are sufficient to induce investment from R  we now check that t\ 
has no incentive to deviate. Her expected payoff is:
4 "  2
But then t\ has a profitable deviation which is to send a gift-in-kind which reveals her 
own type. This induces all R  players such th a t d < 1 to invest, yielding the following 
payoff:
p (b  - £ )  + -  <y +
which is profitable as long as B  < 5. Hence there is no hybrid equilibrium of this type.
Profile 2  We now check the two remaining possible hybrid equilibria. Consider first the 
case where t\ sends a gift-in-kind which reveals her type. This induces investment from 
types such tha t d < 1. Now return  to to who sends money. This leads to the following 
conditional beliefs of R.
Pr(d. = 0|ra) =  p, Pr(d  =  l |m ) =  — Pr(d, = 2|m) =  ^
Investment yields the following expected payoff:
B - ^ i S  + S)
But then to has a profitable deviation which is to reveal her type via a gift-in-kind, 
yielding the following payoff:
p B  -  -  6 )
Hence we cannot sustain this equilibrium.
Profile S*H Finally, consider the case where in the event t\  sends a gift-in-kind which 
reveals her signal.
First, let us establish conditional beliefs of R.  Let kd denote the gift in kind which 
is distance d. away from i?’s type.
Now, if R  receives ko she will know that it d = 1, since if d =  0 and she receives a gift- 
in-kind then it cannot come from d = 0 since then G should send money in equilibrium. 
It cannot come from d. — 2 either since G with this signal would not send gifts.
If R  receives k\  then with equal probability it must come from either d =  0 or d =  2. 
Thus she should invest if: _
Thus whether investment occurs depend on the parameters of the model.
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Finally conditional on /C2 with equal probability the state is either d =  1 or d — 2, 
so there will be no investment after this event.
To induce G to invest under this equilibrium profile we have:
p(B — S) > c (B.14)
if B  — |  < b and
1 ± P B  -  ( p d + ^ S )  
otherwise.
Take first the cuse where B  — |  >  b. Then G has a profitable deviation, which is to 
send a gift matching her own type. This yields a payoff:
2
which is a profitable deviation.
1
2
1  + p B - 1 -D i 6
Now suppose B  — 9 < b. In this case there is no profitable deviation if:
p(B - 6 ) > ]- j ^ B  (B.15)
so in this case there is an equilibrium.
Define for any B  and c:
p(B,c)  = max (^{p\p(B -  £) =  c},{p\p(B -  5) =
We summarise our findings.
P ro p o s it io n  39. Suppose the problem is not regular at C3 . Assume B  < |  +  6  for some 
B. Restrict attention to s £ 67/-
1. For c > c'3 there is no equilibrium s* G S h -
2. For c < C3 and B (c ) < B  <  |  +  b:
(a) s*H is an equilibrium profile if  and only if p G [p(B), 1).
(b) The set of hybrid equilibrium profiles S*H C S h is either empty or S*H =  {«//}.
B .3 R obustness
This section looks at a variation of the model where the amount of money that givers 
spend is a strategic variable.
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We first consider the case where only t o  interim types invest. Then we extended the 
result to the case where t \  types also invest.
To this end let Iq(0) denote a t.Q interim type of G which is of type 0 6  0 .
We shall look for an equilibrium in which each t o ( 0 )  sends a money gift of size m o ,  
and where m o  ^  m o > , 0 ^ 0 ' .
Let /  : © —> IR+, be a one-to-one mapping tha t maps types of G into sums of money 
given.
Consider the strategy profile:
G-players:
• *o(0 ) play (ra0 , 1 )
• t i , t 2  play ( ng , NI )
R-players:
• If ni is received and d ( f ~ l (m),0fi)  < 1 then play 7, otherwise play NI .
First observe th a t the behaviour of t o  players reveal their type to R .  Therefore 
whenever R  receives a m onetary payment th a t comes from a type like herself, or like one 
of her neighbours then it is sequentially rational to invest.
Next, note tha t if min# f (9)  is sufficiently large to deter t 2 and t \  types from investing 
then we equilibrium is established if: (1) All t o  interim types find it worthwhile to invest 
given their equilibrium transfer, and (2 ) t o ( 6 )  does not find it worthwhile to pose as
to{ e ' ) , o ? 0 '.
Given the behaviour of R  it can only be beneficial for t o ( 0 )  to try  and pose as a 
neighbour, whose equilibrium transfer is lower.
Thus we must have:
2 i-— ^ ( B - l )  + p B - m e > -  5 ) + ' D - P ( B - 6 )pB -  m y
which leads to the condition:
1 -^ — (£ -  6 ) = A (p) > m e -  m 0/ (B.16)
where O' is a neighbour of 6 .
Let m ‘ > 0 be the smallest amount of money that deters interim types t j , j  > i from 
sending gifts in the proposed equilibrium. Note tha t is (weakly) decreasing in i since 
expected project payoffs is increasing in i. Also let ra1 be the highest monetary transfer
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which is incentive compatible with types tj,  j  < i sending money. Note that m 1 is also 
(weakly) decreasing in i , and furtherm ore rn1 > m \  whenever ti earns a strictly positive 
payoff in equilibrium. If rhl =  m l then equilibrium cannot be sustained.
First note tha t when p =  1, A(p) =  0 and the equilibrium breaks down. However
when p < 1 it is possible to construct equilibria of this form.
We can now state:
Proposition 40. Consider a variation of the Gift game where the amount of money 
that G can give is a strategic variable. For p < 1 , and for any two neighbours: 6  and 6 ' 
let f  satisfy: (i) \ f { 8 ) — f { 8 ')\ <  A (p), (ii) max# f { 8 ) < m ° , (Hi) min^ f { 8 ) > m ° . Then 
there exists an equilibrium where to types gives monetary gifts according to f ,  t\ and t 2  
do not send gifts. R  invests iff  d ( / _ 1  (mg), Op) < 1 .
We now consider an equilibrium where also t\ types find it worthwhile to invest. It 
can easily be verified th a t condition (B.16) must also hold for t\.
We have:
Corollary 6 . Consider a variation of the Gift game where the amount of money that 
G can give is a strategic variable. For p < 1, and for any two neighbours: 0 and O' let
f  satisfy: (i) \ f {0)  -  f{0')\ < A (p), (ii) max# f (0)  < m 1, (in) mino f{0) > m 1. Then
there exists an equilibrium where to, t\ types gives monetary gifts according to f ,  t 2  do 
not send gifts. R  invests i ff  d { f ~ l {me). Or) < 1.
B .4 W elfare
B .4.1  In form ation  S tru ctu res
This section list the information structures generated under equilibria with gifts.
do d \ d2
Trn (  0 0 0  ^
TO P 0 0
T\ 0 k i£ .4 0
T2 0 0 h zR4
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B lackw ell O rdering
In this section we show how the Blackwell ordering is constructed.
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We are looking for a square m atrix, Q , such that: all elements are weakly positive, 
and the sum of elements of each column sums to one. An information structure p. 
blackwell dominates u iff Qp, = v.
We now compare the various information structures.
Y l ( I T M )  does not blackwell dom inate 11(77, K)  since:
1 + p 1 - p  1 +  p
9 2 ! —  +  9 2 5 —  =  —
1 +  P , 1 ~  P
<721— ^  1-  '^25 — 2—  =  0
leads to a contradiction.
However the following Q m atrix shows th a t 11(77, K )  blackwell dominates n(77. M):
<7n 1 1 0 1
921 0  0  0  0
<731 0 0 0 0
94 i 0 0 0 0
<751 0 0 1 0







1 -P 1 -p 1 0(1+P) 2 (l+ p ) 3
<731 0
1 -P 2 02 (l+ p ) 3
941 0 0 0 0
<751 0 0 0 1
However:
912 P +  913 1 “  P _L2 + ? 1 5




■ 1 -  P q\2 p +  913 4  - +  914
1 -  P ,
4  + < 1 15
1 -  p 
2
0
leads to a contradiction. Hence 11(77, 77) is not blackwell dominated
1 1(7 7 , K)  blackwell dominates H(7. M)  by the following Q-matrix:
9 i i
2 p 1~P 1 01+P 2(1+p) 3
921 0 0 0 0
931 0 0 0 0
941 0 0 0 0
1 - p l+ 3 p 2 11+p 2 (l+ p )
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Since.
1 + p
921P +  <725 (1 — p) =
1 — p 3 +  p
<721— :-------1-<725—:— =  0
2
11(77,77) is not blackwell dom inated by 11(1, Af).
11(77, K)  blackwell dominates 11(77) by the following Q - m a t r ix :
9”  utp I  0
<721 o o o
<731
Since,
(?41 ® 2(l+p) 3 ®
<751 0 0 0 1
1 - p  1 — p
<73iP +  <733—^----^ 3^5—2 — =
1 - p  1 - p  1 - P  l  +  3p
931 — -^--- 1- <733 —  ^ 1" 934 — -^---1- 935 -^----  =  0
implies <731 =  <733 =  <734 = <735 = 0 , then:
1 - p  1 - p 1 - P
931 — -----1- 932P +  934 —  ^ 1- 935 —2— =
we must have: <732 =  > 1 which is a contradiction. 11(77, K)  is not blackwell
dominated by 11(77).
11(77.77) blackwell dominates 11(77, A7) by the following Q-matrix:
9 ii 1 1 1 0
921 0  0  0  0
<731 0 0 0 0
941 0 0 0 0
951 0 0 0 1
Since,
1 +  P , 1 — P _
9 2 1 — 2 ----- *" q25 2  —
3 ( 1 - p )  l +  3p _
921----- -^------ 1“ 925— ^—  -  0
11(77.77) is not blackwell dom inated by 11(77, A7).
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Since,
1 -  p 1 -  p
9i2p +  9i3—^ *" ^1 5 —2 — =  ^
1 - p  1 ~ P 1 — p 1 - p
<712P +  <713— ------- b < 7 l 4 ^  i- 915— Y~ =  ~ [ ~
we have: (/i3 -  <714 =  ^ , so tha t as p —> 1 the difference becomes unbounded, a
contradiction. Hence n ( / ,M )  is not blackwell dominated by 11(111, K ).
Since,
92 1P +  9 2 5 (1  -  P) =  P 
1 - p 3 +  p
<721— ^-----b <725 ^ =  0
U{II I .  K)  is not blackwell dom inated by IT(/, M).
Since.
1 - p  1 - p
<72iP +  <723— ^ b <725 2 =  P
1 — p 1 — p 1 — p 1 +  3p
9 2 1 ^  b ^23 ^----- b <724 ^------b g i 5 ----- ^------  =  0
U { I I L K )  is not blackwell dom inated by 11(77).
Since,
1 “  P ■ 1 “  P n922P +  923— ^-----b <725— ~—  — 0
1 - p  1 -  p , l + 3 p
<723— ^------ b <724— ^-----b <725 ^  — 6
<722 =  923 =  924 =  925 =  0 . B u t ,
1 — p 1 — p 1 — p
922P +  923— ^ b 924— ^ b 925— ^—  — P
a contradiction. 11(77) is not blackwell dom inated by H( I I I ,  K) .
By.
9 n  1 1 1 0
921 0  0  b) 0
931 0  0  0  0
(741 0  0  0  0
951 0 0 0 1
n ( / .  K)  blackwell dominates by 11(7, M ).
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Yl (I .K)  is not blackwell dom inated by H( I , M) .
From,
72iP72s(l — p) = 0
1 — p 3 +  p 
7 2 i — —  +  9 2 5 — ^ —  =  P
II{II) is not blackwell dom inated by II( I . M) .
By,
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1
U(H)  blackwell dominates 11(1, M) .
Since,
1 + P , 1 - 9
721— ^---- 1- 725 2  =  0
1 + p  , 1 - p
721—^----- 1" 725 2  =  p
n (H)  is not blackwell dom inated by II ( II ,  M) .
II(H)  blackwell dominates 11(11, M ), by:
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
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It follows from the Blackwell ordering th a t among equilibria with gifts G prefers either 
s*j h- or s*jj K depending upon which of these is an equilibrium profile.
For the second part we note for equilibria with no gifts the probability with which 
type invests:
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d o d\ d, 2
T (  i ±£ i ±P 3 (W')
U { I I . N G )  = 2 2 4
First we calculate welfare:
l  'h ' =
W f/ .K  =
n ? N G  = h '
W ?l,N G  — b
2 1  — p 2 .  1 - p ,
5 2
f ( ■  ^+ ^ 6) + i( V (jB - ^  + ^ 6)
-  6 ) + l- - ^ b )  + (B -  d + 1 ± ^ 6 )2 2 5 2 2 5 4 4
For fixed c < ci and b < c we now calculate the treshold value for given B  p(B)  such 
that when p > p ( B ) then some no gifts equilibrium is preferred.
(p>\ -i 2(c +  46)
P i ,n g \ B )  =  1 -------=------—
0  — JD
Note that when B  attains i t ’s lower bound B  =  B_ then p/.tvg < b  and tha t threshold
values are decreasing in B . We can also bound p/./vg from below since it follows that for
B  =  5  welfare is higher in s*j K when s*j NG does not exist. The condition for existence 
of s*j NG is: B  > +  £) +  b, setting B  = B  yields the lower bound: | ^ | ,  such that
< p{B) < 1- It then follows th a t when s’} K exists then for any p >  p(B_) then some 
equilibrium with no gifts is preferred by G.
We now turn  to the case where s*n  K is an equilibrium profile. We shall show th a t for 
B  =  B  there is a pB  <  1 such th a t s//,/vg is preferred for p >  pB. We shall then use a 
continuity argument to extend the result until we reach the border with s*j K .
The threshold value for s j i ^ g to be preferred to s*II K is: p{B)  =  1 -  which
is decreasing in B.
Now note tha t B  = B(c)  the threshold value for p is strictly less than one. Note 
that this also holds at the lower bound of B  = 13. Hence since the threshold value is 
continuous in B  when B  is decreased below B  = B(c)  towards B  we must eventually 
cross into the set of param eters for which s) K is now an equilibrium and we are done.
B .4 .4  P r o o f  o f  P ro p o s itio n  17
It is useful to look at the information structures:
In general equilibria differ along two dimensions: (i) the probability with which state 
dependent projects are implemented, (ii) the (intrinsic) utility of gifts. Gifts in kind are
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in general superior along the first dimension, whereas gifts with cash are more desirable 
along the second dimension.
Let the event tha t G sends a gift be denoted E\  and let E 2  be the event tha t R  invests 
conditional 011 E\,  and E 3 the event th a t she free-rides. It is clear tha t £ 2  0 ^ 3  =  
and let v denote the intrinsic value of the gift to the receiver.
Information structure II is preferred to II' if:
2
[^(EjinjPi^in) -Pi(£i|n')Pj(E2|n'))] B(di) >
• t = 0
2
£ > (4 )  [P.(£i|n')(fW,n') + p,(£3|n')b) -  Pi(£i|n)(^(<i,.n) + p.(B3|n);-)]
(=0
The left hand side of the equation is the differential informational value between II 
and IT. The right hand side is the differential intrinsic value between the information 
structures.
We first restrict attention to equilibria which involves gifts. We have the following 
comparison:
s i i ,k  is preferred to sh  if:
(1 — p)(i? — £ + <5) > c(l +  3p)
From which we can see th a t as p —» 1 then L H S  —> 0 whereas R H S  —► 4c, so for 
sufficiently large p the inequality fails.
We can also see th a t for fixed p there is a c sufficiently small (but) positive so that 
the inequality is satisfied.
s’yy.K is preferred to s/^y if:
B ( l  + 3p) > c ( l - p )  + (l  + 3 p ) 6 - ( l - p ) 6
as p —> 1 we get B  > 6 which holds by assumption. As p —> J we get B  > ^  +  5. 
Hence if c > S we are done. Since c\ =  f  +  f  b and b < |  we get 5 > which is satisfied 
by assumption. Hence .sy/ /< is preferred to s/,m for any parametervalue.
syy,A' is preferred to if:
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It thus follows that as p —> 1 s//.a / must eventually be preferred. For fixed p < 1 
there is a sufficiently small c > 0  such th a t s//,#- is preffered. 
sh is preferred to s j j m  if;
B  <  M - c  
" 4 2
letting c and b go to 0 , sh is preferred to sjpM if;
which is satisfied by assumption. However we can say nothing general. 
sjj h is preferred to s j j p x  i£
3(1 - p ) ( B - ^ 6 ) > (5p — l)c
which is not satisfied for p sufficiently close to 1 . Again for fixed p there is a c 
sufficiently small so th a t s j / . x  is preferred to  s j h x - 
sh is preferred to s j u x  if-
R £ + SB -  —  > - c
Since the upper bound for existence of K jjS  is +  b if we can show that:
<5 +  5 , , 5  +  5
then we have shown th a t s j p x  is always preffered. Using c =  c\ and b — |  we get the 
condition: 5 > 55 which does not hold in general. 
s i l k  is preferred to sj^ j if:
(6 p -  2 )B  -  (5p -  1)5 +  (1  -  p)S > (2 -  6 p)c
As p —> 1 we get B  > 5 -  c which is satisfied by assumption. As p = \  we get 5 > 5 
which is also satisfied. When p —> J which in general is not a valid boundary we get 
B > S  — c which is not satisfied in general. 
s u l k  is preferred to sipM if-'
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B > | i  +  i * - c
we need to show that:
^5 -  c > i ( £  +  5) +  6
this boils down to the condition |  >  c +  b, so th a t as c, b —> 0  we get the desired result. 
si^K is preferred to s j m  if:
B  < 5 - 2 c
In the relevant range B  < S +  c. So th a t for c — c\ and h =  = we get S > which is 
satisfied by assumption. Hence s p x  is preferred to S[,m-
Finally consider the comparison with equilibria with no gifts. Note first tha t in the 
region where a//.a- exists this equilibrium is always preferred by R  to an equilibrium with 
no gifts, since sorting is better, and R  recieves gifts she likes with positive probability. 
Hence the only case we need to consider is the region where a/.at is an equilibrium profile. 
First note that a/,atg can never be preferred since the same intensity of investment occur 
in both equilibria, but sj  k  has better sorting, and R  receives gifts th a t she likes with 
positive probability.
Thus we need only compare s j ^  to a j /^ g -  We get:
e > _  1 + j g j  _  W  ~ d g  _
2 p 2 p 2 p 2 p
Letting p —> 1 we get c > 2( B — 5). W hen B  — B_ this gives the condition c > 2b which
is not ruled out. Letting B  =  5 +  c we get a contradiction. Thus there must be some
B'  < B(c) and p' such th a t if B  >  B 1 and p > p' then sh^nq  is preferred.
B.5 Evolution
Proof of proposition 20:
Proof. S te p  1  For any B  and p < p* < 1 suppose b = c < c*(p*). Also suppose that 
in the current profile R  players send message w and play according to s j 7 K and tha t in 
response to any message G players play according to a | 7 k . N o w  let G players strategy 
drift one by one such tha t in response to some unsent message w'  to and t\ types play
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according to s*n  K , while t 2  types do not play according to s*y K , but play such that 
inference from to and t\ types are unaffected (e.g. let them  send money and invest).
Now let R  players one-by-one update their strategy. In particular let them send 
message w' and in the underlying play according to s*n  K , th a t is in particular they do 
not invest after receiving money. This transition occurs with positive probability since 
when faced with to and t\ types R  players earn identical payoffs, but when she faces t 2  
types she earns a strictly positive payoff, whereas when play in the underlying game was 
according to s*n  K she earned 0. Let this profile be denoted z ' . Clearly z' £ Z* .
When G players are given the opportunity to revise their strategy t 2  types will again 
play according to s |y K in response to any message. Thus we can return  to z £ Z* with 
positive probability.
S tep  2  Take any p* <  1. We show th a t for any B  and p < p* < 1 there is a 
0  < b — c < c**(p*) where c**(p*) < c*(p*) such th a t starting  from a profile where 
syy K is played in the underlying game R  will never want to deviate to a strategy where 
to and ti types do not play according to s yy K . We already know that syy K is K s 
preferred equilibrium outcome of the underlying game. Now consider the following non­
equilibrium strategies which G players could drift to in response to some unsent message 
w'\
si to types play according to sy/ K and h =  h°, t\  and t 2 types send money and 
invests.
6’2 to types play according to syy K and h =  h°, 11 types send money and invests, and 
t2 types do not send money but invests.
S3 to types send money and invests, ti types play according to s*n  K and h £ {h+ , h~ }, 
t 2 types send no money but invests.
If c < c**(p*) =  is—p* d then R  players do not find it profitable to deviate when G players 
have drifted to si in response to w '. If c < C2 *{p*) =  1 9 - ^ (1^ — then R  players do 
not find it profitable to deviate when G players have drifted to S2 in response to w' . 
Finally when G players have drifted to S3 R  players do not find it profitable to deviate 
if: c < c*3*{p*) =  f  -  S). Note th a t c?(p*) < c$*{p*) so th a t c$*{p*) is never
binding. Let c**{p*) =  min ( c ^ ( / ) ,  c^(p*)). □
A ppendix C
A ppendix for C hapter 4
C .l P roof o f P rop osition  24
P ro p o s itio n  24. Suppose r = 1. A state is stochastically stable if  and only if  it is 
segregated.
I prove the proposition via a series of lemmas. Let Zk, 1 < k < % = K  be the set of 
states with k clusters of each type, and \Zk\ is the number of elements in Zk- I first find 
the minimum resistance of a segregated state.
L em m a 10. For any 1 < k < K  — 1 there is a state z G Zk such that the m inim um  cost 
of transiting from z to some z' G Zk+i is 7  +  0. For any k > 2 there is a state z G Zk 
such that the minimum cost o f transiting from  z  to some z ' G Z k - 1 is 0.
Proof. The proof is in two main steps. In the first step we show th a t the minimum 
cost of transiting from some 2  G Zk to a suitable state  z' G Zk+1 , 1 < k < K  — 1 has 
minimum cost 7  +  3. In the second step we show th a t the minimum cost of transiting 
from some 2  G Zk to a suitable sta te  z' G Zk- i ,  k > 2 has cost 0.
S tep  1 Start from some z G Zk with the property tha t for both types of residents there 
is a cluster which is not minimal and has a t least 4 residents. Since 1 < k < K  — 1 there 
must be at least one cluster which is not minimal, for all z  G Zk- Furthermore since n 
is even either there is a cluster which contains a t least 4 residents or there are at least 
two clusters which are not minimal. So suppose th a t 2  has a cluster of size at least 4, 
and let them be denoted kA and k s  respectively.
Now let one of the residents in kA make a mistake such tha t she moves to k s  and 
inserts herself such tha t she has at least two B  neighbours on either side. This mistake 
has cost 7 . Now let another resident in kA make a location mistake such tha t she insert
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herself next to the first A  who moved. This mistake has cost 3. We have now arrived 
at some z' G Z*.+ 1 a t cost 7  +  3.
It remains to be shown th a t this cost is minimal. First observe tha t given a state 
with 1 < k < K  clusters all players have utility one. Thus a new cluster can only 
form if a player makes a mistake. Moreover the only type of mistake which leads a new 
cluster to form with positive probability is th a t a player moves from say cluster k,A to a 
location where she has only players of opposite type. If she moves somewhere else then 
cluster k ,4 contains one less of type A  but she is added to another pre-existing cluster 
of type A  players. Therefore the player must make a location mistake which has cost 
7  (since she gets utility  zero). In the ensuing state  all players but one (the player who 
made the mistake) has utility  one. If a player from cluster moves next to the player 
who previously moved both  players will have utility one. But the player had utility one 
before, therefore a 3 m istake is required for a new cluster to form.
S te p  2 S tart from some 2 G Zk where 2 < k < K , with the property tha t 2  has a 
minimal cluster for a t least one of the types. There is such a state  2 G since k >  1.
Let one of the residents in the minimal cluster, call it k, move to another cluster of 
residents of her own type (recall k > 1 so there is another cluster). This has cost (3. Now 
let the remaining player in k  be drawn for location revision and suppose she draws a new 
location which gives her at least one neighbour like herself. This occurs with positive 
probability since there are k -  1 other clusters in 2 . Thus she will move at cost 0, and 
we have transited to  a s ta te  z' G Z k - i- To see tha t this cost is minimal notice th a t since 
we started  out from a sta te  in which all players have utility one, the lower bound on the 
cost of transition is exactly 3. D
Recall that the aim is to  construct minimal cost trees for all recurrent states. Also 
recall tha t the lower bound on the minimal cost of transition is 3. T hat is if I can prove 
that a transition has cost 3  then it is minimal. In the next lemma I show that for any 
2 G Z k  I can construct a path which includes all z' G Z k  \  {2 } and tha t this path  has 
resistance 3(\Zk\ — 1) th a t is the path  has minimum resistance.
L e m m a  11. For- any 1 < k < K  there is a m inim um  resistance path £, which ends in 
2 G Zk and such that fo r  all z' G Zk'  z' G and z" £  Zk'- z' £ with cost fl(\Zk\ — 1)-
Proof. We only show the proof for the segregated states. The proof is analogous for all 
other classes.
Suppose th a t in 2  G Z \ the A  cluster begins at position I. Thus it ends at position
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l + n —1. We now show that the minimum cost of transiting to a state z'  E Z\  such tha t 
the A  cluster begins at position I -f 1 is 0.
Let the player at position I be drawn for revision and suppose she has the opportunity 
to move to position I + n. Let her move counter clockwise around the circle to this 
location. Since her utility is the same at both locations the cost of this move is 13. The 
A cluster now starts at position I T 1.
Now we construct the path  £. £ =  (z1, . . . ,  z^Zk )^ where 2 1 E (  : z' £ Z^, i =
1 \Zfc\ and z — z ^ fcL Two elements z7 and z7+1, i =  1 , . . . .  \Z^\ — 1 has the property
that in z l the A cluster begins at position I and in z7+1 it begins at postion I + 1. The 
cost of this path is the sum of the individual transitions. By the argument above the 
cost of £ is 3(\Zk\ -  1 ). □
I can now prove proposition 24:
Proof of Proposition 24■ It follows from lemmas 10 and 11 th a t the stochastic potential 
of a state z E Z\ is:
, ? ( i z , i - i ) + ] r / ? ( i ^ i - i ) + £ >
k > 2  k > 2
where the two first parts follow from lemma 1 1  and the th ird  part follows from lemma 
10.
For any state z' E Z*./, k' 7  ^ 1 the stochastic potential is:
£ ( ' 3 | Z * l + 7 )  +  .0 ( | Z * ' | - l ) +
k < k '  k > k '
In then follows that z E Z\ has minimum stochastic potential if:
> 0
k < k '
for all k' > 2. The claim then follows immediately since 7  >  0. □
C.2 P roof of P roposition  26
P ro p o s itio n  26 (Modified Schelling). Suppose r =  1. A state is stochastically stable if  
and only if it is segregated.
Again the proof proceeds via a number of intermediate steps.
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L em m a 12. For any k* G there is a state z G Zk* such that the m inim um  cost
of transiting from z to some z' G Zk* is:
n
7(fc; + 1  -  K ) k*Ks+1
For any k * G {k*}f=2 from any state z G Zk* the m inim um  cost of transiting from z to 
some z' G Z\ is 3.
Proof. Step 1 Take some z G Z k*. To transit to z' G Zk*+l k * + 1  ~ k* new clusters must 
form. Thus at least A;*+ 1  — k * 7  m utations are needed. All players who belong to any 
of the original clusters is strict worse off a t any of the seeds of a new cluster, since they 
are smaller in size than all of the original clusters. The size of each cluster is j f r - . Thusfc.s + l
each of the seeds must be complemented by frr 1 further 7  mutations.Ks + 1
Step 2 Take any z G Zk*,  where 5 >  1. Since all clusters have the same size players 
are indifferent between which cluster they belong to. Now let one of the players leave 
their current cluster and join another cluster. This has cost 3- This cluster now at­
tracts demand from all other cluster and so no further m utations are needed to reach a 
segregated state. □
The second step is a corollary to lemma 11 and is stated  without proof.
C o ro lla ry  7. For any k* G {&*} starting from z G Zk* the m inim um  resistance path £ 
such that for all z' G Zk* \  {z} : z' G £ is 3{\Zk*\ — !)•
I can now conclude the proof.
Proof of proposition 26. The idea of the proof is first to argue th a t the stochastic po­
tential of a segregated state provides a lower bound. Then I argue th a t any state which 
is not segregated does not a tta in  this lower bound.
Step 1  By lemma 12 for any k*, s > 1, the cheapest way to go from a state in Zk* to 
a a state in Zk* is via a single 3 m utation. Thus the sum of cost is (S  — 1)3- Moreover
by lemma 7 for any k* the minimum resistance path has cost @{\Zk*\ — 1)- Thus the
stochastic potential of a segregated state is:
s
s=2
Step 2 The proof is then completed by observing tha t leaving the set of segregated
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states has minimum cost a t least:
7 ( * 2 - * i ) £
k 2
This completes the proof since 7  >  (3. □
C.3 P roof o f P rop osition  28
P ro p o s itio n  28. A state is stochastically stable i f  and only if  it is segregated.
In order to prove the proposition let \Zk\ be the number of states with k clusters, 
1 < k < K , and recall tha t any two states z. z' £ z 7  ^ z' and where k < K  z and z' 
are in the same recurrent class.
L em m a 13. For 1 < k < K  the m inim um  cost of transiting from  z £ to z' £ Z ^ -i  
is 3.
Proof. Take some state z £ Z^, 1 < k < K . z either contains a minimal cluster or via the 
unperturbed dynamics with positive probability the process can transit to a state with 
k clusters and at least one minimal cluster. Hence assume th a t z contains a minimal 
cluster. Let one of the residents in the minimal cluster be drawn for revision and let 
the location she can move to be on the edge of another cluster containing residents of 
her own type. Since the resident lives in a minimal cluster she currently has utility 1 , 
and if she moves to her new location she will also get utility 1 . Thus a mistake at cost 
3  is required. Now let the remaining resident in the minimal cluster in z be drawn for 
revision. Since she lived in a minimal cluster she now only has neighbours different from 
herself. Therefore by the unperturbed dynamics the process can transit to a state z' 
which contains only k — 1 clusters. □
L em m a 14. For 1 < k < K  the m inim um  cost of transiting from z £ to z' £ \
is d.
Proof. Take some state z £ Z^, 1  < k < K . Since k < K  there is at least two players 
of type t who only has neighbours like themselves. Let one of these player be i and 
assume that she currently lives on location I. i has utility x. Moreover either z contains 
a cluster of type t ' , t' ^  t players of at least length 4 or via the unperturbed dynamics 
the process can transit to a state with a cluster of at least length 4 of type t' players. 
Hence assume that z contains such a cluster and tha t it begins at location V > I. Now 
let i be drawn for revision and suppose th a t she has the opportunity to move clockwise
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around the circle to /' +  2 . By construction V -f 2  gives i a neighbourhood which only 
contains neighbours different from herself. Thus a mistake at cost 5 is required for her 
to move. Since 2  had k < K  clusters there is another player j  of type t who only had 
neighbours like herself z. After i has moved this player still only has neighbours like 
herself. Thus via the unperturbed dynamics, with positive probability this player will 
be drawn for revision, and suppose she has the opportunity to move next to i. At this 
location she will have a diverse neighbourhood, thus at no further cost she will move 
next to i. The cluster containing i and j  is minimal thus both players enjoy their highest 
utility. Moreover going counter clockwise next to this cluster there is now a minimal 
cluster of type t' players, and going clockwise there is a cluster a t least of length 2. Thus 
we have transited to a state z' E Z^+i-
It remains to be shown that this cost is minimal. T hat is it we need to show that 
any sequence of 3  and 7  mistakes is not sufficient to transit to some z'  E Zk+\.
First we rule out that a sequence of 3  mistakes. Assume th a t s >  1 3  mistakes are 
sufficient for the process to transfer to some z'  E Zk+\- Any single (3 cannot lead a 
player to insert herself in a neighbourhood where she gets utility 0 unless she had utility
0 before. Players who made a ,3 mistake and had utility 1 and x  respectively must have 
moved to a pre-existing cluster. If a player has utility 0 it must be because all other 
players in the cluster she belonged to in 2  have moved. All of the players must have 
moved to a cluster that existed in 2 . But then no new clusters can form.
Suppose s > 1 0  mistakes is the minimal cost to transfer to a state  z'  E Zk+\- Thus 
after s — 1 mistakes a single 3 mistake is required. Let the sta te  which is arrived at after
5 - 1  mistakes be denoted z s~l . Players who made a (3 mistake must have had either 
utility 1 or utility x. That is the player who moves by mistake must move from a cluster 
which existed in zs_v next to a player who formed part of a cluster in z. T hat is up until 
5 -  1 no new clusters have been formed. Since precisely s 3  mistakes are required, by 
the hypothesis there is a p  mistake which will lead to the formation of a new cluster. In 
z s~l all players have either utility 1, x  or 0. Clearly a /? mistake by players with utility
1 or x  does not lead a new cluster to form since they will move to a position where there 
is at least one player like themselves. A player with utility 0 who makes a 3  mistake will 
lead to the dissolution of previously existing cluster, and will with positive probability 
lead to the formation of a new cluster. However the to tal number of clusters cannot 
increase.
Now we rule out tha t a sequence of 7  mistakes lead to some z' E Z^+1 - After s — 1 
7  mistakes, exactly one 7  mistake is required by the hypothesis. As in the argument
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above, 7  mistakes cannot lead to the formation of new clusters only the dissolution of 
old clusters with positive probability. To see this note th a t a 7  mistake leads players 
to vacate in integrated location for a location where they only have neighbours like 
themselves. Since this move must lead players to abandon a pre-existing cluster for 
another pre-existing cluster, no new clusters are formed with pos. prob. after s — 1 
mistakes. But after s — 1 mistakes a player who makes a 7  mistake moves to a cluster 
which existed in the previous state.
Finally we have to rule out tha t any sequence of 7  and (3 mistakes will lead to some 
z' G Zk+i- By the argument above after any /3 or 7  mistake no new cluster is formed 
without the dissolution of an old cluster. □
I can now complete the proof of proposition 28:
Proof of proposition 28. By lemma 13 the stochastic potential of 2  G Z\ is:
3 \Z k \ + ( 3 ( K - 2 )
The stochastic potential of 2  G Zjt, 1 < k < K  is:
3\Zk \ +  (3(K - { k  + 1)) +  5{k -  1) 
and the stochastic potential of 2  G Z k  is at least:
I 3 [ \ Z k \ - 1 )  +  6 ( K  - 1 )
since players in 2  enjoy the highest possible utility.
Since 5 > @ only the states in Z\ has minimum stochastic potential. □
